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ABSTRACT	  	  	  	  	  At	  its	  core,	  this	  dissertation	  is	  a	  study	  of	  how	  one	  group	  of	  ordinary	  people	  attempted	  to	  make	  change	  in	  their	  local	  and	  national	  community	  by	  reframing	  a	  public	  debate.	  Since	  1993,	  over	  five	  thousand	  undocumented	  migrants	  have	  died,	  mostly	  of	  dehydration,	  while	  attempting	  to	  cross	  the	  US/Mexico	  border.	  Volunteers	  for	  No	  More	  Deaths	  (NMD),	  a	  humanitarian	  group	  in	  Tucson,	  hike	  the	  remote	  desert	  trails	  of	  the	  southern	  Arizona	  desert	  and	  provide	  food,	  water,	  and	  first	  aid	  to	  undocumented	  migrants	  in	  medical	  distress.	  They	  believe	  that	  their	  actions	  reduce	  suffering	  and	  deaths	  in	  the	  desert.	  On	  December	  4,	  2008,	  Walt	  Staton,	  a	  NMD	  volunteer	  placed	  multiple	  one-­‐gallon	  jugs	  of	  water	  on	  a	  known	  migrant	  trail,	  and	  a	  Fish	  and	  Wildlife	  officer	  on	  the	  Buenos	  Aires	  National	  Wildlife	  Refuge	  near	  Arivaca,	  Arizona	  cited	  him	  for	  littering.	  Staton	  refused	  to	  pay	  the	  fine,	  believing	  that	  he	  was	  providing	  life-­‐saving	  humanitarian	  aid,	  and	  was	  taken	  to	  court	  as	  a	  result.	  His	  trial	  from	  June	  1-­‐3,	  2009	  is	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  The	  dissertation	  begins	  by	  tracing	  the	  history	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  marker	  "illegal"	  and	  its	  role	  in	  the	  deaths	  of	  thousands	  of	  "illegal"	  immigrants.	  Then,	  it	  outlines	  the	  history	  of	  NMD,	  from	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  Sanctuary	  Movement	  to	  its	  current	  operation	  as	  a	  counterpublic	  discursively	  subverting	  the	  state.	  Next,	  it	  examines	  Staton's	  trial	  as	  a	  postmodern	  rhetorical	  situation,	  where	  subjects	  negotiate	  their	  rhetorical	  agency	  with	  the	  state.	  Finally,	  it	  measures	  the	  rhetorical	  effect	  of	  NMD's	  actions	  by	  tracing	  humanitarian	  and	  human	  rights	  ideographs	  in	  online	  discussion	  boards	  before	  and	  after	  Staton's	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sentencing.	  The	  study	  finds	  that	  despite	  situational	  restrictions,	  as	  the	  postmodern	  critique	  suggests,	  subjects	  are	  still	  able	  to	  identify	  and	  engage	  with	  rhetorical	  opportunities,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  can	  still	  subvert	  the	  state.	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DEDICATION	  	  	  	  	  
For Roberto--and the thousands of other human beings abandoned and discarded 
for profit.	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PREFACE	  	  
During the spring of 2009, I volunteered with No More Deaths (NMD), a 
humanitarian group that provides food, water, and medical attention to migrants 
crossing the southern Arizona desert during the hottest months of the year. NMD 
mission is to end the suffering, and ultimately the deaths, of migrants crossing the 
US/Mexico border. I had been attending their weekly meetings during the year 
and finally had the opportunity to volunteer with them for a week in the desert. 
Toward the end of that week, while hiking about 50 miles south of Tucson and 
about eight miles north of the border, I and three other volunteers found a man 
sitting alone on a desert trail. His face was worn. His jeans were dirty. He looked 
exhausted. We offered some of our water, and he accepted, immediately. He had 
been hiking for 10 hours and had brought only enough water to cover such a 
journey. That was how long he was told it would to take to hike from the border 
to Tucson. He was misled. Most of the time, they are. 
 His name was Roberto. When he was 24, he crossed the border near 
Tijuana into California. He had been living in Los Angeles for the past 26 years 
with his wife, three children, and four grandchildren, when two months earlier, he 
was arrested for public intoxication. Once the police discovered that he was an 
“undocumented immigrant,” an “illegal alien,” he was deported to Nogales, 
Mexico--a place where he had never been; a place where he knew no one; a place 
500 miles away from his family. Motivated to return to the place where he had 
lived for more than half of his life, Roberto looked for the fastest way to return to 
the United States. He found a coyote, a guide, who, for a few thousand dollars 
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(US), would take him and several others through some of the most remote and 
dangerous terrain of the southern Arizona landscape. It was the coyote who told 
Roberto that it would only take 10 hours to hike from the border to Tucson. He 
did not mention that Roberto would need to scale two mountain ranges, cross 
several canyons, and endure multiple days in the heat in order to complete the 60 
mile trek to Tucson. 
 We found Roberto in the mid-afternoon. The day was hot, in the upper-
80s, cloudless and breezeless. He was not only dehydrated, but soon revealed that 
he was diabetic. One of the volunteers I was with was an EMT and had wilderness 
first-responder training. He checked Roberto’s blood sugar level, and it was very 
low. The four of us shared with him the fruit, trail mix, and energy bars we had in 
our packs. As he took each item, Roberto told us that the night before, during the 
10-hour hike, he struggled to keep up with the rest of his group, a struggle he 
attributed to his diabetes. In the morning he woke up to discover that he was 
alone, left behind by the group. He had been walking and resting with no food and 
little water, ever since, alone. 
 I’m not sure what ever happened to Roberto. He planned to walk the 
remaining 50 miles to Tucson and phone a friend, who would then pick him up 
and drive him the rest of the way to LA. But that was not likely to happen. The 
desert and his condition would probably not permit it. After sharing with him the 
remainder of our water and food, we had to leave. It was getting dark. There was 
nothing else we could legally do to help. Perhaps another group of migrants that 
night passed by and picked him up. Perhaps the Border Patrol found him, arrested 
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him, and sent him back to Nogales, where he knew no one, and where he told us, 
if that were to happen, he would merely cross again. He had to get back to his 
family. Or perhaps he wandered alone and exhausted his supplies, never to be 
seen again. In 2009 alone, over 200 remains of bodies were found in the desert. 
That number does not include the hundreds of bodies that were never found. 
 This dissertation is about Roberto and the thousands like him suffering 
and dying in the desert; the polices and enforcement procedures in place that 
produce and perpetuate these circumstances; the publics and counterpublics which 
seek to uphold or change these circumstances; and the rhetorics circulating among 
them, competing for space in the public sphere. At its core, this story is about a 
group of ordinary people seeking extraordinary change. Because of the group’s 
radical acts of compassion under extraneous conditions in the desert, NMD has 
earned a reputation as a moral authority among local publics in the Tucson area, 
one that gives the  group a distinct perspective and position within immigration 
debates and an ethos for constructing a subjectivity of the migrant in the desert as 
a victim of unethical US immigration policy. It is through this construction of the 
subjectivity of the migrant that I focus my scholarly gaze, for it is here that NMD 
attempts to discursively make social change. 
 My text for this dissertation is the trial of Walt Staton, a NMD volunteer 
who was cited for littering after placing bottles of water on a desert trail slightly 
north of the US/Mexico border but within the boundaries of the Buenos Aires 
National Wildlife Refuge (BANWR). My data includes three main types of 
materials: first, official texts, the court transcripts and court documents from USA 
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v. Staton; second, NMD texts, the press releases issued by NMD and complied on 
their website; third, public texts, the newspaper articles and editorials from both 
local (Arizona Daily-Star and Tucson Citizen) and national (New York Times and 
LA Times) media outlets, in addition to the public responses to the trial via online 
public discussion boards and blogs. The parameter of my archival research is 
from December 4, 2008, the date of the littering fine, to September 1, 2009, three 
weeks after Staton’s sentencing to encompass the public response. 
 Obviously this one trial cannot possibly be treated as indicative of any 
larger-scale phenomenon; instead, I use it as an individual case study for the 
purpose of understanding how NMD discursively can affect the public sphere and 
state power. (After the trial and sentencing, for instance, there was an explosion of 
media coverage, covering and commenting on Staton’s actions and US 
immigration policy; moreover, BANWR changed how it negotiates humanitarian 
aid on their refuge). This one trial was chosen because it attracted the highly-
charged and competing arguments surrounding migrant subjectivity, state power, 
and humanitarian aid. This event allows me to observe the rhetorical situation of 
the littering fine from a variety of perspectives: state-sponsored publics (the 
prosecution, the Border Patrol, BANWR officials), counterpublics (NMD, the 
defense), and local publics (respondents to online news articles and blogs). 
 With these materials, I compose a narrative of the events on December 4, 
2008 (the issuing of the littering fine), June 1-3, 2009 (USA v. Staton trial), and 
August 11, 2009 (Staton’s sentencing). I analyze these events through a 
postmodern lens, namely Barbara Biesecker’s productive postmodern framework 
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of the rhetorical situation imbued in differánce, where rhetorical agents negotiate 
rhetorical agency. I examine in particular how the subjects in the rhetorical 
situations perceive and construct the subjectivity of the migrant vis-á-vis the 
contested definition of water/litter (as life-saving or environmentally destructive); 
how that perception and construction shapes their own and other subjects’ 
subjectivity and the temporary relations between them; and how NMD seeks to 
disarticulate previous unproductive discourses, such as racist and xenophobic 
discourses, for the purpose of rearticulating new and productive ones, such as 
humanitarian and human rights discourses.  
 This dissertation offers a concrete instance of Biesecker’s postmodern 
rhetorical situation. Butler via Derrida demonstrates for us the problem with the 
attempt to nail down a definition, freeze language, or censor speech. Too often in 
the current postmodern agential debates, scholars argue so abstractly that I 
question if the debate of definitions is even productive. This concrete example 
will serve as a touchstone for theorists concerned with rhetorical  agency. For 
public sphere and community-literacy theorists, this dissertation provides yet 
another example of how ordinary people “go public” but do so in a creative way. 
Lastly, this study may contribute to an ever-growing need for NMD. The stories 
of NMD volunteers intervening in migrants’ lives and challenging state power 
enter academic discourse with this study. Year after year, NMD volunteers 
discuss ways to make their actions more visible to local and national publics in 
hopes of changing US immigration policy and attracting more volunteers. The 
turnover rate of NMD volunteers, however, is extremely high; with the exception 
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of about fifteen people, NMD is a revolving door of temporary volunteers. This 
dissertation will make the work of NMD more visible and credible to a new 
audience and may inspire students and academics alike to volunteer with NMD, 
as I have, in the future.  
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CHAPTER	  1	  THE	  RHETORIC	  OF	  “ILLEGAL”	  AND	  ITS	  VIOLENT	  CONSEQUENCES	  FOR	  “ILLEGAL”	  IMMIGRANTS	  
Not a week goes by in Tucson without a news story about “illegal” immigration. 
Take, for instance, a given week in April 2010 when local stories included 
“Human Smugglers Busted in Tucson” (Kelley), “KGUN9 Viewers Debate 
Border Policy and Gun Control” (Carr), “Arizona May Crack Down Hard on 
Illegal Immigrants” (Fonseca), “Immigration Agents Raid Tucson Shuttle 
Businesses” (Jun), “Guilty Verdict for Tucson Drop House Hostage Taker” 
(Herschler). But on April 23, 2010, a local news story became a national news 
story when Jan Brewer, governor of Arizona, signed the highly controversial 
Senate Bill 1070 into law (Archibold). 
 The new law permits police officers with “reasonable suspicion” the 
power to detain anyone they “perceive” to be an “illegal” immigrant. If the 
detained subject does not produce immigration papers, he or she will be charged 
with a misdemeanor. Critics claim that SB 1070 legalizes racial profiling, as 
anyone who “looks illegal” is subject to police questioning (Kreutz and 
Villarreal). Supporters argue that the law is a much needed safety measure against 
the violence that “illegal” immigrants bring to the US. At the bill signing, Brewer 
said, “We cannot sacrifice our safety to the murderous greed of drug cartels. We 
cannot stand idly by as drop houses, kidnappings and violence compromise our 
quality of life. We cannot delay while the destruction happening south of our 
international border creeps its way north” (Evans). 
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 This theme, that “illegal” immigrants bring violence, is a common one, 
repeated and reified in local and national news stories; it breeds racism, unfairly 
casts an entire group of people as deplorable, and justifies discriminatory laws 
such as SB 1070. What allows the state1 to make such an unjust association is the 
rhetorical marker “illegal.” The marker has the connotation of “criminal activity,” 
which implicates the subject as a “criminal,” even though, ironically, the subject 
has committed no crime2 (Unruh). As a perceived criminal, the subject is treated 
like one. Agamben argues that subjects in this state are stripped of political life 
and reduced to “bare life” (Agamben, Homo Sacer), which can then be 
disregarded or killed without consequence. The marking of undocumented 
immigrants as “illegal” has directly influenced the construction of US 
immigration policies, which has resulted in the extraordinary violence upon 
“illegal” immigrants. 
  In 1993, the Clinton administration implemented a border enforcement 
policy which sought to deter “illegal” immigrants from crossing the US/Mexico 
border by “funneling” them into the most remote and dangerous areas of the 
Arizona desert. The policy failed to decrease the number of border crossers while 
increasing the number of “illegal” immigrant deaths (Corneilus 284). It is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The state is a structural effect of perceived sovereign power and the arrangement 
of space and bodies. The state is not “the government” but rather the effect of the 
perception of “the government.” 
 
2 The mere act of crossing the border without documentation or authorization 
from the state is illegal but not a crime. If one is deported and crosses again, 
without documentation, then he or she has committed a felony. With Arizona’s 
new state law (SB 1070), however, it is a misdemeanor—a crime—to be in the 
state without documentation. 
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estimated that over five thousand “illegal” immigrants have died attempting to 
cross the US/Mexico border since 1993 (Rodriguez, Arizona). That is one death a 
day, every day, for almost two decades (Jimenez 18). In the Tucson sector alone, 
the number of deaths has doubled from 1995 to 2005 (“Border-Crossing Deaths” 
52). Despite the violent consequences from having marked immigrants as 
“illegal,” the Bush administration continued this immigration policy and its 
“funnel effect” (Jimenez 23), and thus far so has the Obama administration. 
 The reason for this continuation has to do with a much larger set of 
conditions that the state perceives as necessary to maintain because it directly 
relates to the US economy. Desperate economic conditions in Mexico, often 
created by US trade policies, have historically pushed laborers from the south to 
migrate north. And since these extreme conditions of poverty usually produce 
desperate people with urgent material needs, the option for following legal 
channels of immigration, which take between eight to 10 years (Litwin), is not 
normally taken. This set of poor economic conditions and its production of 
desperate people, who in turn cross the border and are then marked by the state as 
“illegal,” has been maintained for nearly 75 years. The production of “illegal” 
immigrants benefits the state; it guarantees a cheap labor force that is easily 
controlled. Having the ability to deport labor, at any time for any reason, allows 
the state to regulate labor, and ultimately have control over a large portion of its 
economy. However, part of this maintenance includes restricting the production of 
“illegal” immigrants, so as not to saturate the labor market. Border enforcement 
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policies, even ones with violent consequences for border crossers, are 
implemented and continued, thus revealing the state’s priority of capital over life. 
 In this first chapter, I examine the historical construction of the “illegal” 
marker, how it came into being in the 1930s and how it has evolved into a tool 
used by the state to manage its economy and how it is responsible for the deaths 
of thousands of undocumented immigrants. This chapter is not meant to be an 
exhaustive history of the US/Mexico border nor of “illegal” immigration in the 
US. It is also not meant to be a thorough analysis of the US economic system and 
its relations to undocumented labor. Instead, this chapter is meant to be a 
rhetorical analysis of the “illegal” marker: how it came into circulation, how it has 
been used, and how it is implicated in the deaths of thousands of “illegal” 
immigrants. 
When Immigration Became “Illegal” 
 It was not “illegal” to enter the United States without documentation until 
the Immigration Act of 1917. This act was mainly designed to eliminate the flow 
of Asian immigration but it also included other “undesirables” as deemed by the 
US, such as “idiots” and “epileptics” (Stat. 39.875). US employers along the 
US/Mexico border lobbied for temporary Mexican laborers to be exempt from 
this act and concessions were made by Congress (Lorey 71). In 1921 and 1924, 
even stricter immigration laws were made, emphasizing quotas, but again 
Mexican laborers were excluded. It was not until 1929 that it became “illegal” to 
enter the United States from Mexico (Lorey 162). The US economy crashed 
during the Great Depression, and many white, native-born US citizens struggled 
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to find work. The once desired low-cost, temporary Mexican laborers were 
blamed for “taking jobs,” so the state officially “encouraged” all Mexicans to 
return to Mexico, thereby relinquishing their jobs to whites. Nearly half a million 
Mexicans—60 percent of whom were Mexican-American, i.e. US citizens, the 
children of Mexican laborers born in the US—either “voluntarily” returned or 
were forcibly deported to Mexico by the end of the 1930s (Flores). If they were to 
recross the border, they were deemed “illegal” by the state, no longer having the 
support of lobbyists or Congress. 
Establishing the Pathway for Exploitable Labor 
 A few years later, when the US became involved in World War II, the 
need for temporary laborers surged. When white, native-born US citizens left the 
country to fight in the war, it caused an immediate labor shortage on farms across 
the southwest. Growers lobbied federal officials to import temporary workers 
from Mexico (Lorey 89), and the government responded in 1942 with the creation 
of the Bracero Program, a systematic legal pathway for Mexican immigrants to 
enter the country temporarily in order to meet the temporary demands of US 
labor. 
 The Bracero Program, which literally means “one who works with his 
arms,” temporarily imported 4.8 million Mexican laborers from 1942 to 1964 
(Akers-Chacon and Davis 140). Each Mexican laborer signed an individual 
contract (to prevent collective bargaining and unionizing) that guaranteed work, 
minimum wage, transportation, and housing, while each laborer’s food and health 
care expenses where deducted from his paycheck. As a “guest worker,” Mexican 
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laborers were to uphold their contracts, work continuously until the end of the 
harvest season, and then return home. If this contract was breached in any way 
(the laborer stopped working), the bracero was deported. 
 This system of temporary, legal, immigrant labor economically benefited 
both countries. During the 1950s, the Bracero Program was the third largest 
“industry” in Mexico as braceros remitted about 30 million dollars each year 
(Akers-Chacon and Davis 145). Since braceros were not permitted to bring wives 
and children, US growers did not need to provide schooling, year-round housing 
or healthcare, which was usually provided to white, native-born American  
workers in order to produce and maintain a stable year-round workforce (Akers-
Chacon and Davis 141). In addition, US social services were not strained because 
once the harvest season ended there were structures in place to ensure braceros 
would return home. Besides the motivation to reunite with wives and families, 
braceros had 10 percent of their wages held until the end of their contracts, which 
could then be retrieved in Mexico (Akers-Chacon and Davis 143). If these two 
“motivations” were not enough, the state directed the Border Patrol, which was 
under the auspices of the Department of Labor, to ensure braceros returned home. 
 While the demand for braceros seemed insatiable, the supply also never 
seemed to cease. Part of the reason why Mexico seemingly had an unlimited 
supply of laborers for export had to do with a certain set of circumstances that 
were co-constructed by the US and Mexico. When the US engaged in WWII, its 
goods that were normally exported to Mexico were instead directed toward the 
war effort. This redirection by the US created a space for Mexican goods to be 
	   	  13	  
sold in the US market, so the Mexican government invested in what came to be 
known as the “Green Revolution,” a large-scale agricultural operation, aimed 
solely at export, mainly to the US in hopes of high capital return. The Green 
Revolution resulted in the “Mexican Miracle,” an expansion of Mexico’s 
economy by 6 percent per year for almost 20 years (Akers-Chacon and Davis 109, 
Lorey 86), but the “revolution” and “miracle” came with consequences for the 
Mexican working class. Small farmers were unable to compete with the large-
scale state-sponsored farms. Many were bankrupted and flooded urban centers for 
work. While some found employment early on, many found the cities already 
saturated. The only place that had viable work options for these former farmers 
was the United States via the Bracero Program. 
Sustaining the Production of the Desperate 
 This set of circumstances—the war, the US’s desire for cheap goods, 
Mexico’s shift from domestic needs to foreign trade—produced desperate people, 
willing to work any job, anywhere, for any amount of money, and it was the 
desperate, the manufactured poor, who became braceros. Both countries quickly 
recognized that in order for the Bracero Program to be sustained, a program that 
both countries greatly benefitted from financially, the production of the desperate 
would also have to be sustained. As time went on and the set of circumstances 
changed, the US and Mexico did everything they could—designing and 
implementing trade and immigration policies—to still sustain the conditions for 
the production of the desperate. Maintaining desperate conditions was the only 
way to be certain desperate people were produced and willing to travel hundreds 
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of miles, leave their families for months at a time, and perform backbreaking 
labor.  
 For example, in 1951, the US Congress enacted “Public Law 78,” which 
essentially gave the US government full control over the Bracero Program (Lorey 
90). Leading up to the passage of this law, Mexico was accepting foreign loans in 
order to maintain its “miracle” economy. The country’s foreign debt increased to 
500 percent, to over a half billion dollars, and the majority of it was owed to the 
US (Akers-Chacon and Davis 110). At the mercy of the US and bracero 
remittances, Mexico relinquished control over the Bracero Program. Without any 
Mexican oversight, US growers were not pressured to uphold contract payments 
to their braceros, and the state in collusion with the growers did not feel obliged to 
enforce them: “[I]n 1959, 182,000 braceros were brought into California and 
Arizona alone, but only 22 field agents were made available to address [contract] 
grievances” (Akers-Chacon and Davis 141-2). This lack of enforcement 
compelled many growers to not uphold bracero contracts, which resulted in a 
steady decline in agricultural wages on a large scale. When white, native-born 
Americans returned from the Korean War, many did not return to the fields 
because the wages were so low. Instead, they turned to urban and industrial 
centers for higher paying jobs. This absence of full-time labor from white, native-
born Americans only created more space for labor from Mexico. 
  In other words, while the circumstances changed, both countries 
maintained the conditions for the production of the desperate. The Mexican 
government continued to focus its attention and investments toward the US in 
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order to pay down loans debts, and the US with Public Law 78 effectively opened 
up more room for braceros. More working class Mexicans became the desperate 
poor and applied to be braceros in droves. By the end of the 1950s bracero labor 
soared, making up the majority of the agricultural workforce in the US; however, 
“[f]or every bracero selected, another five to seven were not” (Akers-Chacon and 
Davis 145). Those who did not meet the requirements still needed to work, still 
had families to feed, still could not find employment in the saturated city-centers. 
They were still desperate, so they still migrated—only, without the approval of 
the Bracero Program. They migrated “illegally.” 
The Production of the “Illegal” Immigrant 
 The border transformed these desperate people rejected by the Bracero 
Program into “illegal” subjects. Ironically this land where the border is situated 
was Mexican land for quarter of a century. California, Nevada, and Utah and parts 
of Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, and Wyoming were considered part of 
Mexico until 1848 with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, marking 
the end of the Mexican-American War (Lorey 29). A few years later, in 1853, the 
southern portion of Arizona (where Tucson is located) and part of New Mexico  
was acquired by the United States with the Gadsden Purchase. The border is still a 
contested space, where subjectivities are transformed. But during the 1950s, it 
was US employers who took these transformed subjects and used their new 
“illegal” status as a tool for economic gain. 
 Even though “illegal” laborers were not official braceros, US growers 
hired them anyway; in fact, “illegals” were preferred by growers. Growers could 
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pay them less. Without an official contract, growers could set wages as low as the 
laborers were willing to work and were not legally obliged to keep them 
employed for any duration of time. “Illegal” laborers were also extremely 
vulnerable. A grower could have them deported at anytime. Braceros were 
contracted through the end of the growing season, but “illegals” could be fired, 
i.e. deported, at any time. The mere threat of deportation had enough persuasive 
force to make “illegal” laborers work longer or accept lower wages. US growers 
took advantage of this immigration status and used it for their capital gain, 
whereby constructing a new class of laborers, one that was cheaper and easier to 
control. 
 US growers were not the only ones to exploit the vulnerability of “illegal” 
laborers. Both the US and Mexico approved of this system because it meant 
higher profits for their countries. Mexico was relieved of providing any social 
services to “illegal” laborers (they would have, had the Mexican citizens “chose” 
to stay in Mexico) and thus, received more remittences by having more Mexicans 
working in the US, which helped pay down the country’s foreign debt. The US 
did not have to pay to transport or house “illegal” laborers, as they did for the 
braceros. “Illegal” laborers crossed and paid for their own transportation to farms 
across the southwest, using the same routes and networks established by the 
Bracero Program. The “illegal” arrangement seemed to benefit everyone. 
 However, unlike braceros, “illegal” laborers had no “motivation” to return 
to Mexico. They brought their wives and families; ten percent of their earnings 
were not held until the end of the growing season; they were not legally 
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contracted to return. So they stayed, which redefined them from ones who 
temporarily stayed without official documentation, “illegal migrants,” to ones 
who permanently stay without official documentation, “illegal immigrants.” After 
growing seasons, many “illegal” immigrants found work with the railroads, in 
factories, restaurants, hotels, and hospitals (Akers-Chacon and Davis 146). No 
industries seemed to mind if a laborer from Mexico did not have papers, if an 
immigrant was “illegal.” They were hired for the same reason: they were cheap 
labor and could be easily controlled and easily fired and  deported. While the 
Bracero Program officially ended in 1964, it provided a pathway for poor 
desperate Mexican laborers to become “illegal immigrants” and work year-round 
in the US at the insistence of US employers. 
Post-Bracero 
 After the Bracero Program, the US and the elites of Mexico still sought to 
replicate the conditions which produced the desperate poor, just like they had 
throughout the program, because doing so still produced cheap, exploitable labor, 
economically benefitting both countries. Only this time, without a fast and legal 
option in place, all of the desperate who were produced were transformed into 
“illegal” immigrants. 
 For example, in 1965, the Mexican government established the Border 
Industrialization Program (BIP) in hopes of absorbing the displaced workers from 
the Bracero Program and stimulating the depressed economy in the manufacturing 
sector along the border (Lorey 104). The BIP permitted the construction of 
maquiladoras, assembly plants run by US companies but employed by Mexicans. 
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US companies were incentivized by the Mexican government to use 
maquiladoras. They could import the raw materials, supplies, even machinery to 
Mexico duty-free, assemble new finished products, and export them back to sell 
in the US market for a minimum fee, merely the added value of the assembly 
(Lorey 106). US companies could pay Mexican laborers roughly 75 percent less 
than what a US worker performing the same job was paid in the US (Akers-
Chacon and Davis 116), yet was still 25 percent higher than many other 
manufacturing jobs throughout the rest of Mexico (Lorey 109). US companies 
using maquiladoras could also prohibit Mexican laborers from unionizing. Many 
US companies took advantages of these incentives, and the number of 
maquiladoras grew rapidly, from twelve in 1965 to 2,200 in 1996, and the 
number of employees jumped from 3,000 to 700,000 during the same period 
(Lorey 107). 
 These incentives, however, were responsible for and led to the conditions 
which produced the desperate poor. Without the pressure from unions, US 
employers allowed wages to remain low or drop. From 1977 to 1982, wages 
dropped 20 percent, and from 1980 to 1990 wages fell another 66 percent (Akers-
Chacon and Davis 117). The wage of a maquiladora employee in the 90s ranged 
between three to four dollars a day (Lorey 109, Akers-Chacon and Davis 117). 
There were no wage increases, no possibility for promotions, and no guarantee of 
job security. Many Mexican families could no longer live on these wages, and 
many heads of households, usually men, were compelled to find higher paying 
jobs. Women then became the majority workers at maquiladoras (Lorey 109), and 
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men usually migrated north (Akers-Chacon and Davis 119). Just as in the decades 
before, poor, desperate Mexicans were compelled to cross the border, and because 
the pathway to employment in the US was already worn and established by the 
Bracero Program, “illegal” immigrants usually found employment quite quickly, 
at jobs which paid much  higher than the maquiladoras.  
 In the early 90s the circumstances changed again, although the conditions 
for the production of the desperate remained the same. In 1994, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was reached by the US, Mexico, and 
Canada. In doing so, the US fruits and vegetables market opened its doors to 
Mexico, while Mexico permitted US grain imports into its grain market. Mexico 
again, as during WWII, became export-focused, tying its economy to the US. In 
ten years, the new arrangement of trade bankrupted 1.3 million small farmers in 
Mexico (Akers-Chacon and Davis 121). The price of US grain was simply too 
cheap for small Mexican farmers to compete in this market. Unemployed and 
desperate, like the bankrupted farmers of the 1950s as a result of the “Green 
Revolution,” former farmers turned their attention north, migrating “illegally” en 
masse. 
“Deportability” 
 What began as a labor shortage during WWII has become a profitable 
industry for the US and Mexico. By maintaining the conditions that produce the 
desperate, even as circumstances between the two countries have changed over 
time, poor Mexican laborers continue to migrate north, using the pathways and 
networks established by the Bracero Program, and once they cross the 
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international border, they are transformed into the “illegal.” The “illegal” marker 
under the category of immigration is used merely to separate immigrants with 
authorization from the state from those without authorization. Undocumented or 
“illegal” immigrants are not criminals (Unruh) but they are deportable, a unique 
characteristic embedded within the “illegal” immigration status, one that the state 
and US employers covet and have appropriated into the category of labor. 
 “Deportability” under the category of labor means having the ability to 
terminate laborers and deport them at anytime for any reason. This ability 
effectively allows employers full control over their workforce (De Genova). 
Employers can put all laborers at all times under surveillance, with the 
justification that they are searching for “illegal” immigrants among them. With 
the mere threat of deportation, employers can effectively pay “illegal” immigrants 
less and offer no benefits. The drop in wage effectively lowers the wage for all 
laborers, as employers have no obligation or incentive for paying other laborers a 
higher wage for the same work. If laborers choose to organize or strike, 
employers simply hire more “illegal” immigrants as scabs. 
 The state also highly desires the “deportability” feature of the “illegal” 
marker. It allows for a “flexible” workforce, one that can be attracted and 
retracted easily. During times of economic booms and busts, the state can use 
“illegal” labor to help stabilize the market, loosening and tightening border 
enforcement, dismissing or conducting deportation raids on businesses, according 
to the needs of the labor industry and US economy. The state has gone to great 
lengths to maintain its high labor profits since the Great Depression. That is why 
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it has sought to maintain and manage the conditions for the production of the 
desperate in Mexico: to ensure a steady supply of subjects to be transformed into 
“illegal” immigrants.  
 Maintaining the conditions for the production of the desperate is a two-
fold process. First, the state must attract labor; it must create a situation so 
restrictive and so desperate that the only seemingly reasonable option is to 
migrate north to the US. The BIP permitted the construction of maquiladoras with 
many economic incentives. Many US corporations took advantage of the 
maquiladoras, especially the restriction of unions. With the extreme drop in 
wages, more and more desperate laborers were produced and compelled to 
migrate north in hopes of higher wages to remit. With the passing of NAFTA, 
small grain farmers were put out of work, and like their fellow farmers during the 
“Green Revolution,” could not find jobs in Mexico that could support their 
families. Consequently, the bankrupted and desperate farmers migrated north in 
hopes of a better life. 
 Second, the state must limit labor. It cannot accommodate a seemingly 
endless supply of labor without risking saturation, so it appropriates the “illegal” 
marker from the category of immigration to the category of labor. The state uses 
the “illegal” marker in the category of labor for its flexible feature, to deport when 
the need has been fulfilled and to enforce the border when the market determines. 
Enforcement falls on the Border Patrol, which originally operated under the 
Department of Labor, but now does so under the Department of Homeland 
Security. The restriction of “illegal” immigrants by the Border Patrol during times 
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of economic depression serves the state economically; fewer laborers mean fewer 
labor costs which translates into higher profits. 
 Limiting labor through enforcement and deportation as well as producing 
the conditions for the production of the desperate would not be possible without 
the “illegal” marker. And without the rhetorical power of the “illegal” marker, the 
US would be unable to maintain its economic power as it currently desires. The 
state’s use and maintenance of the “illegal” marker under the category of labor 
come at great expense for undocumented immigrants, especially in recent years, 
when the state’s priority of capital has resulted in the violent deaths of thousands 
of “illegal” immigrants. 
The Violent Consequences of the “Illegal” Marker 
 In 1993 anti-immigration sentiments were high, especially in California 
where Proposition 187 passed with an overwhelming majority. The measure 
would have excluded undocumented immigrants from attending public schools 
and using public services but was deemed unconstitutional by a federal court 
(Cornelius 778). President Clinton, critically needing California for his re-election 
bid in 1996, decided to take advantage of the zeitgeist and take on “illegal” 
immigration. The result was an immigration policy that nearly tripled the budget 
for border enforcement by the end of Clinton’s tenure as president, from 750 
million in 1993 to 2 billion dollars in 2000 (Cornelius 778). (The spending 
continued to climb to 3.8 billions dollars in 2004 with the Bush administration.) 
 The majority of the resources was directed at four of the nine border 
sectors where it was believed that the majority of the “illegal” crossing took place. 
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Operation Hold-the-Line was launched in El Paso in 1993, Operation Gatekeeper 
in San Diego in 1994, Operation Rio Grande in south Texas in 1997, and 
Operation Safeguard in Tucson in 1998. The “concentrated border enforcement 
strategy” was deemed by the US Border Patrol to be an overwhelming success. In 
California and Texas, the Border Patrol followed a “line-watch duty.” Agents sat 
in their vehicles, 100 yards apart, one or two miles from the border, and waited 
for undocumented immigrants to cross (Cornelius 780). Thousands were 
apprehended. As a result, fewer and fewer  undocumented immigrants crossed in 
California and Texas, and by 2004, apprehensions fell by a combined 64 percent 
in those sectors (Cornelius 783); however, during that same time, the 
apprehensions in Tucson jumped to 43 percent of the total apprehensions across 
the border. In other words, while the “concentrated strategy” seemingly fortified 
San Diego, El Paso, and Rio Grande, it effectively “funneled” a greater number of 
undocumented immigrants into the Tucson sector, which also happens to be the 
most treacherous terrain on the border. This “funnel effect” was anticipated and 
intended as part of the overall border enforcement strategy. The Clinton 
administration calculated that the extreme natural hazards of the Arizona desert 
would discourage and deter potential crossers from attempting the perilous 
journey. Doris Meissner, Clinton’s Immigration and Naturalization Service 
Commissioner, said during an interview in 2000 that, “We did believe that 
geography would be an ally to us. It was our sense that the number of people 
crossing the border through Arizona would go down to a trickle once people 
realized what it was like” (Borden A1). 
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 But the number did not go down. The people were not deterred. They were 
desperate. And so they attempted to cross the Arizona desert through the searing 
heat in record numbers. And thousands died. From 1994-2009, it is estimated that 
between 3,861 to 5,607 “illegal” immigrants have died (Jimenez 8). Despite these 
deaths, the immigration policy continues today, indicating that the state prioritizes 
capital over life, submits immigration policy to economic policy, and uses the 
rhetoric of the “illegal” to do so. 
The Rhetoric of the “Illegal” 
 It would seem as though the deaths of thousands of people on US soil 
would cause alarm throughout the country. But it does not. The deaths of 
hundreds of undocumented immigrants usually go unnoticed each year because 
they typically are unreported, and even when they are reported and circulated in 
public discourse, there still is not a public outcry. This lack of response may have 
to do with what Agamben calls “a state of exception” (Agamben State). 
 A state of exception is “a state of necessity” (Agamben State 1), a time in 
which there is no juridical form, when legislative power is absorbed into 
executive power (Agamben State 18), when the sovereign suspends law in order 
to use the “force of law” without consequence (Agamben State 40). The US Civil 
War is a classic example of a state of exception. The state could no longer handle 
extreme internal conflict, and so it suspended law—habeas corpus—called an 
emergency state, extended military power into the civil sphere, and created war. 
The US/Mexico border is a modern example of a state of exception, a place where 
anything goes, where the border is being remade back into the frontier (Alonso). 
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Law is suspended, while the “force of law” or the performance of law is enacted 
(Agamben State 39); for instance, the Border Patrol as the de facto sovereign 
conducts extreme measures of surveillance and enforcement, often using military 
equipment, such as helicopters and drones, and detaining subjects for unspecified 
amounts of time without access to legal representation. 
 A subject in a state of exception is what Agamben calls “homo sacer” 
(Agamben Homo Sacer), “a legally unnamable and unclassified being” (Agamben 
State 3), which can be killed but not sacrificed, meaning that a subject in the state 
of exception is no longer within the system of law and order because there is no 
law and order; law is suspended, and without the protection of the law, a subject 
is reduced to “bare life,” a being that the sovereign can kill without punishment 
because there is no law. Or another way to put it: in the state of exception, 
subjects are no longer valued as humans. Humans when killed by the state, such 
as Pat Tillman and other American soldiers in 2004, are considered “sacrificed” 
because their life has worth. But “homo sacer,” such as Iraqi civilians and 
“terrorists” in Guantanamo Bay, are stripped of political life and reduced to “bare 
life,” where they can be killed or disregarded without consequence. On the 
border, undocumented immigrants have been stripped of political life and reduced 
to “bare life.” They are homo sacri, left to die in the desert by the sovereign. 
There would not be a state of exception on the border with undocumented 
immigrants as homo sacri if the “illegal” marker were not constructed and 
circulated by the state. 
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 It is imperative that the state continues to maintain this state of 
exception—continue to fund border initiatives, expand the size and autonomy of 
the Border Patrol, implement new technologies for surveillance, report 
simultaneously on the “successes” of apprehensions and the continuous threats of 
violence, drug cartels, kidnappings and smuggling—because it allows the state to 
have ultimate control over this group of subjects. The state craves this control 
because “illegal” immigrants make up a huge portion of the US labor force. 
Having the ability to manage this population, specifically, having the ability to 
deport this group, allows the state to manage its economy. The apprehension and 
deportation of “illegal” immigrants on the border or in the work place can be 
regulated, increased or decreased, at any time, depending on the needs of the 
economy. Consistently, the state has “cracked down” on “illegal” immigration 
during times of economic hardship. Immigrants are deported. Borders are 
enforced, ensuring that the white working class maintain their jobs while 
providing a scapegoat for the country to blame (Akers-Chacon and Davis, 
DeGenova, Lorey). 
 The state’s use of the rhetorical marker “illegal” to identify undocumented 
immigrants works discursively to strip border crossers of political life and 
maintain its state of exception on the border. Simultaneously, it also works 
discursively to justify the state’s actions on the border. In other words, if the 
Border Patrol perceives, as informed by the state, that undocumented immigrants 
are “criminals,” and if the state, through the repetition of the rhetorical marker 
“illegal” in public discourse, can persuade the public via local and national news 
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stories to also perceive that undocumented immigrants are “criminals,” then the 
actions of the state—abandoning border crossers to the geography of the Arizona 
desert—can also be more readily accepted and justified. In short, the rhetorical 
marker “illegal” kills and continues to kill undocumented immigrants everyday in 
plain sight without notice. 
Subverting the State 
 The state has been replicating the conditions for the production of “illegal” 
immigrants for the last 75 years. Immigration and labor policies are in place to 
ensure the maintenance of this production continues. But in the last fifteen years, 
the use of these policies, and its shorthand, the rhetorical marker “illegal,” is 
responsible for the deaths of thousands of manufactured undocumented 
immigrants. There seems to be little that can be done to subvert a state so 
entrenched and resolute in maintaining this system of profits and deaths; however, 
a small group of ordinary people in Tucson has identified a way to undermine the 
state, expose this nefarious system, by saving the lives of undocumented 
immigrants in the desert. Their rhetorical act of providing food, water, and 
medical attention—direct humanitarian aid—to undocumented immigrants 
suffering in the desert disrupts the discourse of the state; it shows through 
rhetorical action that the state’s use of the rhetorical marker “illegal” abandons 
border crossers to die in the desert. Chapter 2 examines the humanitarian and 
rhetorical actions of this group, aptly named “No More Deaths,” and the state’s 
discursive response to their actions. 
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CHAPTER	  2	  DISRUPTING	  THE	  DISCOURSE:	  RHETORICAL	  AGENCY,	  COUNTERPUBLICS,	  AND	  SUBVERTING	  THE	  STATE	  	  
On July 9, 2005, Shanti Sellz and Daniel Strauss, volunteers for the humanitarian 
group No More Deaths (NMD), found nine undocumented immigrants in the 
southern Arizona desert. For the preceding forty days, temperatures had exceeded 
100 degrees, and during that particular week in July, a record 78 lifeless bodies 
were found in the desert (Goodman). The immigrants that Sellz and Strauss 
encountered had been traveling in the deadly heat for four days, the last two of 
which were without food or water. Three of the nine immigrants were extremely 
ill. One of them found blood in his stool and had been vomiting for days, a sign of 
severe dehydration, which is perilous in the desert (Goodman), and the other two 
had acute blisters, preventing them from walking any further, another common 
cause of death in the desert3. 
 Sellz and Strauss decided to call a medical professional. The phone call 
was a part of an “emergency evacuation protocol” that NMD established with the 
US Border Patrol. The agreement was that if volunteers encountered and 
suspected immigrants who needed immediate emergency care, they were to call a 
medical professional. If the medical professional determined that the immigrants 
were extremely ill and in need of immediate emergency care, then the volunteers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Border crossers usually travel in groups, and those who are unable to keep up 
with their group members are usually left behind by their coyote (paid guide) and 
have difficulties surviving on their own. Many of the undocumented immigrants 
that NMD volunteers find in the desert have been left behind and are usually in 
extremely poor health. 
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were to transported the sick immigrants to a Tucson medical facility. After 
confirming with two doctors and a nurse that the three immigrants were in severe 
medical distress, Sellz and Strauss helped the undocumented immigrants into their 
vehicle and began driving north to Tucson. 
 Shortly thereafter, the two humanitarians were pulled over by the Border 
Patrol. The “illegal” immigrants were seized and detained, while Sellz and Strauss 
were arrested. The two were charged with two felonies apiece: one, aiding and 
abetting and furtherance of illegal presence in the United States and two, the 
conspiracy to do so. They each faced up to 15 years in prison and $500,000 in 
fines (“Humanitarian Aid”). After the incident, Strauss recalled, “We really don't 
know exactly what changed from the day before, when we passed Border Patrol 
completely in the open, waved to them, waved back, to the day that we were 
arrested. Something changed politically, a change in policy, and they wanted to 
shut down our organization and the work that we did” (Strauss qtd in Goodman). 
 Metaphorically, the “day before” lasted about a year, and during that time, 
NMD volunteers provided humanitarian aid to undocumented immigrants 
suffering and dying in the desert; they took their experiences with the immigrants 
suffering and circulated them as narratives, to friends and family, to schools and 
churches, on NMD’s website, and with the local media. The stories spread, and 
the listeners often asked, “why?” Why were so many undocumented immigrants 
crossing the US/Mexico border? Why were so many of them dying in the desert? 
Why wasn’t the state doing anything about it? The search for these answers often 
lead to an exposure of the state’s history of inhumane immigration, economic, and 
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border enforcement policies and its rhetoric of the “illegal” that sought to cover 
them up4. The day that Sellz and Strauss were arrested something did change 
politically. The state attempted to stop NMD volunteers from circulating their 
counterhegemonic narratives in order to re-cover its rhetoric and power. 
 This chapter explores the interactions, the exposures and re-coverings, of 
NMD and the state. Specifically, it details the formation and operation of NMD as 
a counterpublic engaging rhetorical agency and examines the counterarguments 
and strategies of the state to suppress the discursive disruptions of NMD. 
Rhetorical agency is the power to persuade, and in recent years, rhetoric scholars 
have been challenged to articulate theories of rhetorical agency that take into 
account the postmodern critique (Geisler “How Ought”). Agents in postmodern 
theories are not free from context as they are in modernist-humanist theory, but 
they still have agency, the ability to make change and have rhetorical effect, 
despite these contextual restrictions. They negotiate agency with the rhetorical 
situation. This chapter showcases the operations of NMD as a concrete example 
of postmodern rhetorical agency where agents attract and reflect the effects of 
state power. 
The Roots and Formation of NMD 
 In order to understand how NMD exposed and subverted the effects of 
state power, it is important to know from where and what context NMD grew. In 
the 1970s and 80s, El Salvador and Guatemala were both in the midst of bloody 
civil wars. It is estimated that 70,000 people were killed and 30,000 were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Chapter 1 for details. 
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disappeared in El Salvador from 1980 to 1992 (Gibb), and 100,000 were killed 
and 40,000 were disappeared in Guatemala from 1960 to 1996 (“Guatemala’s 
Future”). Countless Salvadorans and Guatemalans fled their home country at this 
time, fearing for their lives. Many crossed the international border into the United 
States without any immigration documentation; they sought political asylum yet 
were not granted political refugee status. 
 The United States secretly backed the governments of El Salvador and 
Guatemala (Gibb, “Guatemala’s Future”). It wanted to keep the governments in 
power, so that their trade policies that favored the US were maintained. If the US 
had recognized Central Americans as political refugees, it would have indicated 
that the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala were committing human 
rights abuses—crimes that the US was funding. Since the US Congress cannot 
publicly support states who violate international human rights laws, it decided not 
to grant Central Americans refugee status in the US. In other words, rather than 
end their funding and arming of the military-led governments of El Salvador and 
Guatemala, US lawmakers decided to keep supporting them in hopes of 
maintaining their favorable trade policies. As a result, the state rhetorically 
marked the fleeing Central Americans into the US as “illegal aliens” instead of 
“political refugees,” and if the “illegal aliens” were caught crossing the 
US/Mexico border by the US Border Patrol, they were immediately deported back 
to their home countries, where they almost certainly faced death for fleeing their 
home country (Fife). 
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 Jim Corbett, a Quaker, and John Fife, a Presbyterian minister, felt 
compelled in 1981 to do something. Corbett began secretly hiding the fleeing 
Central Americans in his southern Arizona home and in the homes of fellow 
Quakers around the Tucson area, while Fife secretly hid Central Americans in his 
Tucson church, Southside Presbyterian. The two continued hiding and helping the 
unofficial political refugees, providing food, water, shelter, clothes, money, 
employment, and legal counsel, for about six months, in total, helping about 60-
70 people, 10-12 a month, until the Border Patrol found out and ordered them to 
stop or be indicted (Fife).  
  Instead of stopping, Corbett and Fife went public. On March 24, 1982, the 
second anniversary of the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, shot while 
conducting mass by the US-backed military of El Salvador, Fife called a press 
conference at Southside Presbyterian and declared the church a “sanctuary.” The 
day before, Fife sent letters to the US Attorney General, US Border Patrol Chief, 
and Director of Immigration, announcing that the church would “publicly violate 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 274(A)” (Corbett qtd in Coutin 
289). Other churches and synagogues quickly followed, declaring themselves 
sanctuaries and offering “safe haven” and material aid to Central Americans. The 
religious leaders of these congregations talked to one another and soon organized 
networks to transport refugees from one house of worship to another. This system 
of transportation which guided refugees to safety has often been compared to the 
underground railroad of the 19th century (Gzesh). 
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  Corbett, Fife and 14 other religious leaders of the “sanctuary movement” 
were eventually indicted on smuggling charges in 1986. The trial generated 
national attention and publicized the movement. All the defendants were 
convicted but received no jail time (Gzesh). By the end of the 1980s, 213 
churches and synagogues and 17 cities across the US declared themselves 
sanctuaries (Fife.) 
 Early on, those who were involved in the sanctuary movement believed 
that their actions were consistent with the principle of civil disobedience, where 
one publicly violates an unjust law and receives the consequences for breaking it, 
in hopes of changing that unjust law, but later on they learned that they were 
following a different principle, one that legally justified their actions. According 
to Fife, once the sanctuary movement received national attention, he received an 
angry phone call from Ira Golabin, a human rights lawyer from New York. 
Golabin told Fife to stop using the term “civil disobedience” with the media 
because it was an inaccurate description of the sanctuary movement’s actions. The 
movement was not violating an unjust law; in fact, according to Golabin, the US 
had just refugee laws, which conformed to international human rights laws. 
Saying that the sanctuary movement followed the principle of civil disobedience 
implied that the US not only had unjust refugee laws but that they needed 
changing. That was problematic for Golabin and human rights lawyers who 
needed those laws to uphold human rights. Instead, Golabin pointed out to Fife, it 
was the US that was in violation of its own refugee laws, namely the 1980 Refuge 
Act, which claimed that the US would not deport refugees back to places of 
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persecution, and it was the sanctuary movement that was bringing that violation to 
the nation’s attention (Fife). In other words, the US should have granted political 
refugee status to the fleeing Central Americans because the embattled 
governments of Guatemala and El Salvador were committing countless human 
rights abuses on its people; instead, the US broke international human rights laws 
and sent countless Guatemalans and Salvadorians back to their home countries in 
the midst of civil wars. 
 While Fife and Corbett were acting in good conscience, they were not 
aware until Golabin’s phone call that they were following a new civil principle. 
Corbett decided to call it “civil initiative,” and located its legal precedent in the 
outcome of the Nuremberg trials. The Nazis officers who were on trial in 1946 
argued that during WWII they were merely “following orders.” Civil initiative 
maintained that citizens were no longer excused from following the orders and 
actions of the state; instead, citizens in a post-WWII world have the moral 
responsibility to follow international human rights laws when the state directly 
violates human rights. According to Corbett, this legal precedent justified the 
sanctuary movement’s actions and networks of safe haven throughout the country. 
In 1990, with the pressure of the sanctuary movement, the US Congress passed 
legislation which allowed President Bush to grant “temporary protection status” to 
fleeing Central Americans (Gzesh). 
 By 1993, however, the state drastically changed directions, implementing 
a militarized border enforcement strategy. As described in fuller detail in Chapter 
1, President Clinton, seeking to be “tough on immigration,” a position designed to 
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boost his chances for reelection in 1996, enacted Operation Hold-the-Line, 
Operation Gatekeeper, and Operation Rio Grande. These aggressive border 
enforcement strategies seemingly fortified the porous border sectors in California 
and Texas, but they also effectively “funneled” border crossers into the Tucson 
sector, which has the harshest terrain and temperature of the sectors on the 
US/Mexico border. The “funnel effect,” nonetheless, was intentional and part of 
the enforcement strategy, designed to deter border crossers from crossing. 
However, instead of deterring, it caused the deaths of thousands of undocumented 
immigrants coming from Central America and Mexico. 
 From 1990 to 1998, approximately 40-45 bodies were found each year in 
the Tucson sector (“Border-Crossing” 57), but after Operation Safeguard was 
implemented in 1998, which effectively pushed border crossers further into the 
most remote and extreme areas of the desert, in combination with the “funnel 
effect,” the number jumped to 55 in 1999, then to 120 in 2000, and then to 190 in 
2002 (“Border-Crossing” 57). The intentional use of geography for deterrence, 
directly resulting in a spike in deaths, placed the state again in direct violation of 
international humans rights laws. Seeing no change in immigration or border 
enforcement policy with the new Bush administration, Corbett and Fife were 
compelled once again to follow civil initiative. Shortly before his death in 2001, 
Corbett argued, “When a government uses the crucifixion of entire peoples in the 
desert as a border enforcement strategy, we have no middle ground between 
collaboration and resistance. We can take our stand with the oppressed or we can 
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take our stand with organized oppression, but cannot, we can never, do both” 
(Corbett qtd in Fife). 
 In 2003, a record 205 human remains were found in the Tucson desert 
(Rodriguez), and by early the next year it was clear that unless something changed 
2004 would be worse5. Fife met with the religious leaders in the Tucson area to 
discuss what could be done. There were already well-established and well-
organized humanitarian groups working on the border, such as Humane Borders 
who maintained over 100 water tanks in the desert and provided maps to these 
water tanks to potential border crossers in Mexico or the Samaritans who drove 
through the desert offering water, food, and medical treatment to anyone they saw 
in need, but none of them offered humanitarian aid full-time in the desert. 
Catholic bishop Gerald Kicanas and Fife decided to form a new humanitarian 
group that would be a “constant presence” in the desert. Volunteers would camp 
in the desert during the hottest months of the year, rotating in new people every 
week; they would hike the desert trails into the most remote areas, precisely 
where the border crossers were funneling and dying; and they would bring with 
them water, food, and medical packs, offering the life-saving aid to anyone in 
need. Kicanas and Fife decided to call the new group “No Mas Muertes” or “No 
More Deaths” as both a declaration and a goal. In the summer of 2004, the group 
launched, carrying on the tradition of the sanctuary movement and following the 
principle of civil initiative.  
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 The constant presence of NMD volunteers providing direct humanitarian 
aid, arguably saved lives, but it also worked as an argument which challenged the 
state’s immigration and border enforcement policy as evidenced by Sellz’s and 
Strauss’ arrests—the state’s response to the challenge. The humanitarian act 
begged the question: why is humanitarian aid needed? The answer exposed the 
state’s deadly enforcement strategy. In this regard, Sellz and Strauss did not 
simply provide humanitarian aid but rhetorically disrupted the discourse of the 
state. NMD volunteers would not have been able to subvert the state without 
having engaged and negotiated their rhetorical agency. 
Postmodern Rhetorical Agency 
 A great debate within the field of rhetorical studies in recent years turns on 
the concept of rhetorical agency, and the operations of NMD contributes to the 
debate. At the Alliance of Rhetoric Societies (ARS) conference in 2003, 
rhetoricians gathered to discuss “How ought we to understand the concept of 
rhetorical agency?” (Geisler, “How Ought” 9). In 2004, Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly published Cheryl Geisler’s synthesis of the position papers at the ARS 
conference. Geisler begins her report by noting how the majority of rhetoricians 
acknowledge in their position papers that the postmodern critique “severely 
assaults” former notions of the humanist autonomous agent. Susan Wells asserts 
that “very little is left of the concept” after this critique, and Carl Herndl claims 
that “theorists typically struggle with the dilemma of how to understand the 
postmodern subject’s ability to take purposeful political action without merely 
recuperating the humanist individual” (qtd in Geisler, “How Ought” 10). Geisler 
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then posits that agency is usually studied in political contexts where humanist 
agency is often justified. Nan Johnson argues, consequently, that rhetoricians 
need to move their studies to new locations to gain a different understanding of 
agency. John Campbell concurs, furthering that our problem is not in 
understanding agency but rather the varieties of agency. Geisler offers those 
varieties of agency by pointing out the theorists who discuss agency in new or 
different locations. Dan Brouwer, Jerry Blitefield, Renu Dube, and Kirt Wilson 
examine subaltern groups, John Louis Lucaites, Susan Wells, and Barbara 
Biesecker explore the media, and Geisler, herself, studies digital technology.  
Next, Geisler synthesizes papers which question the reality of agency, 
those that hold onto humanist models, and those that identify the constrains and 
conditions of agency within postmodernism. Joshua Gunn and Celeste Condit 
argue that agency is an illusion. Gunn suggests that instead of kidding ourselves 
that rhetoric has efficacy in postmodernism, we should accept our own irrelevance 
as a field. Condit claims that while agency may be an illusion, it may be a 
“necessary illusion” (qtd in Geisler, “How Ought” 12) for rhetorical functionality. 
Geisler argues that “[p]erhaps more productive was the insight that agency can be 
understood as a resource constructed in particular contexts and in particular ways” 
(Geisler, “How Ought” 12). James McDaniel, for instance, argues that “agency 
seems a fundamental fantasy to the democratic ethos,” which he acknowledges is 
a site for studying how agency operates in society. 
Then, Geisler recognizes the papers that discuss the skills of the agent, 
those that give more agency to the agent, and the papers that discuss the 
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conditions of the scene, those that give more agency to the situation. John 
Campbell claims that a skilled agent identifies the desires of the audience and 
shapes his/her message accordingly to maximize the possibility of persuasion, 
while James Jasinski argues that agents have agency when they demonstrate their 
skill of assessing and managing a situation. Lenore Langsdorf, gesturing toward 
“practice,” theorizes ways for the agent to retain skill while recognizing that 
agency is embedded in discourse. Janet Atwill, using Bourdieu’s habitus, looks to 
practice as well, as a way to show agency within the agent and the scene. At last, 
Geisler turns to the conditions in which the agent must act. Michael Leff asserts 
that constraints are “historically situated,” thus agency has limits (Geisler, “How 
Ought” 14). Both Nan Johnson and Kirt Wilson agree, claiming that agency is 
constricted by discursive conventions and generic forms. Julia Carpenter and Carl 
Herndl posit that agency resides in the arrangement and constellation of social 
contexts, whereas John Logie identifies agency as “the complex process by which 
a communicative act materializes out of a  combination of individual will and 
social circumstances” (qtd in Geisler, “How Ought” 14). Geisler nearly 
synthesizes all of the forty position papers. Her work alone indicates just how 
diverse and complex the positions and conceptualizations of rhetorical agency are 
in the field of rhetorical studies at this time. 
Philosophy and Rhetoric published, in the same year as Geisler’s report, a 
special issue on rhetorical agency. Gerard Hauser, in the introduction to the 
edition, compares the current debate over rhetorical agency with the historical 
strife between philosophers and sophists over “what constituted responsible 
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speech and who had responsibility for the consequences of moving the demos to 
public actions” (Hauser 181). The philosophers saw the sophists’ move to explore 
language as an abandonment of the quest for Truth and the abandonment of 
responsibility at large. In terms of agency, according to Hauser, the ancient 
philosophers argued that agency resides in the self-aware person, while sophists 
claimed it permeates in discourse. Hauser argues that the ancient debate continues 
today in the form of modern versus postmodern rhetorical agency: “The 
originating debates between the Sophists and philosophers of ancient Greece 
remain unsettled and continue as a central problem in philosophy of rhetoric 
because they lie at the center of the dialectic between doctrines of reason, 
structure, and identity that mark the modern/postmodern divide” (Hauser 183). 
Theorists in this special issue take an even wider range of perspectives on 
agency than those at the ARS conference, locating agency as communicative 
labor, the property of questioning, within texts, and within the performative. 
Ronald Walter Greene argues that rhetorical agency is usually associated with 
political action, as Geisler and Johnson mention, which leaves the field of rhetoric 
with three options: to critique the super-structures in hegemony, to enlarge 
rhetoric to the spheres of the visual and the corporeal, or to design new ways to 
activate subjects. All of these strategies, Greene claims, are problematic because 
each turns rhetoricians into moral critics. Instead, Greene argues, we should 
replace this political model that conceptualizes agency as the intermediary 
between structure and change for a materialist model that places rhetorical agency 
into notions of labor and production. Nick Turnbull perceives logic as having no 
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agency, being fixed and structured, while observing rhetoric as having agency, 
being fluid and open (Turnbull 209). Thus, he looks to reject the Aristotelian 
separation of logic and rhetoric through the principle of questioning. “Rhetoric is 
an intrinsic property of reason in the form of questioning rather than a residual 
factor that accounts for the problematicity that is externalized by the logic of 
propositional necessity. Reason becomes flexible, and rhetorically rich, without 
being relativist” (Turnbull 219). Every question provides an alternative, Turnbull 
argues, decentering the one who questions, releasing an agency to debate possible 
answers (Turnbull 221). Andrew Hansen’s thorough textual analysis of President 
Lincoln’s second inaugural address reveals a lasting agency. Hansen argues that 
due to its rhetorical construction, its language, its style, its form, and the 
ideologies within them, the speech shapes and pulls at audiences’ values and 
interests (Hansen 252). Finally, Dana Anderson negotiates Burke’s pentad with 
Bourdieu’s habitus. She first clarifies Burke’s seemingly firm position that 
conscious action is dramatism, while unconscious motion is behaviorism, but 
then, she argues that for Burke, it is really “purpose” not “consciousness” that 
motivates one to act. Thus, Anderson is able to carve out a space for Bourdieu’s 
“unconsciousness” practice to operate within Burke’s dramatism: 
[W]hereas Burke’s hermeneutic of motive sees the consistency between 
scenes and acts or scenes and agents as a sort of natural principle of unity 
in interpretation, Bourdieu’s anthropology of action isolates the specific 
mechanism by which scenes, agents, and actions dialectically constitute or 
“contain” each other, the means by which such consistency between 
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agents, actions, and scenes is maintained. Bourdieu terms this mechanism 
the habitus, the seat of human practice and the concept that challenges the 
conscious or purposive character of action in Burkes’ approach to motive. 
(Anderson 263, original emphasis) 
In short, Anderson argues that agency is shared between agents and structures—
the structures that agents activate through their bodily practices within these 
structures (Anderson 271-2). 
A year after Philosophy and Rhetoric’s special edition, Christian 
Lundberg and Joshua Gunn published their critique of Geisler’s ARS report in 
RSQ. Through the metaphor of a Ouija Board, the two scholars suggest a non-
relationship between agents and agency, claiming that while agency exists, it is 
impossible to locate an agent from agency. Agency is unstable and unfixed, while 
agents are a function of language they argue; thus agents are not intrinsically 
linked to agency. Lundberg and Gunn contend that Geisler presented agency in 
her report as something an agent can possess. They claim quite the opposite, that 
agency possesses agents. Geisler responds to Lundberg and Gunn’s critique a few 
pages later. While she does recognize that indeed her use of “post-modernism” 
was too broad (that she did not differentiate it with post-humanism), she does 
assert that she did not label Gunn’s position, that agency is an illusion, as 
postmodern, and also did not single out Gunn for this position, as she also 
mentioned Condit (Geisler, “Teaching” 108). Finally, in 2008, Lisa Storm 
Villadsen examined rhetorical agency through official apologies for RSQ. Like 
Hansen, Villadsen thoroughly examines texts and the rhetorical situation of a 
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state’s official apology to measure the amount of rhetorical agency a state   has 
after circulating such an apology. 
 There has been a wide array of theories within this debate on rhetorical 
agency. Some rhetorical theorists argue to abandon the concept of agency 
altogether, call it an illusion (Gunn, Lundberg, Condit), a fantasy (McDaniel), 
while others (J. Campbell, Jasinski) posit agents have agency and control over 
situations. Then there are those who theorize that agency is shared between agents 
and structures (Anderson, Langsdorf, Atwill), that agents may act but their actions 
are embedded in discourse. While many of the arguments are abstract, 
definitional, and argumentative, limiting the overall potential for future invention, 
I find that the theories which articulate a shared sense of agency, where agents 
negotiate agency with the situation, the most accommodating to the postmodern 
critique. The rhetorical performance of NMD is a concrete example of this 
postmodern rhetorical agency, where agency is shared and negotiated, and an 
understanding of the humanitarian group’s operation serves the field as a 
rhetorical site from which rhetoricians could invent and develop a better 
understanding of agency. 
Rhetorical Agency and State Power 
 What makes the operation of NMD unique is that it does not engage 
rhetorical agency as an individual or even as a group but rather as a space in 
discourse that counters the effects of state power. Rhetorical agency is deeply 
implicated with state power. According to Foucault, power is a productive 
network that runs through the whole social body. It’s embodied through acts, 
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attitudes, and modes of everyday behavior. But power is not a matter of consent. 
It is exercised by some on others, inscribed in a field of sparse available 
possibilities, which is supported by permanent structures (Foucault). 
 This postmodern perspective of state power begs the question that is 
central to the debate over rhetorical agency: Can subjects, subjected by the state, 
constructed in ideology, positioned in a series of power relations, act in a 
rhetorically effective way? Bourdieu, through theorizing of the habitus, suggests 
that while subjects are not transcendentally free, they are socialized in practice to 
act according to socially constructed organizing principles (Bourdieu 137). The 
social world inscribes itself in subjects and the subjects embody it, the habitus, 
and then react to these inscribed principles. In other words, rhetorical agents are 
never free from context but are also not controlled by it, and so thus, still have the 
ability to create, be rhetorically effective. NMD volunteers are rhetorically 
effective. Despite the restrictions from rhetorical situations, NMD volunteers are 
able to identify and engage the opportunities for change. These opportunities are 
normally found when NMD negotiates agency with the state. 
 The state determines what is sayable and what is not through the 
construction of censorship (Butler), much in the way ideology functions, but that 
construction must continuously be reproduced, renegotiated, and reconstructed. 
Language is constantly changing because it is imbued with differánce (Derrida). 
Hegemonic definitions seek to freeze words, keep language in place, but words 
always wiggle out from under them. The contexts in which words are 
spoken/heard or written/read are constantly changing, and so the contexts are 
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constantly changing those words no matter how hegemonic discourses try to tie 
them down with definitions and divisions (Derrida). The state’s obsession to make 
something true, create a correct definition, determine a permanent presence, make 
language stable through censorship, inevitably and always fails. This failure 
points to the destablizing forces of differánce. Differánce alters the temporary 
constraints of discourse and hence the agency of rhetorical agents. In this regard, 
the constant citation and iteration of a word or phrase opens language and 
pathways for subjects to subvert the effects of state power. 
 For example, as described in Chapter 1, when the state uses its rhetoric of 
the “illegal” to mark undocumented immigrants as “illegal” immigrants, as it has 
for the past 75 years to control and exploit immigrant labor for extraordinary 
profit, it is vulnerable to subversive rhetoric. The contexts in which the term is 
used continuously change, destabilizing the definition of “illegal.” In the 1950s, 
the term “illegal immigrant” meant an immigrant without documentation or 
authorization to live in the United States, but in the early 1960s, toward the end of 
the Bracero Program, the state reconstructed “illegal” to mean “deportable labor,” 
so as to entice US growers to recruit and hire undocumented immigrants, use their 
labor, and then either deport them without pay or to threaten them with 
deportation so that the immigrants would work more for less pay. The rhetoric of 
the “illegal” exploited immigrants for maximum profit. Recently, the state has 
reconstructed “illegal” to mean “terrorist” or “violent drug smuggler” so that the 
economic exploitation could continue (and be justified) through its current 
contexts. The state must always reproduce, renegotiate, and reconstruct its 
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rhetoric for each altering context, but when it does, when it attempts to stabilize 
its unstable rhetoric that is imbued with differánce, discursive opportunities arise 
for postmodern rhetorical agents to subvert the hegemony of the state.  
 NMD volunteers look for these opportunities as rhetorical agents of 
change. Despite the contextual restrictions that postmodern theory articulates, 
NMD volunteers are still able to identify and engage with these opportunities, 
acting creatively and purposefully at strategic turns. Specifically, NMD operates 
as/from a space in discourse and is able to subvert the state because it operates as 
a counterpublic engaging rhetorical agency in a field of state-sponsored publics. 
NMD as Counterpublic  
 A society is made up of a variety of publics. A “public” is a space in 
discourse that brings people together. It could physically bring people together, 
how a passion for an athletic team draws a crowd to cheer, but in most cases it 
discursively organizes people (Warner 67), meaning a public is an invented notion 
or idea, that once addressed, comes into existence and serves as a relation among 
strangers (Warner 74). A public is rhetorical. It requires participation for 
membership (Warner 77-8) and attention for it to be sustained (Warner 87). 
Without participation and attention, publics tend to disappear. The circulation of 
texts as a result keeps publics active and effective (Warner 90).  
 NMD is an example of a public. It holds a place in discourse for 
strangers—sympathetic to undocumented immigrants, social justice, and 
humanitarianism—to relate and organize. Membership could range from reading 
their website or participating on their listserv to attending weekly meetings or 
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volunteering in the desert. In addition, NMD is also an example of a 
“counterpublic,” one that is in tension with or directly counters a larger public 
(Warner 56). NMD is in direct tension with the state, and specifically, the state-
sponsored public of the US Border Patrol. 
 The Border Patrol, an animation of state hegemony, embodies and enacts 
the rhetoric of the “illegal.” The rhetorical marker “illegal” is used by the state to 
demarcate undocumented immigrants from documented immigrants, but it is also 
used to establish and maintain a “state of exception” (Agamben) on the border, 
where “illegal” immigrants are not perceived as valued humans, but rather as 
disposable criminals, which may be abandoned to the extreme conditions of the 
Arizona desert to die. The Border Patrol’s physical enforcement of the border 
serves rhetorically to circulate the rhetoric of the “illegal,” discursively 
reinforcing that undocumented immigrants are indeed “criminals” that need to be 
apprehended. 
 The state-sponsored public of the Border Patrol is powerful and works 
rhetorically to reiterate the rhetoric of the “illegal” in the face of various 
destabilizing contexts over the years. However, while the state via the Border 
Patrol attempts its reiterations of its rhetoric that the contexts destabilize, a 
counterpublic, such as NMD, has the opportunity to subvert the state. Since its 
launch in 2004, NMD has engaged rhetorical agency and disrupted the discourse 
of the state in the following two ways: 
 First, NMD volunteers in the desert who provide direct humanitarian aid 
to undocumented immigrants are counterhegemonic texts; their physical actions 
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counter the Border Patrol’s physical enforcement on the border. Instead of 
abandoning border crossers to die, like the state’s rhetoric permits, NMD 
volunteers attempt to keep them alive. In other words, the humanitarian actions of 
NMD volunteers make visible the effects of state power, that “illegal” immigrants 
are suffering and dying and are in need of emergency medical care. 
 Second, NMD volunteers take those experiences of encountering and 
attending to undocumented immigrants suffering in the most remote and extreme 
locations in the Arizona desert, suffering because of state-sponsored immigration 
and border enforcement policies, and circulate them as narratives through NMD’s 
website or newsletter, on speaking tours at college campuses or houses of 
worship, or in newspapers online or in print as letters-to-the-editor or feature 
stories (Haynes, Ortiz). These narratives work rhetorically, engage rhetorical 
agency, and have powerful rhetorical effects because of their relations to state 
power. The narratives’ common theme, that “illegal” immigrants are not 
“criminals” but instead are “abused humans,” abused by the effects of an 
inhumane border policy, is an alternative to state hegemony; it counters the state. 
Humanitarians as Criminals 
  The arrest of Sellz and Strauss in 2005 is evidence of NMD’s powerful 
rhetorical effect on the state. It no longer could remain silent on NMD’s 
discursive disruption and so countered back, redirecting the discourse away from 
the suffering immigrants and to the “criminal behavior” of Sellz and Strauss. The 
result was (momentarily) catastrophic for the state. 
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 Seizing the opportunity to circulate their story and the story of immigrants 
in the desert, NMD engaged rhetorical agency and launched a local campaign 
called “Humanitarian Aid is Never a Crime.” Yard signs were created and 
purchased and placed all around Tucson by those who supported Sellz and Strauss 
and demanded that the charges brought against them be dropped. Proceeds from 
the yard signs went to the production of postcards that were sent by supporters of 
NMD to US state attorney of Arizona Paul Charlton’s office, demanding again 
that the charges against Sellz and Strauss be dropped. The campaign discursively 
organized people, served as a relation among strangers, and brought the 
alternative discourse of NMD to a wider range of publics. The campaign gained 
national attention when the Associated Press picked up the story (Rotstein) and 
Amnesty International publicly supported Sellz and Strauss (“Humanitarian 
Aid”). 
 On September 1, 2006, District Judge Raner C. Collins dropped all the 
charges brought against Sellz and Strauss by the state, “declaring that the U.S. 
Attorney does not have a credible enough case against the two young volunteers 
to go to trial” (Ufford-Chase). In a press conference on September 7, 2006, Sellz 
and Strauss’ lawyer explained that “we should be clear that this decision was 
based on Judge Collin’s assessment that Daniel and Shanti were acting on their 
belief that the Border Patrol had either explicitly—or implicitly—approved of the 
protocol developed by Samaritans and No More Deaths volunteers over the 
previous three summers, which called for medical transport in cases of extreme 
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medical danger” (Ufford-Chase). Even though the charges were dropped, the 
competing discourses on “illegal” immigration circulated on a national scale. 
 One of the reasons why NMD has been so successful engaging rhetorical 
agency and subverting the state is because it is not merely a group of 
humanitarians collecting and circulating counterhegemonic texts from the desert. 
It is precisely because NMD is a public and a counterpublic. As a public, NMD is 
a space in discourse that attracts attention and participation from those 
sympathetic to human rights. As a counterpublic, that specifically counters the 
state, NMD is in relation (albeit confrontational) to state power. This relation 
provides NMD the unique opportunity to attract and reflect the effects of state 
power. 
 NMD’s simultaneous act of saving lives and circulating texts is a 
meaningful one for the field of rhetorical studies because the group may provide a 
better understanding for how rhetors are to engage state power and negotiate their 
postmodern rhetorical agency. 
The State’s Counterargument 
 Since 2006, the state has taken a different approach to refute the 
counterhegemonic actions of NMD. Instead of arresting humanitarians for their 
life-saving work, which only brings attention to the state’s inhumane border 
enforcement policy, the state has been ticketing NMD volunteers for littering. 
 In addition to hiking the desert trails, NMD volunteers drive to specific 
remote locations where undocumented immigrants cross the border in high 
numbers. At these locations, volunteers “drop water,” leave multiple one-gallon 
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jugs of water and return on a later date to pick up the empty containers. Each jug 
is marked with a location number and the date in which the water was dropped. 
NMD uses a sophisticated tracking system of maps and GPS to monitor how 
much water is taken, how much more is needed, and where the immigrants are 
leaving the empty jugs. This information is recorded in log books and left in 
NMD vehicles so that any volunteer can pick up where the previous volunteer left 
off. 
 On February 22, 2008, Dan Millis, a volunteer for NMD, and two other 
NMD volunteers were on a routine water supply drop in a remote area of the 
desert called Brown Canyon. This area is known for its heavy “foot traffic” but is 
also a part of federal land, the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge. BANWR 
is a 118,000 acre habitat for native plants and animals that lies precisely along the 
US/Mexico border. Millis and the two others had finished dropping 22 gallons of 
water and were in the midst of picking up empty containers when they were 
stopped by Fish and Wildlife officers. After explaining their purpose and actions, 
Millis was cited for littering and was given a $175 ticket. He decided to challenge 
the ticket in court, pleading NMD’s unofficial motto, “humanitarian aid is never a 
crime.” Seven months later, a federal magistrate judge issued a ruling, that Millis 
was guilty of littering but would receive no sentence.  Upon hearing the ruling, 
Millis said, “I feel like this is a passive-aggressive message from the government. 
It says that what we were doing—in essence saving lives—is illegal, but that 
there’s no punishment for it.” (“Humanitarian Found”). 
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 The state’s new strategy of distributing littering fines instead of making 
arrests shifts the discourse between NMD and the state. If the state continued to 
retain its counterargument within the realm of humanitarian aid, as per the case of 
Sellz and Strauss, it risked further exposure of its rhetoric of the “illegal.” Yet by 
shifting the discourse to “litter,” a clear cut definition that is not vulnerable to 
civil initiative and already holds a place in discourse—the desert, especially in 
BANWR, is increasingly being covered in debris that undocumented immigrants 
discard on their journey, such as backpacks, clothes, food, and empty containers 
of water—the state could rearticulate NMD’s humanitarian aid as “pollution.” In 
other words, this shift overtime would mark humanitarians as criminals (litterers) 
and humanitarian aid as criminal activity (littering), preventing NMD volunteers 
from effectively doing their work and circulating their counterargument. The 
strategy while worrisome at first quickly became a new opportunity for NMD to 
subvert the state. 
 On December 4, 2008, another NMD volunteer was cited for littering, but 
this time NMD was prepared. Walt Staton and three other NMD volunteers had 
just completed a routine water supply drop when they were stopped by a Border 
Patrol agent and a Fish and Wildlife officer. The officer asked the four 
humanitarians if they had left any water bottles on the trails and if they were 
willing to show them where. Staton responded that they had and took the 
authorities with the other humanitarians to retrieve the water. Once the six 
returned, the water was confiscated, and Staton was cited for littering. 
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 Staton, following in Millis’ footsteps, refused to pay the $175 fine, opting 
for a trial instead. A trial provided NMD with a public opportunity to recounter 
the state, to expose the rhetoric of the “illegal,” to show that undocumented 
immigrants were suffering and dying in the desert as a direct result of the state’s 
inhumane border enforcement policy. A trial gave NMD an opportunity to argue 
that borders crossers needed humanitarian aid and so were given water—not 
litter—to survive. Nevertheless, a trial gave the state a chance to further mark 
NMD’s “humanitarian aid” as “garbage” and to re-cover its rhetoric of the 
“illegal.” In short, the trial would come down to the definition of “litter,” and like 
any definition or any word, “litter” is imbued with differánce. The state as well as 
NMD would have to reproduce, renegotiate, and reconstruct its definition of 
“litter” to include or exclude water in this new context. The trial, in other words, 
marks an exact moment when rhetorical agency is engaged and negotiated, when 
publics and counterpublics compete for rhetorical space in discourse, when 
differánce is revealed. 
 Staton’s trial, which garnered national attention, took place on June 1-3, 
2009, and it will serve as the main focus of Chapter 3, an examination into the 
complexities of rhetorical agency. 	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CHAPTER	  3	  THE	  TRIAL:	  NEGOTIATING	  RHETORICAL	  AGENCY	  AND	  POWER	  WITH	  THE	  STATE	  
During Labor Day weekend, 2009, I accompanied three No More Deaths (NMD) 
volunteers into the southern Arizona desert. We took a red beat-up pick-up truck 
known among volunteers as “the Roja.” After a bumpy but beautiful ride through 
rocky canyon floors and stunning hillsides of ocotillos, we arrived at our location, 
about 10 miles north of the US/Mexico border. We drove to this remote location 
to collect and replace empty water jugs with full new ones. Each of us grabbed 
four one-gallon jugs of water from the bed of the Roja and walked down a trail. 
One volunteer led us with a hand-drawn map, while another followed closely 
behind with a hand-held GPS device. Their collaboration suggested that our trail 
would shortly intersect with another, a place where, I was told, migrants 
frequently passed, a perfect place for a water drop. Under the slight but welcomed 
shade of a nearby mesquite tree, we dropped the water and labeled each jug with 
the date and the waypoint, the designated number on the GPS that corresponded 
with this location. NMD used this labeling system to determine if a trail was 
active, slow, or inactive. For example, if in three days, when another group of 
volunteers checked this same waypoint, all the water jugs marked with our date 
were empty, a NMD volunteer would record in a logbook that the trail was 
“active” and might be in need of more water on the next water drop. 
 But on this morning in early September, there were no empty water jugs. 
One of the volunteers hiked back to the Roja to check the logbook and read how 
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many jugs were left by the previous group and when. According to the last entry, 
16 one-gallon jugs of water had been left three days prior. One volunteer 
speculated that a group of migrants might have picked up the water and carried it 
with them. Another suggested that migrants are often suspicious of water sites, 
believing it to be a trap laid out by the Border Patrol for an ambush, and so 
migrants quickly take the water, hike a short distance and hide, before consuming 
the water and leaving behind the empty containers. She suggested that we hike 
north up the trail to find the empty jugs. We hiked for nearly half an hour without 
seeing any sign of the empty containers, such as their blue plastic caps and 
binding. Needing to drop more water at different locations that afternoon, we 
decided to give up the search and hike back to the Roja.  
 However, once we make it back to the mesquite tree, the same volunteer 
who suggested that we hike north said that she had one more idea. About 50 
meters east of the mesquite tree was a steep ravine, and sure enough, about 20 
meters down was a pile of 16 empty water jugs. One volunteer carefully climbed 
down to retrieve the empties from the wash, but when he returned with the bottles 
strung together on a rope, he was not pleased. Laying down the bottles before us, 
we saw the problem. Each bottle was empty but still had its cap on. Across the 
center of each jug was a gaping hole. The bottles had been slashed. 
 It was not clear as to who was doing the slashing, the Border Patrol, local 
ranchers, both, but what was clear to NMD volunteers was the message: Stop 
leaving water for “illegal” aliens. The “slashings” had become a common 
occurrence ever since the trial of Walt Staton. Staton, a NMD volunteer, was cited 
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for littering after completing a water drop on a wildlife refuge along the 
US/Mexico border. His trial in June 2009 gained local and national attention 
because the focus shifted away from the crime (littering) and onto a debate about 
upholding US immigration policy and criminalizing those who sought to disrupt 
it. 
 NMD and the state argued relentlessly within this complex rhetorical 
situation. Each side competed for the opportunity to change the discourse on 
immigration policy in Arizona and throughout the nation. The state introduced 
environmental and criminal arguments, revealing photos of the once beautiful 
desert now covered in the trash of “illegal” aliens and the plastic water jugs of 
NMD. The humanitarian group posited moral and ethical arguments, describing 
the desert as a site of crisis where many die of dehydration, need life-saving 
water, and aid should be provided regardless of citizenship status. The arguments 
are not clear cut, the witnesses are not always trustworthy, and the social impact is 
extremely high. NMD’s ability to act is on the line. Deemed criminal, the charge 
would severely restrict if not altogether end their humanitarian aid. Deemed 
heroic would change the way immigration policy is understood on the border. 
 NMD’s persuasive power rests in its rhetorical agency. Throughout the 
trial NMD must negotiate what agency it has with the state to push and expand 
and strengthen its arguments. Barbara Biesecker’s rhetorical situation provides a 
framework for understanding how rhetorical agency operates in this trial. Her 
postmodern theory allows us to see how subjectivities are constructed and 
reconstructed, how the relations between subjects effect their subjectivity 
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(re)construction, and how these negotiations provide the rhetorical agency to 
make change. 
 In this chapter, I examine the rhetorical agency produced and negotiated in 
USA v. Staton. But first, I rearticulate the debate over rhetorical agency through 
the debate over the rhetorical situation. 
The Rhetorical Situation 
	   The debate over rhetorical agency, the construction of subjects and 
subjectivities, the ability to act/speak in rhetorically effective ways, can be located 
in rhetorical studies through the debate over the rhetorical situation. Rhetoricians 
have been arguing over agency for years, mainly, where agency lies: within the 
situation (Bitzer), within the rhetor (Vatz), or somewhere between the two 
(Consigny). However, these interpretations of rhetoric in action are problematic 
for postmodern theory because they suggest that the subjects within the rhetorical 
situation are static, not in constant flux. Barbara Biesecker fills this gap with her 
rearticulation of the rhetorical situation through Derrida’s thematic of differánce. 
But before I explain Biesecker’s productive framework, it is necessary to explain 
the arguments of Lloyd Bitzer, Richard Vatz and Scott Consigny to fully 
understand the context from which Biesecker theorizes. 
 Bitzer argues that a rhetorical situation has three main constituents: 
exigence, audience, and constraints. Not all exigences are rhetorical, only those 
which can be modified by rhetoric, not all audiences are rhetorical, only those 
which are capable of being influenced by rhetoric and can do what the rhetoric 
calls for, yet all constraints are within the rhetor and within the situation (Bitzer 
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8). Thus, when a rhetor is invited by the situation to elicit a response, the rhetor 
enters and provides a response that is within the constraints of the situation. For 
example, after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, FDR addressed Congress, within his 
constraints and the constraints of the situation, and urged them to declare war. In 
other words, according to Bitzer, the situation dictates, constrains and controls the 
response, and hence, the rhetorical agency of the rhetor. Rhetoric, then, comes 
into existence as the prescribed “fitting response” to that situation (Bitzer 5). 
 Vatz takes issue with Bitzer’s rhetorical situation. He claims that Bitzer 
falsely identifies an “intrinsic nature” in events, from which rhetoric follows, 
which theoretically, Vatz posits, does not allow rhetors to interpret a situation 
(Vatz 155-6). Vatz argues that facts (situations) are not publicly observable, i.e. 
are not objective. Facts are learned through others. Rhetors “sift and choose” how 
to present facts and translate facts; hence, the meaning of an event is not in the 
situation, but is in the interpretation of the rhetor (Vatz 156-7). Locating rhetorical 
agency with the situation, as Bitzer does, is ethically problematic for Vatz. In fact, 
according to Vatz, the rhetor in Bitzer’s rhetorical situation has no responsibility 
or the motivation to act in an ethical manner, for it is the situation which retains 
the rhetorical agency for the rhetor. In other words, the rhetor could claim that 
“The situation made me do it” or “Don’t blame me; I had to say it.” Vatz by 
contrast locates rhetorical agency within the rhetor so as to put the onus on rhetors 
to make responsible choices in the moment and to be responsible for their actions 
afterward. In short, Vatz aligns his theories with a more traditional humanist-
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modernist interpretation of rhetorical agents, rhetorical agency, and the rhetorical 
situation. 
 For Consigny, Bitzer and Vatz are the extremes of the debate on how 
rhetoric works. Yet instead of dismissing their theories entirely, Consigny keeps 
what he considers to be the productive elements from both and contributes 
necessary caveats: from Bitzer—the situation has particularities but is not 
determinate, from Vatz—the rhetor is creative but is not completely free 
(Consigny 175-6). Theoretically, then, according to Consigny, the rhetorical 
situation is “an indeterminate context marked by troublesome disorder which the 
rhetor must structure so as to disclose and formulate problems” (Consigny 178). 
In other words, the role of a rhetor within a rhetorical situation is to reorder the 
disorder, to make sense of the competing discourses. Rhetors may not always be 
effective in this role because they are always constrained by the particularities of 
the situation; thus, rhetors must acknowledge the particularities to themselves and 
to their audiences or, hence, run the risk of being dismissed by their audiences. 
But if the rhetor does acknowledge the limitations, if the rhetor poses questions 
and exposes problems, and if the rhetor “orders the disorder,” then, theoretically, 
the audience will take action (Consigny 183). 
 The problem with Consigny as well as Bitzer and Vatz is that all three of 
their theories operate under a “logic of influence” (Biesecker 110), meaning that 
they perceive a rational exchange between the rhetor and the audience, an 
assumption that fixes, or marks a place of origin on either the rhetor or the 
audience. This causal relationship is problematic for Biesecker, who through 
	   	  60	  
Derrida’s thematic of differánce, contends that subjects have no origin; they are 
becoming; they are not fixed. Biesecker, referencing Derrida, argues that every 
subject is different from another while at the same time keeps dividing itself. A 
rhetor, then, cannot accurately assess a rhetorical situation because the situation is 
continually changing and the rhetor, too, is continually changing. Biesecker 
contends that through Derridean deconstruction rhetoricians would be able to see 
that all texts have non-originary origins, i.e. differánce, and that differánce is, in 
fact, “covered up” by rhetors, who seek to make unities out of the divisions, make 
a non-identical identifiable. Rhetoricians should conceive of the rhetorical 
situation, not as a place for rhetors to persuade an audience to act, but rather, as an 
event that makes the production of subjects and subjectivities and power relations 
possible (Biesecker 126).  
In this chapter, I use Biesecker’s logic of articulation as the theoretical 
tool for analyzing NMD’s rhetorical situation, the trial of USA v. Staton, a site 
that makes visible the history of decentered subjects and the continued production 
of their subjectivities. Through this analysis, the following sections recognize the 
rhetorical situation as a space open to connections, disconnections, and 
reconnections; I identify how NMD seeks to find the “radical possibility” 
Biesecker promises rhetoric can offer, the agency to move, shift, destablize 
meanings and ideas in new and promising directions. Through Biesecker’s theory 
of the rhetorical situation, I identify how NMD dismantles discourses which have 
always been xenophobic and criminalizing in order to usher in new discursive 
possibilities—discourses surrounding a migrant’s humanity, how a US citizen of 
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conscience should act, how an ethical government should construct and enforce 
laws—can be invented anew. Biesecker’s theory of rearticulation, in sum, is 
critical for analyzing how rhetorical agency works and for NMD, how to develop 
a rhetorical disruption of migrant deaths and the power relations that support it. 
The Trial 
 The trial of USA v. Staton begins on June 1, 2009 in Tucson, Arizona. The 
defendant, NMD volunteer Walt Staton, is charged with “knowingly littering or 
disposing of garbage or other debris on a national wildlife refuge.” The charge 
becomes an important piece of the trial. It is constantly contested by the state, 
represented by prosecuting attorney Lawrence Lee, and NMD, represented by 
defense attorney William Walker. There are two aspects to the charge that the 
state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, the knowingly and the littering. Did 
Staton know that he was littering or did he think that he was providing 
humanitarian aid? Is a bottle of water litter or is it life-saving humanitarian aid? 
These two aspects, the knowing and the definition of litter become two spaces of 
negotiation throughout the trial where rhetorical agency is contested.  
 In addition, there are three other spaces where rhetorical agency is 
negotiated. One is a negotiation over what the trial “is really about.” Several times 
Lee and Walker accuse the other of making the trial “something that it is not.” 
Both agree—at different times—that the trial is about littering on BANWR; 
however, the issues of “illegal” immigration, US immigration policy, and 
humanitarian aid is used several times to emphasize guilt or innocence. It 
becomes obvious that the trial is not simply about litter. The larger issues and how 
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they are used play a big role in shaping the outcome of the trial. The next space of 
agential negotiation involves the witnesses’ subjectivity of credibility. In other 
words, the ethos of each witness is constructed and challenged and reconstructed 
and re-challenged. Different techniques are used by the lawyers to shape/undercut 
the subjectivity of the witnesses. Credibility is tied to agency. In this trial, the one 
who is believable, has a desired ethos, has a greater ability to negotiate his/her 
rhetorical agency and persuade the jury of Staton’s guilt or innocence. Finally, the 
space of context becomes a space of negotiation. Should the littering charge be 
understood within the context of the law or the context of the humanitarian crisis 
on the border? This space shares arguments with the definition of litter, what the 
trial is really about, and if Staton knew he was littering or not. Shaping and 
controlling the context from which this trial should be assessed becomes critical 
toward the end of the trial. These contested spaces are where rhetorical agency is 
negotiated and shifts, where meaning is made and remade, and where 
subjectivities and relations form and break. 
Jury Selection 
  Before the trial begins, the jury is selected. Potential jurors are asked a 
series of questions to procure information that might render them unfit to be 
jurors on the case. Magistrate Judge Jennifer Guerin wants to make sure the jury 
is fair and impartial, and so she asks the potential jurors, “Do any of you have 
strong feelings about providing humanitarian assistance for undocumented 
migrants? In other words, for aliens” (USA v. Staton 1:55). Two potential jurors 
say that they do, a Catholic woman that says her church goes on walks in the 
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desert and provides water to migrants and another who says she has taught 
bilingual education for years and feels like the migrants in the desert could have 
been her students. Then three more speak up and say that they also would have a 
problem being impartial—all believing that aid should be given (USA v. Staton 
1:56-7). Then one potential juror says that he is “personally in support of any 
human aid” but would be able to follow the instructions of the court (USA v. 
Staton 1:58). [He was later dismissed (USA v. Staton 1:90).] Then, another 
speaks, saying that he was a missionary in South America and Mexico and thus, 
believes strongly in providing water to migrants in the desert. 
 Walker then approaches the bench and says, 
I think that the question [that] has been posited to these potential jurors is 
that if they are in favor of humanitarian assistance or aid, that is an issue in 
this case, and they might not be able to get past that issue. This is not a 
case that involves an issue over whether you are for or against 
humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid is not a crime. The question in here is 
whether or not the defendant violated the law by distributing litter and 
garbage on the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge. And what I would 
respectfully ask is that I be allowed to ask the general panel a question or 
ask those particular jurors a question and preface it by saying that 
humanitarian aid is not on trial here and whether or not the defendant 
favors humanitarian aid or not is not the issue here. (USA v. Staton 1:59) 
Already, before the trial has even begun, questions about the true nature of the 
trial are raised. 
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 Judge Guerin asks to clarify what Walker’s question is, and Walker states, 
“What I would say is that there is no issue here before the court as to whether or 
not humanitarian assistance is a crime. There will be evidence that the defendant 
is a humanitarian. This issue is whether or not he littered by littering and 
disposing of garbage and other debris on the national wildlife refuge” (USA v. 
Staton 1:60). Lee responds: “Humanitarian aid is exactly what Mr. Walker wants 
to put on trial here” (USA v. Staton 1:60). Judge Guerin decides to dismiss all the 
potential jurors who said that they could not follow the law because of their 
feelings about humanitarian aid but to ask follow-up questions to those who said 
they could put those feelings aside and still follow the law. 
 During the follow-ups, one potential juror initially says that he could put 
his feelings aside but then admits that he would have some difficulty being 
impartial. Then, Walker asks a follow-up, firstly stating that the case is not about 
humanitarian aid but is about “the very narrow question of whether or not the 
defendant littered garbage” (USA v. Staton 1:63) and then asking if the potential 
juror could follow the law of the court regarding litter. The potential juror 
responds, “For just littering, yes, I think I would be able to.” Then, Judge Guerin 
interjects, “As I heard you say earlier, you feel uncomfortable with that, that you 
feel—” (USA v. Staton 1:63), but then the potential juror interrupts, “If it were 
just littering. I guess there is more to it than that” (USA v. Staton 1:63). It is clear, 
from this sequence and this potential juror’s response, that this littering trial is not 
just about littering. It is about humanitarian aid, undocumented migrants, and the 
crisis on the border. Both Judge Guerin and Walker negotiate their rhetorical 
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agency, push for retaining or dismissing a potential juror that would favor her/his 
agenda, an impartial trial, one that identifies with the constructed subjectivity of 
Staton. 
 Judge Guerin then finally clarifies to a new juror, 
[T]his case does not involve the issue of whether or not providing 
humanitarian assistance is a crime, but it does address whether or not this 
defendant knowingly littered on the Buenos Aires National Wildlife 
Refuge by placing water bottles there. In being presented with the issue, in 
trying to decide as a juror whether or not the defendant is guilty or not of 
that offense, would your beliefs about humanitarian assistance affect your 
ability to be fair and impartial? (USA v. Staton 1:64).  
The new juror says she thinks so, but then Judge Guerin qualifies, “You think you 
could follow the law even if you were to be instructed that placing litter is a 
crime?” The new juror says yes. Judge Guerin thanks her but before she can move 
on to question the next potential juror, Walker interjects: “Did you say if you 
were instructed that placing water was the crime?” Judge Guerin responds, “She 
said she could be fair and impartial. I think she should remain on the jury” (USA 
v. Staton 1:64). [She ends up not being on the jury (USA v. Staton 1:95).] Then 
Lee interrupts, “I object to her being on the jury. The question is he’s equating 
placing water bottles as humanitarian aid. [...] The whole defense position is that a 
water bottle on the wildlife refuge is humanitarian aid and therefore is not a 
crime” (USA v. Staton 1:65). Judge Guerin responds to Lee, “I think he is saying 
that it’s not garbage.” Lee counters, “But I think the way Your Honor is asking 
	   	  66	  
the question is that couching it in terms of humanitarian aid is exactly what 
defense wants this whole trial to be about. [...] My suggestion is that when we ask 
them it’s whether or not you believe right off the bat that placing a full water jug 
on the national wildlife refuge is humanitarian aid and would color your ability to 
be fair and impartial at this point” (USA v. Staton 1:65). Judge Guerin answers 
Lee, “I think that is addressing the issue which you said you didn’t want to be 
asked. It’s tricky. It’s a fine line.” 
 This sequence that began with Judge Guerin’s phrase “placing litter,” 
which marked water as litter, demonstrates just how critical the definition of litter 
is to this trial. Equating water with humanitarian aid favors Walker, while 
equating water with litter favors Lee. The negotiation of this definition strikes 
right at the heart of this trial. Is it about litter or is it about humanitarian aid? Both 
Lee and Walker have attempted to deny the humanitarian aspect of the trial, but 
have done so in ways that favor his own position.  
 The questioning of potential jurors continues; each juror that answered 
Judge Guerin’s initial question about having feelings about humanitarian aid but 
being able to put those feelings aside are each asked to come forward and answer 
follow-up questions. Once complete, Judge Guerin, Walker and Lee decide which 
potential jurors to strike and which to keep on the jury. The three agree on all of 
their choices but still need to question potential juror 32. When Judge Guerin 
reexamines her, a candid and revealing scene unfolds, marking the complexities 
of this case and the complexities of negotiation. The Judge Guerin asks, “In 
deciding whether or not the defendant knowingly committed the offense, would 
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your views regarding humanitarian assistance affect your ability to follow the 
instructions of the law as to what littering is and to make an impartial decision?” 
(72). Juror 32 responds, “In other words, it wouldn’t really be a migrant issue?” 
Judge Guerin clarifies, “The defendant might have interests in providing water 
because of migrants, but my question to you is whether you could follow the law 
in making a decision as to whether or not he knowingly littered by placing water 
bottles on that refuge?” Juror 32 responds, “I am trying to decipher. Probably, 
yes.” Judge Guerin, “Probably?” Juror 32, “Yes.” Lee objects to having her on the 
jury saying she hesitated and didn’t give “an equivocal, ‘Yes, I can’” (USA v. 
Staton 1:73). Judge Guerin replies, “Given the way that we are phrasing each one 
of these questions, I take the witness’ hesitation as a hesitation as she could be 
fair, as hesitation thinking through the different descriptions of the questions that 
were being asked, and I thought that was reasonable for her too” (USA v. Staton 
1:73). Juror 32 stays on the jury. 
 A recess is taken before the trial begins. Once the selected jury returns 
Judge Guerin provides them with “the information”—“the description of the 
charges made by the government against the defendant” (USA v. Staton 1:102). 
The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “on or before 
December 4, 2008 the defendant knowingly littered or disposed of garbage or 
other debris on a national wildlife refuge” (USA v. Staton 1:102). After the 
information is given, Lee begins his very brief opening statement. 
Lee’s Opening Statement 
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 He argues that Staton was seen leaving about 20 one-gallon jugs of water 
on a national refuge, which Lee defines as a place that Congress established “for 
animals, plants, and wildlife” (USA v. Staton 1:108). Lee claims that Staton was 
confronted and admitted to leaving the jugs “purposely and intentionally” and 
then asks the jurors to use “common sense” when determining if plastic is garbage 
or not. “Leaving plastic on a wildlife refuge, plastic water jugs, plastic tops, 
plastic binding that holds those tops together, is littering” (USA v. Staton 1:108). 
Albeit brief, Lee establishes that Staton purposely left litter on BANWR. Walker 
is not as brief. 
Walker’s Opening Statement 
 Walker begins by pointing out to the jurors the two precise areas where 
agency is being negotiated, “whether or not he [Staton] put something on the 
wildlife refuge that was garbage or debris, not whether somebody else turned it 
into garbage or debris later” (USA v. Staton 1:109) and if he “knowingly [put] 
garbage or debris on the wildlife refuge” (USA v. Staton 1:110). Then Walker 
makes a quick qualifier, “You are not going to be told ever in this case that 
humanitarian assistance is a crime or against the law or it’s against the law to give 
water to a migrant because it’s not. That is not what this defendant is charged 
with. He’s only charged with littering garbage and other debris on the national 
wildlife refuge” (USA v. Staton 1:111). Already, Walker is attempting to shape 
how the jury should perceive and comprehend the events of December 4, 2008. 
 He then works to establish Staton’s ethos, i.e. construct Staton’s 
subjectivity as credible: “He’s an Arizona boy and he’s been an Arizona boy all of 
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his life,” “he attended the Prescott Unitarian Universalist Fellowship,” “[h]e was a 
Boy Scout,” “received an Eagle Scout award,” “[h]e is a certified wilderness first 
responder,” graduated from high school “with a 4.0 grade point average, a perfect 
grade point average,” “began attending the University of Arizona [...] with a full 
tuition scholarship,” (USA v. Staton 1:112), “graduated from the University of 
Arizona in the summer of 2004 with a 3.7 grade point average, close to perfect, 
not perfect, but pretty close, with a degree in urban planning,” (USA v. Staton 
1:113). The several references to “Arizona” is intentional. Arizona is known as a 
“state of transplants.” Every year thousands of Americans make Arizona their 
new home, and in the winter, “snow birds,” or people residing in cold climate 
states, temporarily migrate to and reside in Arizona for the season. “Local 
Arizonans,” those who were born and raised in Arizona, are somewhat rare. They 
are often perceived as understanding the culture of Arizona more than “outsiders” 
or “transplants.” In short, a local Arizonan is respected by other Arizonans. By 
Walker emphasizing that Staton is “an Arizona boy all of his life” who attended 
the local Arizona university, which is revered in Tucson, to a jury who most likely 
is composed of local Arizonans, Walker is attempting to construct Staton’s 
subjectivity as respectable, likable, and thus believable.  
 Then Walker changes courses. He moves to construct NMD’s subjectivity. 
In the morning session, he had argued that humanitarian aid had nothing to do 
with this case, but now, needs to frame the narrative of the case as a humanitarian 
from a humanitarian group providing humanitarian aid. The distinction between 
aid and litter is critical to Staton’s innocence or guilt. Walker says, “And in the 
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summer of 2004, he began spending time with No More Deaths. Some of you 
may have heard of that organization. You will hear in the evidence that No More 
Deaths is an organization that is dedicated to stopping migrant deaths in the 
desert. No More Deaths does not engage in smuggling people across the border. 
They don’t engage in illegal activities of that sort, but they believe that every 
human life is sacred—” (USA v. Staton 1:113). 
 Lee objects, and the court overrules. Walker continues: 
 “They believe that every life is sacred. And Walt is going to testify that 
the reason, the motive, the intent of the acts he committed on December 4 was to 
save human lives [...]” (USA v. Staton 1:113).  
 Next, Walker continues to define what NMD is not in order to clarify what 
it is. 
[W]hat he did on December 4 when he went out to the national wildlife 
refuge was part of a plan to strategically place water in locations where a 
majority, at least a large concentration of migrants, crossed on trails, not to 
help them enter the United States, not to help them violate the law in any 
respect, but merely to leave life-sustaining water so that they would not 
die in the desert. [...] And you’re going to hear that he and No More 
Deaths got feedback from migrants that it was life-sustaining water in the 
desert that saved many migrant deaths, saved many migrants from death, 
after they were returned to Mexico, they would have died in the desert 
otherwise (USA v. Staton 1:114). 
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 Then Walker goes back to shaping Staton’s subjectivity as someone who 
is credible, honest and open: “You will hear when he was approached by the 
border patrol agents and Bureau of Fish and Wildlife, he immediately told them 
exactly what he was doing. He didn’t view it as against the law. He didn’t view 
that he was littering or putting garbage out. He viewed this as putting out life-
sustaining water for migrants. He was proud of it. He did it openly. He did it 
pursuant to a plan” (USA v. Staton 1:115). 
 Next, Walker moves to establish the difference between “life-sustaining 
water” and “garbage or debris.” He says, “You will hear the government seized 
from him not only full water jugs that he was placing out but also empty water 
jugs that were debris, that were garbage, that someone else had made garbage and 
debris, picked up the full water jugs, drank from them, and some of the people 
instead of taking the empty water jugs with them and putting it in a proper 
receptacle would throw it in the desert” (USA v. Staton 1:115). This argument is 
unique because Walker does not merely say that what Staton put out is not 
garbage at all, but rather has the potential to become garbage. He implies that the 
migrants make that garbage out of Staton’s humanitarian aid. This careful 
distinction puts blame on the migrants for littering but also somewhat implicates 
Staton in the littering for providing the materials to create litter. 
 Again, Walker attempts to establish what garbage is in order to show that 
what Staton put on the refuge was not garbage: “[Staton and the three other NMD 
volunteers] systematically when walking the same trails they put the water out 
before collected all the garbage found, collected the empty bottles that they found, 
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empty jugs they found, so they were not garbage, so they could do their best to 
make sure they weren’t garbage” (USA v. Staton 1:115). “They were doing their 
best to preserve the refuge for animals, for other humans, for the enjoyment of 
anyone and anything that was out there” (USA v. Staton 1:116). 
 Then, Walker looks to establish the credibility of NMD’s actions, 
mentioning that the University of Arizona gives college credit to students who 
place water in the desert: 
[H]e was not arrested by himself [...but] with three other people, one was 
another member of No More Deaths and two of them were university 
students who were getting credit from the University of Arizona who 
recognized the value of this program to their university education and 
gave them approval for going out into the desert and putting these water 
bottles out for migrants, two university students, undergraduates, who 
were earning credit for doing this” (USA v. Staton 1:116). 
In other words, Walker is taking the strong reputation of the University of 
Arizona and transferring it onto the actions of NMD and Staton.  
 In sum, Walker uses various rhetorical strategies to negotiate Staton’s 
rhetorical agency with the jury: One, Walker establishes that empty jugs of water 
is litter, and since Staton did not put out empty water jugs—he put out full ones—
he did not litter. Moreover, Staton collected the empty jugs of water (the garbage) 
after dropping the full jugs, which helps boost his ethos and establish that he 
“knew” the difference between garbage and aid. Two, Walker establishes that 
Staton was “putting out something of value” (USA v. Staton 1:117). Staton had to 
	   	  73	  
buy the water at the grocery store. Garbage, on the other hand, has no value. Also, 
water, in the context of the desert has value; it is life-sustaining. Finally, the 
University of Arizona values the actions of Staton and NMD. Students receive 
college credit. Thus, providing water in the desert is valuable; it is not trash. 
Border Patrol Agent Collins 
 After Walker finishes his opening statement, Thomas Collins of the US 
Border Patrol is called as Lee’s first witness. Lee uses Collins’ testimony to 
rearticulate Staton’s subjectivity that Walker constructed. According to Collins, 
he was patrolling the border on December 4, 2008. When Lee asks what his duties 
were for that day, Collins responds that his job was to patrol the border, “looking 
for terrorist weapons, terrorists, illegal aliens, smugglers, drug smugglers” (USA 
v. Staton 1:122). This description is important because it helps construct the 
rhetorical situation of that day. The expectation of Collins’ narrative is that he will 
find one or more of these subjects, and what he finds is Staton and three other 
volunteers for NMD. Thus, his description helps construct the subjectivity of 
Staton and the others, that they are “terrorists” or “drug smugglers.” If they were 
not, Collins would not pursue them. But he does. The implication is that Staton 
and NMD are at the very least suspicious people if not criminals, equivalent to the 
subjects he lists. 
 Collins was standing on a hill “looking for a group of aliens [that he] 
believed was coming through the area” (USA v. Staton 1:123). He was watching a 
vehicle track and waiting for cars to drive down it. Some did. From his location 
overlooking rolling hills, cars would dip down and disappear for a moment and 
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then reappear and pass his location, but one car disappeared and did not reappear. 
Lee asked, “Based upon that observation, what were your thoughts?” Collins 
responded, “At that time I was thinking that the vehicle that I saw was going to 
stop to pick up illegal aliens. That’s common practice in that area for smugglers to 
stop and pick up aliens” (USA v. Staton 1:124). This description again suggests 
that Collins will find “illegal aliens” or “smugglers,” but instead finds Staton and 
NMD volunteers. Collin’s narrative implies that Staton is associated with these 
groups. 
 Collins ends up calling for back-up, for more agents, anticipating an arrest. 
He waits for about a half an hour and then saw the vehicle reappear and pass his 
location. It’s Staton’s silver Jeep and he sees the No More Deaths sticker-sign on 
the side of it. Collins says he didn’t follow Staton “immediately” because he “was 
still looking for the group of illegal aliens that [he] suspected was coming through 
the area” (USA v. Staton 1:125). Lee asks if he ended up finding that group and 
Collins responded he did “later” (USA v. Staton 1:125). It is unclear then if there 
ever was a group of undocumented immigrants, but the suggestion of the 
possibility is enough to rearticulate Staton’s subjectivity as one who associates 
with “smugglers.” 
 A Border Patrol helicopter arrives to explore the area via Collins request. 
Then, Collins contacts Fish and Wildlife Officer Casey and leaves his location “to 
look for the group of illegal aliens” (126). Lee asks what the results were of the 
search and Collins responds, “I made contact with four aliens that were able to 
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evade me.” Lee counters, “And how were they—just got a jump on you?” To 
which Collins responds, “They saw me coming” (USA v. Staton 1:127). 
 Walker objects, stating that the line of questioning is “totally irrelevant to 
the charges in this case or to any relevant issue in this case” (USA v. Staton 
1:127). To a degree, Walker is correct. Lee’s questions takes Collins’ narrative in 
a different direction, away from the littering fine and to the phantom “illegal 
aliens.” The move is purposeful. Lee’s questions help construct a certain 
rhetorical situation, one that expands the jury’s imagination, frames the subjects 
in the story as either associating with “illegal aliens” or participating in “illegal” 
activity with “illegal aliens.” The details that Collins provides is unnecessary to 
the crime in the case, which is littering. Lee via Collins keeps the focus on “illegal 
aliens.” In other words, if this case really is about littering, Collins’ testimony 
would have started when Collins met Staton, when Collins talked with Staton, and 
when Collins collected evidence from Staton. But the story doesn’t start here. It 
starts much early, constructing a scene in which the rhetorical agents’ 
subjectivities are articulated to be in association with “illegal aliens” or “illegal” 
activity. 
 Finally, Collins begins to tell of his encounter with Staton; that once he 
arrives at the location, he sees water bottles and footprints around them. He 
follows the footprints to the road, the same road that he saw Staton’s jeep go by. 
Collins gets back in his vehicle and contacts Officer Casey again. He drives down 
the road to where Casey is and meets Staton and the three others in the silver 
Jeep. 
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 Walker steps forward and begins his cross-examination of Collins. His 
goal is to undo or reconstruct Staton’s subjectivity back to what he articulated in 
his opening statement, that Staton is caring and noble and was knowingly 
providing valuable aid, not garbage, to people in need. In order for him to 
rearticulate Staton’s subjectivity he first must challenge the subjectivity—both the 
authority and credibility—of Collins. 
 Walker begins by having Collins confirm that he has no “technical 
enforcement activities on the wildlife refuge relating to littering” and is only 
“interested in catching people who have crossed the American border illegally” 
(USA v. Staton 1:130). Then, Walker asks, “[O]n this day you don’t observe or 
see any activities by this man or the other people that he is with that have 
anything to do with border enforcement?” (USA v. Staton 1:131). To which 
Collins answers, “That’s true” (USA v. Staton 1:131). Walker is trying to 
disassociate Staton from “illegal aliens,” precisely the opposite of Lee’s strategy. 
Lee has constructed at least a suspicion that Staton is involved in the illegal 
activities that the Border Patrol is looking for. Walker’s needs to establish that 
Staton was not engaging in any of these activities to reconstruct Staton’s 
subjectivity as ethical, honorable, and, of course, law-abiding.  
 Collins admits that he “come across these No More Deaths vehicles in the 
desert before,” that Staton was forthcoming about what he and the three other 
NMD volunteers were doing, and that he saw the No More Deaths sticker-sign on 
the side of Staton’s vehicle. 
	   	  77	  
 Then Walker shifts his line of questioning to the definition to litter. He 
points to Exhibit 3, a photo of the water that was confiscated on December 4, 
2008. Collins agrees that the jugs of water in the photo are full, “like you might 
get at the grocery store” (USA v. Staton 1:134). Then Walker asks, “And did you 
see—did you ever see any of these people putting it out or throwing out or 
dispensing on the wildlife refuge any discarded jugs that contained no water?” 
Collins responds, “No.” Walker is having Collins make the distinction between 
full bottles and empty bottles, and by association between humanitarian aid and 
litter, and to what Staton left in the desert and what Staton did not leave in the 
desert. 
 Finally, Walker pulls out a page from Collins’ report of events on 
December 4, 2008 and reads it in open court. Collins writes (Walker reads), “In 
previous weeks I had located numerous full water bottles consistent with those 
left by humanitarian organizations that work in the area. I have also encountered 
these plastic bottles discarded as garbage further north along these trails” (USA v. 
Staton 1:136). Collins’s log entry fits with Walker’s definition of litter. 
Humanitarians leave “full water bottles” and someone else discards them “as 
garbage.” 
 In the cross-examination of Collins, Walker effective reconstructs Staton’s 
subjectivity, but he does so by rearticulating Collins’ subjectivity. Walker 
repositions Collins’ authority of having nothing to do with litter but instead only 
having to do with “illegal” border-crossings. He then has Collins admit that 
Staton had nothing to do with “illegal” border-crossings or “illegal” activity. 
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Then, ironically, Walker calls upon Collins’ perceived authority, as an agent of 
the state, to help construct his definition of litter. Collins distinguishes the 
difference between full bottles and empty bottles and writes in his logbook that 
NMD leaves full bottles, not garbage, in the desert. Walkers rearticulations are 
effective. 
Border Patrol Agent Baron 
 Lee calls his next witness, another Border Patrol agent, Blake Baron. His 
story corroborates with Collins’. Baron describes his job as “being down in 
remote areas south of Tucson for 10, 12 hours a day. Everything from looking for 
illegal immigrants to drug smugglers” (USA v. Staton 1:139). Baron was in the 
area when he received a call from Collins, who told Baron that “[h]e was working 
what he believed to be a group of four to five illegal aliens in the area” (USA v. 
Staton 1:140). Baron mentions remembering the Border Patrol helicopter circling 
above and then spotting Staton’s Jeep. When Baron sees the Jeep, he attempts to 
get the license plate number as per Collins’ request but is unable to. He continues 
driving down the road and eventually spots the Jeep with the back hatch open 
(thus, the license plate could not be seen) and sees Staton and the three others 
talking with two gallons of water in each hand. Baron calls Agent Collins and 
Officer Casey. In this sequence, Lee attempts to reassociate Staton with “illegal” 
activity and undo Walker’s rearticulations during Collins’ cross-examination. 
During the cross-examination of Baron, Walker must, again, reconstruct the 
subjectivity of Staton. 
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 Since, the framework of Baron’s narrative mirrors Collins, casting Staton 
and the NMD volunteers as the “catch” in an “illegal alien” hunt narrative, 
Walker must reframe the story. He begins, as he did with Collins, by asking 
Baron of the parameters of his authority. Walker asks, “You guys have nothing to 
do with enforcement of crimes by American citizens or alleged crimes by 
American citizens upon the wildlife refuge, do you?” Baron responds, “It depends 
on the crime, sir” (USA v. Staton 1:144) Walker, surprised by the response, 
adjusts, “Yes, of course, thank you. I appreciate that clarification. If they are 
connected with smuggling aliens, then you do?” (USA v. Staton 1:145). Baron 
answers, “Yes, sir.” Walker continues, “You saw nothing that day that indicated 
that the humanitarians that were connected with No More Deaths were doing 
anything in connection with aliens that you were investigating, did you?” Baron 
responds, “No, sir.” Walker continues, “No. In fact that was a whole separate 
incident, was it not?” Baron answers, “Yes, sir.” Walker pushes further, “So when 
you come in contact with these people, and not this direct contact, but when you 
see them, you see them doing nothing with aliens, do you?” Baron responds, “No, 
sir.”  
 What is important in this sequence is that not only is Walker reframing the 
story, disconnecting the discourse that frames Staton and the NMD volunteers in 
the same light as “criminals” and reconnecting it with one that frames and shapes 
the subjectivities of the subjects as nobel and ethical, but he is using the language 
of the state, the Border Patrol, to undo the state’s argument, that Staton and NMD 
are criminals. He juxtaposes the Border Patrol’s phrase “smuggling aliens” right 
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before using the word “humanitarians” and then shortly thereafter reemphasizes 
the separation between what criminals do, “smuggling aliens,” with what 
“humanitarians” do by asking, “you see them doing nothing with the aliens, do 
you?” (USA v. Staton 1:145). By recouping the rhetoric of the “illegal” from the 
state, using the word “alien,” and reordering it in this juxtaposition, Walker 
effectively argues that “humanitarians” are not “illegal,” are not criminals, or are 
not engaging in criminal behavior. (Later in the cross-examination, Walker 
emphasizes this point further by having Baron articulate what he saw the 
humanitarians doing, namely, taking water from the Jeep, not “smuggling 
aliens.”) Once Walker makes this point, which reconstructs the subjectivity of 
Staton and the NMD volunteers as non-criminals, he attempts to use the 
subjectivity of Baron (like Collins) to help construct the definition of litter: 
 First, he reasks Lee’s question: “Now, you have been a border patrol agent 
there on the border two and a half years?” (USA v. Staton 1:145). Walker reasks 
this question to recall Baron’s perceived credibility for the jury, that as a border 
patrol agent he has specialized knowledge of the issues in the desert. Then, 
Walker asks, “You know the value of water in the desert, do you not?” (USA v. 
Staton 1:146). Baron answers, “Yes sir” (146). Walker pushes, “It’s an extremely 
valuable commodity, isn’t it?” Baron agrees, “It is” (USA v. Staton 1:146). And 
then one more push, “In fact, it’s life saving for many people, is it not?” Lee 
objects and the objection is sustained. Walker takes Baron’s subjectivity as an 
authority of the state and Baron’s specialized relation to the desert and turns it 
into an asset for rearticulating the definition of litter. Baron helps define water as 
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valuable and since garbage is not valuable, water is not garbage—especially not 
in the desert. This rhetorical move helps expand the rhetorical agency of Staton, 
that he acted appropriately in the desert, not as a criminal. 
 Lee needs to regain the lost rhetorical agency of the state and so redirects 
Baron, asking him how often he sees NMD on BANWR dropping water. Baron 
answers that he sees NMD volunteers about once or twice a week (USA v. Staton 
1:150). Then Lee asks how often does Baron see NMD come back to pick up the 
empties—or full jugs. Baron answers: Never. Baron admits to seeing “hundreds” 
of empties while seeing only “dozens” of full water jugs. Then, oddly, Lee asks 
the same question, perhaps to emphasize that NMD does not pick up the empty 
water jugs, but this time, Baron answers differently: “I’ve seen when they do. 
When they hold the trash cleanups out there and invite area residents and the 
sportsmen that use the area for hunting to come down, they will clean it up” (USA 
v. Staton 1:151). Recognizing Baron’s inconsistency, Lee quickly steers the next 
question away from Baron’s admission, that NMD does indeed “clean up trash” 
and encourages others to do so, to how Baron has never seen Staton—
specifically—do the clean up.  
 Then, Walker jumps in, seeking to undo Lee’s redirect. He snaps, “You 
don’t have any earthly idea whether this guy went out and picked up trash?” 
(USA v. Staton 1:151). Baron responds, “I’ve never seen him, sir.” “If he were to 
testify that he was out there on occasions picking up trash and garbage, you 
wouldn’t dispute that, would you?” Lee objects, saying that the objection “goes to 
credibility” (USA v. Staton 1:151), but is overruled. Baron responds, no. Walker 
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concludes, asking Baron if he knows whether or not NMD regularly goes out to 
BANWR to collect trash, to which Baron again answers that he does not know. 
 Through this sharp line of questioning, Walker is able to halt the 
reconstruction of Baron’s credibility and shed doubt on Baron’s testimony 
overall. Lee and Walker negotiate—construct and reconstruct—Baron’s 
subjectivity as a un/reliable voice in this case. At times Walker uses Baron’s 
authority to Staton’s advantage, specifically to prove that Staton was not engaged 
in any “illegal smuggling” activities (Since the Border Patrol are “authorities” in 
this area, Baron helps prove Staton’s innocence even though Baron via Lee was 
attempting to imply or at least associate Staton with criminal behavior as a way to 
lower Staton’s character.), and then at other times discredits Baron for having no 
authority, to expose that Baron does not really know what Staton did or did not 
do. 
Fish and Wildlife Officer Casey 
 Lee’s next witness is Fish and Wildlife Officer James Casey. After Lee 
has Casey detail his long list of experience working at various national wildlife 
refuges, Casey explains that the difference between national parks and wildlife 
refuges is that parks are for the enjoyment of the people while refuges are for the 
protection of plants and animals (USA v. Staton 1:155-6). Then, Lee shows Casey 
a series of photographs, all of BANWR at various locations, all with debris and 
garbage. 
 Then, Walker interrupts: “May I voir dire the witness on these 
photographs, Your Honor?” (USA v. Staton 1:164). (“Voir dire” means “to say 
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what is true.” In legalese, it means to determine the competence of an alleged 
expert witness). Judge Guerin permits Walker’s interruption, and Walker asks, 
“Agent, it appears as if these photographs were taken in July of 2007. Is that 
correct?” Casey replies, “I’m not sure if all of them are. This one here we are 
currently looking at is.” Walker continues, “14 has that date on it, does it not?” 
(USA v. Staton 1:164). Casey responds, “Yes, it does.” Then Walker goes on, 
asking the exact same question for photograph 15 and 16 and 17 and 18 and 19. 
Casey continues to respond in the affirmative, but the repetition of Walker’s 
questions and Casey’s “Yes, sir” answers builds a momentum, which casts 
Casey’s hesitation over the first photograph as suspicious. Finally, Walker asks 
where on the refuge the photographs were taken, to which Casey provides the 
details. More pointedly, Walker asks if the photographs “were taken on the 
specific trails that water was put out that day” (USA v. Staton 1:165), to which 
Casey responds that he does not know.  
 Then Walker pushes. “I am asking, do you know whether these 
photographs, Exhibits 14 through 19, are specific locations where this defendant 
and others put out water on December 4, 2009, two and half years later (sic)?” 
(USA v. Staton 1:166). Casey replies, “They are south of that location. They are 
in the general area.” “So they are not in the same locations?” Walker continues. 
Casey responds, “Not the same location.” Again, Casey’s testimony and 
subjectivity becomes suspicious. At first, he say that he does not know if the 
photos were taken on the specific trails but then after being pushed admits that 
they were indeed not taken on the trails but rather south of the trails. 
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 Then, Walker asks Casey if he knew who took the photographs and Casey 
said he did, so then Walker asks, naturally, “Who took the photographs?” and 
Casey responds, “I took the photographs, sir” (USA v. Staton 1:166). 
 In this sequence Walker first attempts to challenge the relevance of the 
photographs, which were taken in July 2007 while the alleged crime took place in 
December 2008. Instead, in addition to determining that the photos were taken a 
year and a half earlier, he discovers that they were not even taken at the same 
location of the alleged crime. Moreover, Casey took the photos himself, which 
raises questions about his credibility, considering when first asked if the photos 
were taken in 2007 he says, “I’m not sure if all of them are” (USA v. Staton 
1:164). He took the photos, he knew where they were taken, and thus he knew 
when they were taken. Casey seems to construct his own subjectivity—with the 
help of Walker—as a suspicious rather than an expert witness. 
 Lee allowed to direct his witness again quickly works to reconstruct 
Casey’s subjectivity as reliable and authoritative. Lee asks, “[...] even though [the 
photographs] were taken some time ago, are they still fair and accurate 
representative of locations on the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge?” (USA 
v. Staton 1:167). Casey concurs. This one questions seems to undercut Walker’s 
interruption. Casey is able to continue his testimony and his photographs are 
admitted as evidence, over Walker’s objection. 
 In the next sequence, Lee asks Casey to describe what he sees in the 
photos and how the garbage smells—“You can smell feces, urine. Body odor that 
is actually trapped in the clothing tends to accumulate there. Also the smell of 
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rotting food is very common” (USA v. Staton 1:167)—but then, Casey further 
describes one photo of empty water bottles as being along “illegal” trails: “This is 
a trail. This is an illegal trail. This is not maintained. This is—these are water 
bottles and other types of trash left along the trail” (USA v. Staton 1:167). Lee 
interjects, “When you say ‘illegal trail,’ are there only certain trails authorized on 
the refuge?” (USA v. Staton 1:168). Casey continues, “There are several 
maintained trails that are recognized by the refuge as hiking-type trails or nature 
walking trails” (USA v. Staton 1:168). 
 It’s critical that the state use the term “illegal” with regards to the trail. 
The rhetoric of the word “illegal” in this context relates to the “illegal” 
immigrants which have created them. Both are “illegal” or not “authorized on the 
refuge” as Lee puts it. In addition, water bottles and trash are along the “illegal” 
trails in the photographs, thus associating the litter with the water bottles and the 
water bottles to the “illegal” trails and the “illegal” trails to the “illegal” 
immigrants. 
 This sequence in particular which Casey describes in photograph 15 and 
then continues to describe in photograph 16, 17, 18, and 19 articulates the 
constellation of relations between the subjects in this rhetorical situation. Because 
of these relations and the use of the rhetorical marker “illegal,” the subjectivities 
of the immigrants and NMD are implicated as criminal. The implied argument is 
as follows: The “illegal” immigrants created “illegal” trails on the refuge. Both do 
not belong. Moreover, litter and water bottles do not belong on the refuge. 
“Illegal” immigrants use the water bottles. NMD supplies the water bottles. By 
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association—by relation—NMD’s subjectivity is shaped by Lee as engaging in 
“illegal” activities, even though humanitarian aid is not a crime. 
 Earlier, Border Patrol agent Baron admitted seeing “trash cleanups” by 
NMD on BANWR. While Lee cannot argue that NMD does not perform trash 
cleanups, he can make an argument regarding the frequency of those cleanups. 
After asking Casey to describe the components of each water bottle—the plastic 
tops, the plastic binding, and the plastic bottle itself—Lee asks Casey, in 
reference to a bottle in a photograph, if they are “in a sturdy condition or brittle?” 
(USA v. Staton 1:169). Casey responds, “Brittle condition, sir.” And Lee follows-
up, “What would that indicate to you?” “They have been left on the refuge for 
quite some time” (USA v. Staton 1:170). 
 It is common knowledge in southern Arizona that the scorching hot desert 
sun could turn any inorganic material brittle. Discussing the condition of the 
discarded bottles indicates to the jury that the “garbage” left by NMD has been 
left out in the desert for quite some time, so while NMD volunteers may indeed 
organize trash cleanups, they must not do so on a frequent basis. This careful 
construction of logic by Lee restructures NMD’s subjectivity from a responsible 
humanitarian group to an irresponsible one. 
 Lee continues to push that not only are “brittle” bottles and “fresher” ones 
(USA v. Staton 1:170) found along the refuge, but so are the plastic tops and 
bindings. The jury is shown a paper bag Casey uses to collect the plastic tops and 
binding that he encounters “very frequently” (USA v. Staton 1:172) on BANWR. 
He even states that 60 to 70 percent of the refuge is covered with these plastic 
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tops and bindings (USA v. Staton 1:172). Then, in a similar move to Walker, Lee 
ask a series of quasi-repetitious questions and Casey responds with repetitious 
answers: “When you are on the refuge, how often do you see water jugs?” “Every 
day, sir” “How often do you see the tops of the water jugs?” “Every day, sir.” 
“What about the bindings?” “Every day, sir” (USA v. Staton 1:173). The 
rhetorical effect of Lee and Casey’s repetition is an attention paid to the volume 
of garbage left on BANWR. 
 Finally, Lee directly questions Casey about the events of December 4, 
2008. Casey received a call over the radio from Collins. He left and went to 
milepost seven on Arivaca Road. There, he found Baron waiting by Staton’s 
empty Jeep. The two waited about ten minutes when Staton and the three other 
NMD volunteers arrived carrying approximately 10 empty water jugs. Casey 
asked Staton how many full water jugs Staton left on the trail. Staton said eight. 
Casey asked to see them and Staton complied, but before they walked down the 
trail, Collins arrived to inform Casey that he found 20 full water bottles that he 
thinks Staton and his group also left. Then, Staton and the others took the agents 
and Casey to retrieve the eight bottles. Casey seized the water as evidence and 
cited Staton for littering (USA v. Staton 1:174-8). 
 Before leaving, Casey took a binder from Staton’s Jeep (USA v. Staton 
1:179). Inside the binder were maps and descriptions of water drops and where 
water should be left on different locations. Lee shows the jury a picture of the 
water bottles left by Staton and his group. On the water bottles there are markings, 
the number “577” and the date “12-4-08” (USA v. Staton 1:181). 
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 Walker begins his cross-examination the following day, by having Casey 
look at one of the pictures Casey took of the full water bottles on the trail. Walker 
asks Casey if Casey sees any debris in the photo. Casey replies that there “appears 
to be a can or a bottle, toward the top middle of the photo” (USA v. Staton 2.1:20) 
to which Walker responds, “And that’s the only debris that you see on that 
photograph, isn’t it?” “Yes, sir,” Casey follow. 
 Walker is attempting to make two arguments. One, the definition of litter 
excludes water. Walker’s questions seeks to make Casey unknowingly construct a 
definition of debris that favors the defense. Casey, while looking for “debris” in 
the photo, could have answered, “the full bottles of water,” but does not. Instead, 
Casey mentions a can or a bottle, not the 20 full bottles of water. Two, the photos 
are inaccurate. Walker seeks to establish that on December 4, 2008, there was not 
much trash on the refuge, but perhaps during July of 2007, when the photos were 
taken a year and a half earlier, BANWR was covered in trash. Moreover, NMDs 
trash cleanups in 2008 might have helped reduce the litter. In short, the 2007 
photographs are misrepresentations of BANWR. 
 Walker next recalls the binder of maps and instructions that Casey seized 
from Staton’s Jeep. Walker reads what is written at the top of the map and has 
Casey confirm it. It says, “Route, AW. Description, Arivaca West supply drop 
driving and hiking route” (USA v. Staton 2.1:31). Casey confirms that the map 
says this and that they indeed found water bottles in this location, on December 
4th, and that Staton admitted to doing so (USA v. Staton 2.1:31), but then Walker 
reads on what is written on the map: “That last three drop points are on the 
	   	  89	  
Buenos Aires Wildlife Refuge. If you drop here, you risk being ticketed for 
littering by US Fish and Wildlife, regardless of how much trash you pick up. You 
can be ticketed for that too” (USA v. Staton 2.1:31-2). So then Walker asks 
Casey, “Is it true that you can be ticketed for picking up trash?” And Casey says, 
“Yes” (USA v. Staton 2.1:32). (It is never clear as to why this rule is in place nor 
is it explained on BANWR’s official website.) This instruction, written on the 
NMD water drop map, presumably written by a NMD volunteer will come back 
to haunt Staton, but for now Walker is using it to construct his definition of litter. 
However, in the following sequence Walker has trouble negotiating the definition 
with Casey. 
 Walker asks Casey if when he first encountered Staton and the others, if 
they were carrying full bottles of water. Casey says they were not, so Walker 
asks, “They were carrying empty bottles back to their vehicle, off of the wildlife 
refuge, were they not?” (USA v. Staton 2.1:33). Casey answers, “They were still 
on the wildlife refuge, yes, sir.” Walker clarifies, “Yes, but they were picking up 
trash, were they not?” Casey answers, “They had water jugs in their hands yes, 
sir.” 
 Walker is trying to get Casey to help construct the definition of litter, but 
Casey does not cooperate. Casey does not clarify in this sequence if the “water 
jugs” were empty or full, even though the day before in his testimony to Lee, 
Casey says Staton and his group had approximately 10 empty water bottles when 
he first encountered them (USA v. Staton 1:176). He does not use the word 
“trash” in relation to the empty water bottles; he again, merely calls them “water 
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jugs.” By refusing to negotiate, establish the relation between these words and 
Walker’s words, Casey avoids reconstructing a definition of litter that means 
“empty bottle” and keeps it under his own definition of litter as “empty or full 
bottle.” 
 Walker grows frustrated with Casey’s lack of compliance with regards to 
this definition reconstruction. After Casey says that Staton and the others merely 
had “water jugs in their hands” rather than “empty water jugs” or “trash,” Walker 
attempts again: “And they were bringing them back to the truck to take them off 
the wildlife refuge?” Casey responds, “I don’t know if that was their intention. 
They were holding empty water jugs” (USA v. Staton 2.1:33). Casey finally says, 
“empty water jugs,” and so Walker pushes some more, “And they were taking 
them toward their truck weren’t they, sir?” “Yes,” Casey responds. “Well, what 
do you think their intentions were?” Lee objects and the objection is sustained. So 
then Walker modifies the question to, “Well, did you ask them what their 
intentions were?” Casey replies, “No, sir, I didn’t.” Then Walker snaps, “Well, 
you didn’t think their intentions were to throw them out into the wildlife—” Lee 
objects and is sustained again. 
 This sequence marks a moment of restricted agency for Walker. 
Rhetorical agency is a negotiation, and Casey is not negotiating, or at least not in 
the way that Walker wants him to. Casey knows that if he does negotiate, use the 
language of litter or relate empty water jugs to litter, his definition—the one that 
he used to give and justify the citation he gave to Staton—will be reconstructed. 
His power and his agency will depreciate. And so Casey is careful when 
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answering Walker’s questions and is precise with his words—or sometimes lack 
of words. 
 Walker continues the cross-examination and reminds Casey of his 
testimony from the day before when Casey said that he smelled rotten food and 
feces in the littered areas of the refuge. Then Walker asks Casey if Staton and his 
group brought food and left it out. Lee objects but is overruled. Casey says that 
they did not. Walker then asks if he saw them defecate (USA v. Staton 2.1:35), 
and again Casey said that he did not (USA v. Staton 2.1:36). So then Walker asks, 
“What you saw them leaving was nothing more than full sealed bottles of pure, 
clean water; true?” Casey carefully responds, “I was told they left full sealed 
bottles on the refuge, sir.” Walker asks a slightly different question, “And the 
bottles that you retrieved and took pictures of were bottles of sealed pure, clean 
water; true?” Casey answers, “Yes, sir, that day.” 
 Walker departs from this line of questioning in order to construct a new 
argument, the value of water and its role in the definition of litter. The logic 
Walker hopes to build is the following: litter has no value, so it is trash, but water 
has value (costs money), so it cannot be trash. Casey admits that the bottles of 
water had a “Fry’s label” (a label of a local grocery store in Tucson). The key 
word that Walker often uses to construct this relation between water and value is 
“identification.” “[I]t had identification on them, that they were actually bought at 
a store in Tucson” (USA v. Staton 2.1:36). He uses the word again with regards to 
Staton, asking Casey if he had asked Staton for his identification. (Casey said he 
did, and Stanton complied.) Walker then uses “identification” again with regards 
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to Staton’s Jeep, asking Casey if he saw the big sticker-sign which said “No More 
Deaths” on the Jeep. (Casey said he did.) What Walker wants to construct, of 
course, is a definition of litter, which is contested constantly in this case. What is 
not contested, however, is the value of the bottle of water, the identity of Staton, 
and the identity of the Jeep as a NMD’s vehicle—all have been identified as such. 
The transparent identifications of these three help lay the foundation of what is 
and what is not, moving the subjectivities of things and people from ambiguous 
areas to distinct areas. Building relations to those already “agreed upon” 
definitions is the goal of Walker’s value arguments. 
 Toward at the end of Walker’s cross-examination of Casey, he asks the 
Fish and Wildlife officer, “[Y]ou asked Mr. Staton what he was doing, and you 
asked him how many empty water bottles did you pick up? You asked him that 
question, didn’t you?” Casey replies, “Yes, sir, I did” (USA v. Staton 2.1:37). 
Finally, Casey admits to “empty” water bottles. But then Walker asks, “And you, 
in fact, asked him, did you not, did he usually pick up empties?” (USA v. Staton 
2.1:37). Casey says “I do not recall, sir, if I asked him that” (USA v. Staton 
2.1:38). 
 As it turns out, Casey records the entire exchange with Staton in the desert 
without Staton knowing. When Walker points this out, Lee objects to relevance. 
Judge Guerin sustains. Walker knows it is not relevant but knows that recording 
without permission hurts Casey’s character (USA v. Staton 2.1:38). Nevertheless, 
Walkers pulls out the transcript of Casey’s recording and points to page 13 when 
Casey asks, “Do you guys usually pick up empties when you come out too?” 
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(USA v. Staton 2.1:40). Casey then confirms that he did ask that question. Walker 
then goes through the transcript when the NMD volunteers say that they brought 
out garbage cans that day to pick up litter and Casey says to them “Well, we 
appreciate you picking them up on your way out.” (USA v. Staton 2.1:40).  
 What Walker is trying to do here is two-fold. One, discredit Casey, for 
first tape-recording without permission and second for lying by not admitting he 
asked this question. Two, that while picking-up garbage is a different act from 
littering (to do one act does not undo the other), it helps lend credibility to Staton 
that he “knew” what the difference was between litter and water. Thus, the crime 
of “knowingly littered” should be dismissed. In other words, he picked up 
garbage, but he left water. 
Walt Staton 
 After the morning break, Walker calls Staton to the stand. He makes 
allusions to his opening statement, constructing Staton’s ethos as credible and 
honest. He has Staton mention his clean criminal record, his status as a “pure” 
Arizonan, his 4.0 high school GPA, his involvement with EcoBears (an 
environmental club at his high school that would perform trash clean-ups), his 
Boy Scout experience and Eagle Scout award, his full-tuition scholarship to all 
three Arizona universities, and his choice to attend the U of A in Tucson (the 
favorite among Tucsonans), his knowledge of map making and map reading via 
his geography and regional development degree, his volunteer work with the 
Sonoran Institute (a Tucson non-profit that seeks to preserve wildlife), his 
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Wilderness First Responder training and certification, and his recent acceptance to 
seminary school (USA v. Staton 2.1:78-83). 
 Next, Walker has Staton discuss NMD and his involvement in the group. 
During the discussion, Staton says that NMD does not “engage in any smuggling 
activities” nor “helping people, undocumented migrants in crossing the border” 
(USA v. Staton 2.1:84). The articulation is noted because several times Walker 
has argued that Staton’s case as nothing to do with “illegal” immigration and 
should solely focus on the crime of littering, but here Staton speaks directly to 
immigration and “smuggling,” a preemptive defensive posture to indicate to the 
jury the legitimacy of NMD.  
 Then, Staton is given his chance to recount the events of December 4th: 
He was out on a supply water drop with one other volunteer from NMD and two 
U of A students. Before Casey stopped them, they had already put out over 50 
water jugs. He was following a system, established by himself, a retired dean of 
geosciences at the U of A, and other NMD volunteers. They mapped trails used 
by immigrants and put the water where trails converged. Instead of placing water 
on one trail, they would place it at the convergency of several “high traffic” trails 
(USA v. Staton 2.1:86-87).  
 Staton then looks at Casey’s photos of the refuge and says that the plastic 
bottles in the pictures are not from NMD but from Mexico (USA v. Staton 
2.1:89). Walker and Staton go through each photo, and Staton points out the 
difference in shape and size between the Mexican water jugs and the ones left by 
NMD, relieving him of the responsibility of the trash in the photos (USA v. Staton 
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2.1:91). Then, Walker asks Staton if he tried to hide anything from Casey, 
withhold any information about his actions from the officer (USA v. Staton 
2.1:93). This question about Staton’s transparency, his forthcoming admission of 
what he was doing, is brought up several times by Walker. Staton’s transparency 
not only lends credibility to his testimony, that he is telling the truth, but that he is 
innocent, that he has nothing to hide, that what he did was right and he thought it 
was right. 
 Next, Walker brings up the cost of the water, the value argument. Staton 
admits to purchasing the water from a grocery store in Tucson. Walker then asks a 
key question: “On December 4th, when you were putting out the bottles of water, 
did you believe that putting out full bottles of fresh pure water, as you did, was 
littering or disposing of garbage or other debris?” Staton’s response, “Absolute 
not” (USA v. Staton 2.1:93). “A full jug of water is what we put out. We intend 
that to be something that migrants who, if they’re dehydrated or whatever, if they 
need water, that’s what the water’s for [...] I know there has been thousands of 
deaths along the border over the last several years. Many of the deaths occur from 
symptoms starting with dehydration” (USA v. Staton 2.1:94). Walker asks, “How 
do you know that?” Staton continues, “It’s my personal experience. I have come 
across migrants in the desert who are dehydrated. I know that because of my 
Wilderness First Responder training. We can do patient assessments in the field” 
(USA v. Staton 2.1:94). 
 Not only does Walker have Staton reveal his background early on in the 
cross-examination, which helps construct Staton’s subjectivity as honest and 
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credible, but uses that background to help express Staton’s “knowing” in this 
case. In other words, his certified training helped Staton “know” he was providing 
water to prevent dehydration—not littering. 
 Staton then explains the training he received from NMD. He discusses the 
“limited manpower” and how they need to figure out exactly where to put this 
water to help as many migrants as possible. He says that NMD’s mission is to 
save lives and they do so in a “strategic,” in a “scientific,” and in a “systematic” 
way (USA v. Staton 2.1:96). Those key words remove Staton’s perceived 
subjectivity out of the realm of “personal experience” (ethos), or acting 
emotionally as an individual (pathos), or even out of politics, and temporarily into 
a neutral, logical, space (logos). Of course NMD’s desert activities are political 
and personal, but reconstructing it as “science” suspends momentarily those other 
elements and helps view Staton’s actions as scientific. 
 Then, Walker gets to the maps confiscated from Staton’s Jeep and says, 
“Okay. This says, ‘If you drop here, you risk being ticketed for littering by U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife.” Staton, “That’s correct.” Walker, “‘Regardless of how much 
trash you pick up.’” Staton, “Yes.” Walker, “So if you know that you might be 
cited, doesn’t that indicate you knew this was a violation of the law, what you 
were doing?” (USA v. Staton 2.1:99). 
 This question speaks directly to the “knowing” part of Staton’s crime, that 
he “knowingly littered.” Staton provides a technical answer, but it is rather weak. 
“I was aware that we could be given a ticket for it. That doesn’t mean that I 
thought it was a violation of the law or that I thought I would be guilty of this. We 
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knew that the tickets were issued but that there was outstanding cases, and a ticket 
doesn’t mean you’re guilty” (USA v. Staton 2.1:99-100). True, but not 
convincing. It is clear that Staton “knew” but tries to maneuver around it. This 
key admission or lack thereof will be exploited by Lee in the cross-examination. 
 After the lunch break, Lee is given the chance to cross-examine Staton. He 
begins by asking Staton if the plastic tops and binding are good for the 
environment (Staton says no) and then asks if they belong on the refuge (USA v. 
Staton 2.2:3-4). Staton answers that he doesn’t like to see those things on the 
refuge.  
 Next, Lee directly attacks Staton’s ethos, the one that Walker spent so 
much time constructing to showcase Staton’s credibility and knowledge. Lee uses 
the constructed subjectivity against Staton to reduce Staton’s agency. He asks 
Staton if he was a member of the Eco Bears, the Boy Scouts, an Eagle Scout, and 
the Sonoran Institute, to which Staton answers yes. Then, Lee asks if Staton has 
planned to go out and drop water on December 4th and if he “knew” what he was 
going to do. Staton said yes. But then Lee asks, “But prior to going there on 
December 4, 2008, you didn’t notify the refuge manager that you were going 
there, did you?” Staton answers, “No” (USA v. Staton 2.2:5). This question 
directly challenges Staton’s transparency and cooperation, which has been 
constructed by Walker as forthcoming so many times. Staton’s subjectivity shifts 
to someone doing something sneaky instead of out in the open. 
 Then, Lee turns his questioning to authorization, to authority, to state 
power. He asks if the trail that Staton dropped water on was an “authorized trail” 
	   	  98	  
(USA v. Staton 2.2:6). Staton says that he has no idea if it was or was not but that 
the chosen trail is something that NMD determines, if it is used by lots of 
undocumented immigrants, then water is put out (USA v. Staton 2.2:6-7). This 
sequence pinpoints a primary clash between a public (the state) and a 
counterpublic (NMD). Each is negotiating agency, fighting over who has the 
authority to act and who does not. The state suggests that it has the power to 
define these trails, while NMD claims to have the same naming power. Who has 
this authority? Who has this power? By “not checking” with state authorities or 
“not knowing” if a trail is “authorized,” NMD via Staton is effectivity subverting 
the state, acting autonomously with their own perceived agency and power. 
 Next, Lee makes two moves. First, he ask Staton if he leaves the water 
jugs for “distressed illegal aliens” (USA v. Staton 2.2:8). Staton says he does but 
he rarely sees them since they travel at night. So then Lee notes that Staton didn’t 
see anyone when he dropped off the water, asking, “You didn’t get a chance to 
use your wilderness first responders skills [...]? [...] [Y]ou basically abandoned 
them at drop point 577. Is that right?” (USA v. Staton 2.2:8). 
 The quick questions allows Lee to implicate Staton with “illegal” aliens, 
associate Staton with perceived “criminals,” and makes headway into the second 
part of the crime, that Staton “abandoned” the water or disposed of it, by leaving 
water in the desert with no one there to pick it up. Then, Lee’s argument that 
Staton did not use his wilderness responders training skills shifts the rhetorical 
situation: Earlier Walker constructs Staton’s subjectivity as a medical expert in a 
medical crisis in the desert. But Lee does not let this constructed medical situation 
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play out—sick patients (dehydrated migrants), medics (Staton) giving out 
medicine (leaving water), healed patients (migrants drinking water). Instead Lee 
isolates the precise moment when Staton leaves the water (medicine) but before 
the distressed migrant (sick patient) picks it up as a way to show that Staton is not 
a medic but a litterer. Isolating this moment makes it look like Staton just dropped 
the water and left. It looks like he littered. It does not look like he provided life-
saving humanitarian aid. 
 Staton attempts to refocus the rhetorical situation with his response, 
“Those jugs were left at point 577 with the intention of saving people lives” (USA 
v. Staton 2.2:8), that this was a medical situation and that his “intention”—he 
“knowingly” understood the situation to be—was medical. So Lee tries again, 
“You left these jugs at 577 with no intention of coming back to get them. Is that 
correct?” Staton fires back, “No, that’s not absolutely correct.” Lee adjusts and 
argues that Staton didn’t have a specific plan to pick them up and Staton agrees. 
In Walker’s direct examination Staton was able to construct NMD as systematic 
and scientific, with a calculated plan and follow through. But here it’s clear that 
NMD did not have a plan, not a systematic nor scientific one, to “clean up.” Lee 
argument turns NMD strength into a weakness. 
 Lee keeps pushing to show that NMD has no “clean up” plan but Staton 
finally has an answer. Lee says, “In fact, you had no idea of when, if ever, these 
jugs would have ever been collected back, do you?” Staton, “I do. These water 
drop routes are usually done on a weekly basis. Whether it would be myself 
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personally or another volunteer within the organization, usually within a week we 
check up on all these spots” (USA v. Staton 2.2:9). 
 But Lee pushes back, and Staton’s response is important because it 
exposes the state’s attempt to construct clear articulations, that NMD has no plan, 
that NMD littered. Staton’s response uncovers the heart of this case, that this 
rhetorical situation is gray and articulations must be negotiated. Lee asks, “You 
don’t have any idea of whether or not you could have recovered these 20 water 
jugs when you dropped them off on December 4, 2008, do you?” Staton says, “I’d 
say it’s a little more complicated than that.” Lee counters, “That’s a yes or no 
question.” Staton, “I understand it’s a yes or no question. I don’t think I can give 
you a yes or no answer” (USA v. Staton 2.2:9). 
 Staton like Casey is very careful with his answers. Any movement could 
expand or restrict the opportunities for his agency and persuasive power to grow, 
take away NMD’s power, or could give power back to the state. By not giving 
clear yes/no answers, Staton keeps the opportunities open, temporarily. 
 Then, Lee gets to the question of full bottles of water and empty bottles of 
water and what is litter and what is not litter. It is clear that Staton believes 
empties are litter and full bottles are not, so then Lee shifts and asks if Staton is 
aware of Dan Millis’s littering case and ruling. (Millis another volunteer for NMD 
put full water bottles out on BANWR months earlier and was cited for littering. 
On September 22, 2009 he was convicted of littering but received no sentence and 
his case during the time of Staton’s trial was still under appeal.) Staton says he is 
aware of both (USA v. Staton 2.2:14), but Lee looks to clarify: “You knew that he 
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was convicted, a judgement was found where he was guilty on September 22, 
right?” Staton responds, “My understanding is that is an ongoing case that hasn’t 
had a final resolution to it yet.” 
 His response is smart. Lee is trying to expose Staton’s “knowing” and 
rearticulate the definition of litter. Staton clearly knew of the case, but defines 
litter as empty containers. If Millis left full bottles of water in the desert for 
migrants, was ticketed and convicted of littering for the full bottles, then Staton 
“knew” that leaving full bottles could result in guilt, i.e. that full bottles of water 
were defined as litter by the state. But Staton dodges this admission by saying that 
the conviction was not final but “ongoing.” In other words, Staton uses the 
authority of the state on the state. If the state defines what is litter and what is not, 
and the state identifies when definitions are set and when they are not (until the 
cases are final, through the appeals process), then Staton is correct. 
 Lee attempts to expose Staton again, “You knew he was found guilty by a 
U.S. Magistrate Judge on September 22, right?” (USA v. Staton 2.2:15). Staton 
responds, “I am aware of the ruling. I know it is still an ongoing case.” Staton in 
particular uses the word “know” to directly counter what Lee is trying to get at, 
that Staton knew he was littering, but instead, Staton argues that he knew it was an 
ongoing case, the definition of litter was not yet finalized. Staton is fighting to 
continue to negotiate this definition of litter and Lee is trying to end it. Their 
rhetorical agencies are directly competing in this moment. 
 Seeing that Staton is not budging in this direction, Lee attempts to push 
Staton in another direction, using Staton’s strong credibility against him. “Let me 
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ask you this. You are a straight A student, right?” Staton answers “Yes.” Lee 
continues, “When there is a ruling, until it’s overturned, it is still good law?” 
Walker objects and the judge sustains it. Using this strategy, Lee is trying to push 
Staton to stop dodging, to answer intelligently and honestly, like his character 
portrayal suggests. 
 Then, Lee pulls out a newspaper article and asks Staton, “On October 22, 
2008 [a month after Millis was found guilty of littering], did you make a 
statement to the Presbyterian news service, words to the effect of: I vow that the 
organization will continue its humanitarian aid work in the desert regardless of the 
outcome of the Millis case?” Staton confirms that he did. 
 The evidence and affirmation seriously damages Staton’s case. It is clear 
that he “knew” that setting water out was considered littering by the state. Lee 
continues to push the point while Staton tries to hedge. Again, Staton and Lee are 
negotiating their rhetorical agency. Lee: “In other words, you were just going to 
ignore the judge’s ruling and continue dropping off water jugs like Exhibit 39 
despite the ruling from Judge Velasco?” Staton: “I wouldn’t say ‘in other words.’ 
The words I said: We were going to continue our—did I say ‘humanitarian’?—
what was quoted, humanitarian efforts in the desert to save the lives of people that 
are dying. That’s what our commitment is.” Lee qualifies, “That was despite 
Judge Velasco’s ruling?” Staton clarifies, “It’s not despite his ruling. It’s a 
responsibility that I feel we have when thousands of people are dying is to do 
humanitarian aid” (USA v. Staton 2.2:19). 
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 Then, something unusual happens. Lee tells Judge Guerin that he objects 
to Staton’s answer. He calls it “non-responsive” and “moves to strike.” This 
sequence highlights the rhetorical space between the state and NMD and Staton’s 
unwillingness to negotiate his agency on Lee’s terms. Staton is essentially saying 
that this situation is about humanitarian aid, while Lee is saying it is about 
breaking the law. Judge Guerin orders that Staton’s response “be stricken” (USA 
v. Staton 2.2:19) and then Walker objects, requesting that the judge reconsider 
(USA v. Staton 2.2:20). The judge has the court reporter reread the question, 
Staton asks that it be read again, and then he finally answers, “The words I would 
say is we were going to continue our humanitarian efforts in the desert—” Lee 
objects, stating that it’s a yes or no question. The judge asks Staton to give a yes 
or no answer. Staton says, “I don’t feel like I could give a yes or no answer and be 
fully honest” (USA v. Staton 2.2:20). 
 Staton’s is trying not to be constructed as outwardly breaking the law, but 
by not answering Lee’s question with a “yes” or “no,” Staton is indirectly 
constructing an argument, exposing to the jury (and the state) that the law is a bad 
law, that the law does not follow humanitarian law, that the law does not take into 
account the context of the desert or the hundreds of undocumented immigrants 
suffering and dying on a yearly basis. Staton directly or indirectly is turning Lee’s 
question into his argument. 
 Finally Judge Guerin asks Staton, “Were you going to continue to drop off 
the water jugs or were you not? And Staton answers, “Yes, we were going to 
continue doing water drop routes, yes” (USA v. Staton 2.2:20-1). 
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 Lee now understands Staton’s argument and belief and rearticulates it. The 
rhetorical move relocates the context from the desert to the law and in doing so 
effectively convicts Staton. Lee asks, “Would it be fair to say that you just 
disagree with what the law is and not that you don’t know what the law is?” 
Staton responds, “I believe it would be more fair to say there is a humanitarian 
crisis on the border, and as a person of faith and conscience, I’m reacting to that 
more than what law has to say in this regard” (USA v. Staton 2.2:21). 
 Staton uses the words “faith and conscience” which comes directly from 
NMD’s roots and founding in the principle of civil initiative6. The implied 
argument here is that there’s the law created by humans and then there’s the law 
created by God. God’s law is above human law. Staton follows God’s law and 
thus in his mind is excused from following human law. Lee’s job is to make sure 
Staton is held accountable to breaking human law, regardless of Staton’s spiritual 
beliefs or adherence to civil initiative. 
 Lee continues, “Would you agree with me when I say that it’s just—that 
you just merely disagree with the law and it’s not your misunderstanding of the 
law?” Lee wants to show that Staton “knew” he was breaking the law. To 
disagree is to know; in other words, in order to disagree one must “know” what 
he/she is disagreeing about. Staton responds, “I would disagree with the 
application of the law. I believe if you are out picnicking and you were to throw 
beer cans everywhere, a littering ticket would be completely appropriate. I believe 
that if thousands of people are dying and you are putting gallon jugs of water out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Chapter 2 for a fuller explanation. 
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with the intention of helping save lives, it’s a ridiculous charge, littering is a 
ridiculous charge” (USA v. Staton 2.2:21-22). 
 Staton perfectly articulates what he believes, which is noble and consistent 
with the subjectivity that Walker helped construct, but at the same time, his 
articulation seals his fate. Using the words “ridiculous charge” proves that he 
knew the law and merely thought it was “ridiculous.” Still Lee wants to be sure 
that Staton clearly “confesses” that he knew and disagreed with (disobeyed, i.e. 
broke) the law. 
 “Mr. Staton, yes or no, do you disagree with the law?” Staton answers, to 
Lee’s dissatisfaction, “No, I disagree with the enforcement and interpretation of 
the law.” Staton makes one last effort with this answer to make a caveat to the law 
and rearticulate the definition of litter. He is arguing that the law is not wrong and 
that he does not disagree with the law. He believes that littering is wrong and that 
those who litter should be punished, like the beer can example. However, he 
believes that this littering law should not be applied to this situation, to this 
humanitarian crisis on the border. Humanitarian aid is never considered litter in 
other contexts, thus a littering law should not be applied to it, should not be 
enforced, and should not be interpreted in this way. In other words, Lee and 
Staton are in a tug-of-war over context. Lee is trying to pull Staton into the 
context of the law and Staton is trying to pull Lee back into the context of the 
desert. Staton knows that if he is dragged into context of the law, he will lose his 
case, but also he hopes that by articulating the context of the desert, the 
application and enforcement of the law will change. Staton recognizes that at this 
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point in the trail, the case is no longer about him; it’s about the state criminalizing 
humanitarian aid. If humanitarian aid is reconstructed and redefined as litter then 
the life-saving aid cannot be given and that humanitarians who continue to 
provide the aid will be considered criminals. 
 Lee tries one last approach. He pulls up the NMD map again that has the 
following written on it, “If you drop here, you risk being ticketed for littering by 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife. [...] The last three drop points are on the Buenos Aires 
National Wildlife Refuge” (USA v. Staton 2.2:23). Lee asks Staton if he 
understands the meaning of these sentences. He says he does. So then Lee asks, 
“And despite knowing the contents of those two sentences that I mentioned, you 
dropped off these 20 or so gallon water jugs similar to Exhibit 39 [photo of 
Staton’s water that Casey took] on the wildlife refuge that day, right?” Staton 
responds, “Yes that is correct.” Staton reveals that he “knew” the law. 
 In Walker’s redirect, he tries to recover Staton’s subjectivity and begins by 
differentiating litter from water. He goes through Casey’s pictures again, asking 
Staton what he left on the refuge. For the pictures of empty jugs of water and 
other trash like the tops and bindings, Staton says that he did not leave those, but 
when he saw them, he picked them up to throw out, and for the photos of the 
filled jugs of water, he says he did leave those on BANWR (USA v. Staton 
2.2:24-5). For the picture of full water jugs in a cluster, Walker asks Staton if the 
arrangement is how NMD leaves the water. Staton says that it is and that NMD 
volunteers also then go back regularly and clean up the empties. “It is definitely 
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part of our regular practice to minimize the impact of the discarded bottles as 
much as possible” (USA v. Staton 2.2:27). 
 In his opening sequence, Walker attempted to reconstruct the definition of 
litter, away from full containers and toward empty containers. He also placed 
Staton in association with the full containers, thus, not the empties or trash. 
Moreover, he looked to reconstruct NMD’s subjectivity as a group that does care 
about the environment, that does regularly go out and clean up the empty 
containers. Lee exposed that NMD does not have a strategic plan for clean-up like 
it does for putting out the water, but Walker attempted to show that while they do 
not have a systematic plan, they do still go out there on a regular basis and clean-
up. 
 Walker then shifts the line of questioning to rearticulate Staton’s 
“knowing” when it comes to littering. He asks, “Did you believe or did you not 
believe that it was litter to put out these groups of water as per this exhibit that is 
on the monitor?” Staton responds, “I did not and I do not believe it is litter. I 
believe it is water to save people’s lives” (USA v. Staton 2.2:27). The response is 
helpful and hurtful to Staton’s case. On the one hand, his answer reiterates the 
difference between water and litter and reenforces the argument that he provided 
water and not litter. On the other hand, it shows that Staton knows the law and 
that he “believes” in something that is different from the law. That “belief” does 
not change the fact that he broke the law. Thus, he knowingly littered. 
 Then, Walker turns directly to Judge Velasco’s ruling. He asks Staton if he 
read the ruling or know what the ruling says, or if the ruling was ever submitted to 
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a jury. Staton says no to all three, so Walker attempts to undo Lee’s exposure of 
Staton’s belief: “You were asked by the prosecutor whether it was just that you 
disagreed with the law? [...] Do you think you were littering garbage or debris that 
day?” Staton responds, “No, I do not believe I was littering garbage or refuse or 
debris or any of the words we have heard” (USA v. Staton 2.2:31). Walker again 
tries to rearticulate that Staton did not “know” that he was littering but fails to do 
so because both the question and the answer are housed in terms of belief. Staton 
“believes” he was not littering and “belief” is different from knowing. It’s the 
same distinction Lee made, and it reiterates that Staton knew the law but disagrees 
with it, proving again that he is guilty of littering. Walker is unable to recover 
Staton’s rhetorical agency or subjectivity. 
Closing Statements 
 Staton is dismissed, and the jury is given “the instructions,” the framework 
they are to use and only use to determine the verdict of the case. Judge Guerin 
reads Staton’s charge, “The defendant is charged with knowingly littering in 
violation of Title 50, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 27.94 on December 4, 
2008” (USA v. Staton 2.2:46), and notes that the government must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly littered what he knew to be 
garbage on a national wildlife refuge (USA v. Staton 2.2:46). Interestingly, Judge 
Guerin closes with her definition of “knowingly” for the jurors: “An act is done 
knowingly if the defendant is aware of the act and does not act through ignorance, 
mistake or accident” (USA v. Staton 2.2:47). 
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 Then Lee and Walker give their closing statements. Lee begins by stating 
“what this case is not about” (USA v. Staton 2.2:50). He argues that it’s not about 
water but rather about “abandoning, dumping or disposing of plastic” (USA v. 
Staton 2.2:50). He asserts that it’s not about saving lives, that Staton was not near 
anyone who needed water or dying from dehydration, and that the trial is not a 
“balancing act,” (USA v. Staton 2.2:50) not about leaving some trash and taking 
away other trash. In other words, if one litters, one litters, regardless of how much 
trash one picks up. 
 Next Lee moves to what he terms to be “not in dispute” (USA v. Staton 
2.2:51), such as Staton went to BANWR on December 4th with a purpose, a plan, 
and instructions. He reminds the jurors of the evidence which supports the 
“undisputed facts,” such as the maps with the instructions written on them. Thus, 
he argues that Staton “purposely, intentionally, and knowingly littered” (USA v. 
Staton 2.2:51). To reiterate his point, Lee asserts that the plastic water jugs did not 
simply fall out of the Jeep. “They thought that, hey, we might be able to get some 
illegal aliens to pick up these water jugs if we leave it at drop point 577. So it 
certainly was done knowingly” (USA v. Staton 2.2:52). In this statement, Lee 
both reconstructs Staton’s subjectivity as one who assists “illegal aliens” and one 
who leaves water in the desert. Ironically, this statement has nothing to do with 
littering. The point of Lee’s closing statement is to reiterate that Staton knowingly 
littered, but this statement indicates that Staton knowingly provided water for 
undocumented immigrants. Of course Lee doesn’t use the term “undocumented 
immigrants” but rather the rhetoric of the “illegal,” the term “illegal aliens” which 
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connotes “illegal” or “criminal” activity. In other words, Lee momentarily slides 
out of the littering argument and into an argument about “illegal” immigration, 
attempting to associate Staton, again, with the “criminal” perception of “illegal 
aliens” retain. It is effective even though it is irrelevant.  
 Lee then argues that Staton had no clear-cut plan to clean up the litter, to 
pick-up the empty water bottles. He notes that Staton admitted that he had no real 
way of tracking where the plastic water jugs go nor a set plan in place for picking 
them up. In short, the jugs “are just abandoned out there to the wind” (USA v. 
Staton 2.2:52). 
 Lee then moves on to the second element of the crime, that Staton knew 
that the water was indeed garbage. He mentions the magistrate’s ruling on Millis’ 
case which found water on the refuge to indeed be litter, and that Staton knew 
about this ruling. “And when I confronted him about that, he basically said I just 
disagree with the ruling. I just disagree with that law. That is fine for someone to 
disagree with it, but it is the law and he did know” (USA v. Staton 2.2:53). Lee 
makes a strong point and I think it’s what nudges the jury to find Staton guilty. In 
closing Lee posits, “He knows the law. He just doesn’t want to follow it. And you 
will see that your jury instructions state on the first page ‘You will apply the law 
as I give it to you. You must follow the law as I give it to you whether you agree 
with it or not.’ This what we have here, ladies and gentlemen” (USA v. Staton 
2.2:54). Lee articulates Staton clearly as guilty. 
 In Walker’s closing statement, he attempts to resurrect the arguments he 
made in his opening statement and undo the points that Lee successfully made in 
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his closing statement. The first point that Walker makes deals with the jury 
instructions. The instructions state that the defendant is only on trial for what he is 
charged with. In other words, Walker argues that Staton cannot be convicted for 
what others did. Walker is implying that “others” took the water and made it into 
garbage, not Staton (USA v. Staton 2.2:56). 
 Then, Walker directly counters Lee. He posits, “When the prosecutor tells 
you this is not a case about water, he’s wrong. When he tells you this is not a case 
about saving lives, he’s wrong about that too” (56-7). Walker is attempting to 
redirect the focus of the case away from litter and back to humanitarian aid. He 
reminds the jury that in order to convict Staton, the jury must conclude that Staton 
dropped litter, not water. If they have any doubt, a reasonable doubt, that what 
Staton put out was not garbage, then he should be acquitted. 
 Next, Walker gets directly to the definition of litter.  “What does he have 
to litter, dispose or dump? Garbage. Is this garbage? This is not garbage? This is 
life-sustaining water [...]” (USA v. Staton 2.2:57). The definition of litter is 
important for Walker because one cannot be convicted of litter if what one is 
putting out in the desert is not litter. Walker mentions the value argument again, 
saying that the water that Staton placed on the refuge “was bought at a store for 
money” (USA v. Staton 2.2:57) and thus cannot be considered “debris.” His goal 
is to redefine and rearticulate what litter is and if Staton indeed littered. 
 After making these distinctions above, Walker makes a new argument by 
analogy. He asks the jury to imagine the bailiff telling them that inside their jury 
room is a lunch for them of McDonald’s burgers. The burgers are wrapped, the 
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fries come in a container, and everything comes in a bag. He then asks them to 
imagine entering the jury room and eating the McDonald’s. Some eat it and throw 
the wrappers away, but others do not. Some leave it on the table or on the floor, 
and one takes the food and eats it in his/her car and tosses the wrappers out his/her 
window. Walker then asserts that if there was a crime called “littering in the jury 
room” then some would have littered and the one who threw the wrappers and 
bags on the street definitely littered. Then he asserts, “But does that mean that the 
person who set the burger out committed littering of garbage? No. Somebody else 
did that. It was a choice” (USA v. Staton 2.2:59). Walker connects the analogy to 
the case. “And in this case, this is what was set out, and if someone else picked up 
that bottle of water and took that cap and carried it two miles north and took that 
cap off of it and threw it down, who is guilty of littering? It would be the person 
that threw that cap away, wouldn’t it? It would be the person who threw that 
empty bottle away, wouldn’t it?” (USA v. Staton 2.2:59). 
 Walker makes a good point, but it’s quite a shift from his previous 
argumentation. Before he was trying to define what litter is and what litter is not 
and with the presumed conclusion that water is not litter and thus what Staton did, 
put out water, is not littering. But this argument by analogy is different. It 
articulates who a litterer is and what a litterer does. While he makes a strong 
point, that the McDonald’s corporation would not be given a citation for littering 
if someone else chooses to take its product and litter it, it also puts into question 
responsibility. It is clear that the migrants are to blame but it also seems to place 
some responsibility on Staton. 
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 Next, Walker moves to the date of December 4th, reminding the jurors 
that Staton is on trail for his actions on December 4th, not before or after that 
date. He mentions the photos used in the trail, that they were taken in 2007 and 
were taken of a different area. And also that Staton is not responsible for what 
happens after December 4th. Again, Walker reiterates, what Staton put out was 
water on December 4th, “life-sustaining water” (USA v. Staton 2.2:60). 
 Then, Walker makes an odd move—like the argument by analogy. He 
spends a lot of time discussing what “reasonable doubt” is and repeatedly telling 
the jurors that if they have any doubt they must acquit Staton. “So if you go back 
to the jury room and you say, you know what, in my mind I’m not sure that this is 
garbage, I’m not sure, I don’t know, because in my mind there are two stories 
here, you know, I kind of buy what the defendant says but I kind of buy what the 
government says too, your duty is to acquit him. No doubt. You have a reasonable 
doubt and it’s your duty to come back and acquit this man” (USA v. Staton 
2.2:62). On the surface, Walker makes a good point and perhaps taps into the 
feelings of wavering jurors. But on the other hand, it seems desperate, like Staton 
is somewhat guilty, and Walker is conceding that and knows he cannot fully 
convince the jury that Staton is completely innocent, so he shoots for reasonable 
doubt, not total innocence. 
 Then Walker seems to reach again with the claim, “By finding him not 
guilty, you are not saying I agree with what he did, you are not saying I think 
what he did is right, what you are saying is I have a doubt as to whether or not he 
committed this crime” (USA v. Staton 2.2:62-3). Again, Walker aims low. He 
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seems desperate, begging, and almost scolding. He even says, “The question is 
not even whether he’s innocent. The question is whether the government has 
proven him guilty of all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt” (USA v. Staton 
2.2:63). 
 Next, Walker directly speaks to Staton’s character, his ethos, his 
“truthfulness and honesty.” He reconstructs Staton’s subjectivity by calling him a 
“humanitarian” and a “truthful person” (USA v. Staton 2.2:63). Then, he asserts 
that “When he sits on that stand and he says I didn’t know this was garbage, 
didn’t think it was garbage, still don’t think it’s garbage, it goes to the element of 
knowing” (USA v. Staton 2.2:64). Walker directly argues that the shaping of 
Staton’s subjectivity was intentional by him to make a case for his innocence to 
the first part of his crime. 
 Then, Walker circles back and reiterates his argument. Showing the 
pictures of the littered refuge and then showing the pictures of Staton’s water 
bottles, he says, “And, A, it isn’t garbage. It’s this. It’s not this. This is garbage. 
This was done in mid-2007. This is not garbage. This is what the defendant did on 
December 4. So they can’t prove that” (USA v. Staton 2.2:65). He recalls and 
reiterates the point about the burger wrapper and how Staton didn’t litter but 
others did. Walker even argues that “I wish they wouldn’t have. Everybody 
wishes that they would pick up the bottles and toss it away after they drink the 
life-sustaining water” (USA v. Staton 2.2:66). And then Walker goes directly to 
Staton’s intention, as a way to argue that Staton didn’t “know” he littered. “But 
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his intent and purpose was for them to drink the water, not to litter, and you would 
have to find him not guilty of this one” (USA v. Staton 2.2:66). 
 Then, in an interesting twist, Walker reintroduces the evidence of border 
patrol agent Collins. Collins wrote up a report about his experiences on December 
4th. Walker rereads two sentences from the report. 
Quote, “in previous weeks,” that is before December 4, “I had located 
numerous full water bottles consistent with those left by humanitarian 
organizations that work in the area.” Listen to this. “I have also 
encountered these plastic bottles discarded as garbage further north.” You 
hear the difference? This is the government’s witness. What he is saying, 
he is making the distinction between full bottles of water that he found left 
by humans, that is these, and those bottles which were discarded as 
garbage further north, that’s these. (USA v. Staton 2.2:67-8) 
 Walker not only uses this quote to redefine what litter is—full bottles of 
water versus empty plastic containers—but he also is able to show, once again, 
that Staton was the one who put out the water not the garbage. Moreover, Walker 
emphasizes how this quote is from the government, is from the border patrol. By 
turning the state against the state, Walker makes a powerful counterclaim. He 
continues, “My client didn’t discard these as garbage further north. What he did 
on December 4 was set these out and these are not garbage. And the government’s 
own witness made a distinction between full bottles of water and garbage” (USA 
v. Staton 2.2:68). This reiteration is strong for Walker. 
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 Walker reminds the jurors of the McDonald’s analogy again, stating that 
“the McDonald’s meal isn’t the garbage when it has a burger in it and the fries in 
it” (USA v. Staton 2.2:69). He then shifts to an argument by narrative. He brings 
up the Lincoln-Douglas debates. He says that during one debate Lincoln asked 
Douglas how many legs a horse has and Douglas says four, but then Lincoln asks 
him, how many legs does a horse have if he calls the tail a leg? Douglas says five 
and Lincoln says that was wrong. Walker explains, “Calling a tail a leg doesn’t 
make it one. And calling this garbage doesn’t make it garbage either. This is not 
garbage. This is pure, clean drinking water to save lives” (USA v. Staton 2.2:69). 
Walker uses this narrative to reconstruct a firmer definition of what is litter and 
what is not litter. Ironically, Walker is implicated in what he is trying to argue 
again. The entire case is about the definition of litter. Both Walker and Lee have 
negotiated, argued, fought over what this definition is. Walker claims that this 
definition does not need to be argued. Water is water and litter is litter. It is an 
interesting tactic to push these definitions into a black and white area. Lee 
attempted to do the same. It’s a part of the negotiation. 
 Finally, Walker addresses the ruling by Judge Velasco, probably the most 
damaging piece of evidence again Staton, which reconfigured Staton’s 
subjectivity as dishonest and wavering. Walker argues that the Velasco ruling was 
brought up, but the ruling was never explained, or explained how it has any effect 
on the case, or even precisely what the ruling was. Instead, it was merely stated as 
something Staton knew about. Then, Walker counters the government directly. He 
argues, “[Staton] didn’t say, as the government claims he said, that he wanted to 
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ignore the ruling. What he said was that he didn’t think that that ruling was final 
on the law. He believed that despite that ruling this wasn’t litter. He has every 
right to say that” (USA v. Staton 2.2:70). This argument is brief and somewhat 
rearticulates Staton’s subjectivity, but it more goes to discrediting the 
government. It seeks to cast doubt on the argumentation of the government, 
reshape the subjectivity of the state, imply that they lied or at least misrepresented 
Staton. 
 Walker leaves the jury with one last impression of Staton as honest and 
trustworthy and uses that subjectivity in combination with his “humane 
intentions” to have the jurors follow their emotions. Walker states that Staton was 
able to “take the witness stand and tell you that he did what he did honestly, that 
he did it with an honest belief that he wasn’t in violation of the law, that he did it 
for humane purpose, and the humane purpose is not to prejudice you, it’s not to 
have you vote with your heart, but there was evidence in this courtroom of the 
value of what he did” (USA v. Staton 2.2:71). The implication is that an honest 
person would not litter and that argument is not very strong. 
 Lee then makes one brief rebuttal argument. He claims, “I believe that the 
defendant is confusing motive versus knowingly doing something” (USA v. 
Staton 2.2:72). Lee counters Walker’s analogy with an analogy of his own: a bank 
robber who says he robbed a bank to get money for his dying grandmother. That 
is a motive for committing a crime, but the robber is still committing a crime. 
“Motives,” Lee argues, “are irrelevant” (USA v. Staton 2.2:72). He asks the jury 
to look at the context: BANWR. The water was left on BANWR. The purpose of 
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BANWR is to have a refuge for plants and animals. Finally, Lee makes another 
analogy, critiquing Walker’s value argument. Lee describes a couch on the side of 
a road. It has value to a college kid but once it is left on the street, on city 
property, it becomes garbage. Lee undercuts Walker’s definition of water and 
litter, his separation of what is life-sustaining and what is trash. Lee posits, in 
short, that context defines. Once the context switches from house to street, the 
couch becomes garbage. The street, the context, defines the couch as garbage. 
Thus, the water purchased from a grocery store, once placed on BANWR, 
becomes garbage. 
 It’s a brief rebuttal but it is effective. Had Walker argued from context, 
refocused the attention of the jury on the context of migrants dying in the desert, 
he might have had more rhetorical agency. But by keeping the attention on 
BANWR and the refuge’s purpose and mission, it’s clear that water bottles do not 
belong on it. 
The Conviction 
 The next day by noon, the jury is deadlocked. The judge gives them the 
Allen charge, encouraging them to reach a decision, and the jury goes back into 
the jury room to deliberate. After a recess, the jury gives a note to the judge 
asking for the precise charge that Staton is charged with. The judge in agreement 
with Walker and Lee refuses to give the precise code violation and instead writes 
back to the jurors that they should use the instructions that were given to them. 
After another recess, the jury reconvenes and reaches a verdict. The courtroom is 
full to capacity with volunteers from No More Deaths. The judge tells the 
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volunteers “that this is a courtroom and no matter what the verdict is to please 
respond in accordance with that” (USA v. Staton 3:7). The clerk reads the verdict: 
“We, the jury, find the defendant, Walter E. Staton, guilty of knowingly littering, 
disposing or dumping in any manner that which he knew to be garbage, refuge, 
sewage, sludge, earth, rocks or other debris on the Buenos Aires National Wildlife 
Refuge” (USA v. Staton 3:7-8). 
 Throughout the trial Walker and Lee negotiated their rhetorical agency for 
their client. Each side constructed and reconstructed subjectivities, examined and 
exposed relations between subjects, showed the jury the complexities of the case, 
what the case was really about and what it was not about, pulled the witnesses 
into frameworks which upheld contexts that favored their client’s agency. The 
trial of USA v. Staton read through Biesecker’s rhetorical situation offers a way 
of understanding how rhetorical agency operates that is consistent with 
postmodern theory. The field of rhetorical studies which seeks a deeper 
understanding of agency can continue to implement Biesecker’s productive 
framework in analyses of rhetorical situations. The implementation will not only 
advance the field in rhetoric and postmodern theory but will also teach us how to 
negotiate power with the state and make change in our local communities. 
The Sentencing 
 Lee made a strong case against Staton. He rhetorically pushed Staton’s 
humanitarian efforts into the realm of litter, and in this realm where water is 
defined as litter, Staton lost. However, Staton’s guilty verdict was not the end for 
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Staton or NMD. In fact, the guilty verdict, perhaps more so than a not-guilty one, 
provided NMD with an opportunity. 
 During the weeks leading up to and after Staton’s sentencing, NMD 
contacted and was contacted by several local and national media outlets. As 
opposed to inside the context of the courtroom, the law can be socially questioned 
and critiqued. NMD, already proficient in collecting and circulating narratives of 
injustices from the desert, decided to construct and circulate a narrative of 
Staton’s courtroom injustice, and a local and national conversation on 
immigration policy and humanitarian aid begins.  
 In Chapter 4, I examine the rhetorical effect of USA v. Staton, local 
publics’ responses and national publics’ responses. I also examine how as a public 
and counterpublic NMD uses this opportunity to disarticulate discourses which 
have always been in order to rearticulate new discursive possibilities. They 
discursively develop a rhetorical disruption of migrant deaths and the power 
relations that support it. In differánce, the argument is always shifting. 
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 CHAPTER	  4	  THE	  SENTENCING:	  RHETORICAL	  EFFECTS	  AND	  DISCURSIVE	  REARTICULATIONS	  
On August 11, 2009, Brady McCombs of the Arizona Daily Star reported: 
At 4:30 a.m. Saturday, a resident called the Border Patrol to report a dead 
person off Arivaca Road, about nine miles west of Interstate 19, said Omar 
Candelaria, Border Patrol Tucson Sector spokesman. Agents found the 
body of a man south of the road, he said. The man was wearing blue jeans, 
hiking shoes and a short-sleeved button-down shirt, Candelaria said. They 
found a Mexican identification card on him. From Oct. 1 through July 31, 
Border Patrol agents in the Tucson Sector had recovered the bodies of 161 
illegal immigrants, an 18 percent increase from the 137 bodies found 
during the same time last year, agency figures show. (A12) 
On that same morning of August 11th, while on his way to the courthouse, Walt 
Staton read McCombs’ article. He knew of the location off Arivaca Road. No 
More Deaths (NMD), the humanitarian group that he volunteers for, which 
provides food, water, and first aid to undocumented migrants in the southern 
Arizona desert, patrols there quite frequently. When he entered the courthouse for 
his sentencing and Judge Guerin gave him a chance to speak, Staton referenced 
the article (USA v. Staton Sent. 6), explaining that the jugs of water he left in the 
desert on the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge (BANWR) for dying and 
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dehydrated migrants should not be considered garbage by the state but life-saving 
aid. In short, humanitarian aid should not be a crime. 
 He argued that the crisis on the US/Mexico border warranted humanitarian 
action and that his intention on December 4, 2008 was not to challenge US 
littering laws but to prevent needless death and suffering in the desert. He posited 
that “[M]any of us will probably never fully understand the complexities of 
immigration, of what drives people to come and what drives the United States to 
enforce the border in such a way as to push people into these remote areas [...]” 
(USA v. Staton Sent. 6), but many would agree that the current immigration 
policies need fixing. Staton confessed that his dream was to wake up one day and 
have US immigration policies reformed in such a way that people would no 
longer need to cross the desert; and on that day, Staton continued, “many of my 
friends would gladly take as many trash bags as needed to clean up the entire 
Wildlife Refuge and all the areas along the border” (USA v. Staton Sent. 9). The 
cost of “littering” does not outweigh the cost of human life. “[B]ut,” Staton 
concluded, “by necessity and by our faith and by our conscience, we’re going to 
keep doing humanitarian aid in whatever way, responsible way we can see” (USA 
v. Staton Sent. 9). Staton made it very clear to Judge Guerin that neither he nor 
other NMD volunteers would be deterred from providing necessary humanitarian 
aid in the desert so as long as the state continues to uphold unjust immigration and 
border enforcement policies. 
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 The courtroom was silent, despite being filled to capacity, volunteers for 
NMD and other Tucson humanitarian organizations on the left and representatives 
from BANWR, the Border Patrol, and Fish and Wildlife on the right.  
 Judge Guerin, in her response to Staton, said that while “[...] your motives 
were good and humanitarian assistance is commendable, the more that individuals 
involve themselves in that community and the issues that we face, the better we 
can make our community and the world, when you seek to reach those objectives 
by destroying other objectives and other valid goals, then that does cause harm as 
well” (USA v. Staton Sent. 39-40). Judge Guerin then sentenced Staton to one-
year of unsupervised probation and 300 hours of community service, specifically 
directed at trash removal, a steep sentence for a first-time littering offender with 
no prior criminal record. 
 But Judge Guerin was not finished. 
 She continued, “Those were the only conditions I had intended or 
considered imposing. However, based on your comments earlier that you were not 
committed or could not say that you would not engage in this same conduct, I am 
also going to order as a condition of your probation that you not be permitted to 
go on the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge during that year of probation” 
(USA v. Staton Sent. 42-3). In short, Staton was banned from BANWR. 
 Judge Guerin was sending a message to Staton and to NMD: 
Humanitarian aid, leaving jugs of water in the desert for undocumented migrants, 
is a crime, and anyone indicating that he or she would continue to commit this 
crime would be punished and banned from doing so again. 
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 Immigration and border enforcement policies in the US are highly 
contentious issues. Often, politicians frame border issues as a national security 
issue, where migrants are depicted as drug smugglers and human traffickers who 
enter the country “illegally” and must be stopped with military-like force. This 
framing and depiction conjures a fear (and hatred) of foreigners, and since this 
population of border crossers is also non-white, there is routinely a racist 
undercurrent in its discourse. NMD, on the other hand, offers an alternative 
discourse that frames the issues on the border as a humanitarian crisis, where 
undocumented laborers are funneled into the most remote and dangerous areas of 
the southern Arizona desert, abandoned by the state to die of dehydration and heat 
exhaustion, and relies on humanitarian and human rights ideographs, such as 
<humane> and <life-saving>7 to construct its framework. 
 The news of Judge Guerin’s sentencing of Staton spread quickly, from 
local to national media, and with it came NMD’s alternative discourse. The 
humanitarian and human rights discourse, which frames issues on the border as a 
humanitarian crisis, challenges the state’s immigration and border enforcement 
policies, and calls into question the effectiveness of racist and xenophobic 
discourses. It nudges the often unidirectional response to US immigration 
problems (more border patrol agents, more surveillance technology, more border 
fence) to consider reforming the currently destructive immigration and border 
enforcement policies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Using <angle brackets> is the “standard notation style for ideographs” (Cloud 
288). 
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 NMD volunteers are aware of the media attention they garner from their 
actions, and they use that attention to circulate their humanitarian and human 
rights discourse. They believe that the more publics hear their discourse and 
circulate it, the greater the possibility that the immigration debate in the US will 
be reframed, from an invasion to a crisis, and once reframed as a humanitarian 
crisis, immigration reform would follow. 
 Staton’s littering fine and trial and sentencing drew media attention and 
provided NMD with public opportunities to circulate their discourse through the 
press. This chapter measures the rhetorical effectiveness of that circulation 
strategy. It measures how NMD volunteers take advantage of these opportunities 
and remain newsworthy, if other publics are indeed adopting and recirculating this 
alternative discourse, and if those publics are challenging the racist and 
xenophobic discourse dominant in immigration debates. This chapter examines 
the specific ideographs that NMD volunteers use in their humanitarian and human 
rights discourse and compares them with the ideographs used in online discussion 
forums that follow newspaper articles and blogs entries that cover the actions of 
NMD in order to measure if a humanitarian and human rights discourse is being 
circulated and/or challenging the dominant racist and xenophobic discourse. In 
short, this chapter examines the rhetorical effect of NMD’s actions before and 
after Staton’s sentencing. It investigates how NMD as a public and counterpublic 
uses these rhetorical situations as opportunities to disarticulate discourses which 
have always been—racist and xenophobic—in order to rearticulate new discursive 
possibilities. 
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Ideographs 
 Michael McGee argues that “[s]ince the clearest access to persuasion (and 
hence to ideology) is through the discourse used to produce it, I will suggest that 
ideology in practice is a political language, preserved in rhetorical documents, 
with the capacity to dictate decision and control public belief and behavior” 
(McGee, “Ideograph,” 4-5). That political language, which captures ideology and 
controls the beliefs and behaviors of publics, circulates in discourse as 
ideographs. McGee defines an ideograph in several different ways: 
An ideograph is an ordinary-language term found in political discourse. It 
is a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a 
particular but equivocal and ill- defined normative goal. It warrants the use 
of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived 
as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels 
easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable. (McGee, 
“Ideograph,” 15) 
<World peace> is an example of an ideograph. It is an abstract term that circulates 
in political discourse, which cues and permits certain beliefs (e.g. equality, non-
violence) and behaviors that are easily recognized by the community in which it is 
used. While the definition of <world peace> is not agreed-upon, it is used in 
political discourse as if it is. 
 Ideographs are also bound by culture. Each member of a public, for 
instance, belongs because he or she is shaped and conditioned by the vocabulary 
of ideographs. McGee argues that “[a] degree of tolerance is usual, but people are 
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expected to understand ideographs within a range of usage thought to be 
acceptable” (McGee, “Ideograph,” 15). If some members do not understand 
ideographs, use them in unacceptable ways or do not respond to them in the 
expected manner, then other members of the public will correct them. In other 
words, the agency of ideographs permits members to police and enforce the 
boundaries of the public (McGee, “Ideograph,” 15-16). 
 Since <world peace> is an abstraction, we have come to understand its 
meaning through its applications (McGee, “Ideograph,” 10). For example, if the 
term is used to describe a time when all wars cease across the globe, we 
understand a meaning of the term. However, a meaning is accepted to be true only 
if it is believable, and the believability of a meaning is dependent upon the history 
of the term’s references. When deciphering whether a meaning is believable or 
not, we compare the currently proposed meaning to the meanings the term had in 
the past. If the currently proposed meaning coincides with previously proposed 
meanings, then the usage of the term is believed and accepted. McGee calls this 
historical analysis “vertically structured.” 
 In addition to understanding ideographs through its historical references, 
we also understand its meaning through its current situation. Within any given 
situation, there is a leeway for how a term could be used, an available means that 
a rhetor has to construct a meaning. The leeway is restricted by the historical 
references (Since <world peace> has never included <injustice> or another 
similar term within its meaning, rhetors cannot use it in a current situation), but 
there are still opportunities for “new” applications in a new situation. If the 
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currently proposed meaning is reasonably germane to its new situation as well as 
its historical use, then the usage of the term is believed and accepted. McGee calls 
this rhetorical analysis “horizontally structured.” Understanding both of these 
structures—vertical and horizontal—enables us to locate ideology operating 
through a public’s discourse. 
 After Staton’s conviction, several media outlets ran stories, and local 
publics responded to these articles through online discussion boards. At first, the 
overwhelming majority of respondents used phrases such as “illegal invaders,” 
“build the wall,” and “go back to Mexico.” These phrases function as ideographs, 
clearly capturing racist and xenophobic ideology. However, after the strategic and 
rhetorical actions of NMD volunteers, the online discussion shifted. Phrases, such 
as “humane,” “human beings suffering,” and “saving lives” appeared in more 
posts. These phrases, functioning as ideographs, capture humanitarian and human 
rights ideology. A change in the use of ideographs is a way to measure a shift in 
ideology. Below, I trace the racist and xenophobic ideographs used in the online 
discussion forums as well as the humanitarian and human rights ones and analyze 
how a group of ordinary people shift the dominant discourse of the immigration 
debate. 
After the Trial 
On June 4, 2009, the day after Staton’s trial, NMD released the following 
statement: 
This is a sad day for human rights and for all of us in southern Arizona. 
By penalizing life-saving work, the United States is showing callous 
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disregard for the lives of our neighbors to the south, whose only crime is 
to seek a better life. No More Deaths will continue to provide life-saving 
aid to those in need, and to do our part to clean up the desert. The era of 
border enforcement that uses death and human rights abuses as a deterrent 
must come to an end. (“Humanitarian”) 
In this brief statement, NMD effectively articulates a humanitarian and human 
rights discourse. Ideographs such as, <human rights>, <life-saving work>, and 
<human rights abuses> dominate the text. NMD volunteers value life over 
citizenship status, and whenever they discuss issues regarding undocumented 
immigration or border enforcement, they frame them with a humanitarian and 
human rights discourse. By framing them in this way, NMD volunteers hope 
others will at least consider if not fully conclude that US immigration policy 
needs reform. Of course, publics normally do not debate immigration and border 
enforcement issues in this way. The dominant discourse mainly deploys racist and 
xenophobic ideographs. 
 KOLD-Tucson, a local television station, published a news report on their 
website the same day as NMD’s press release inaccurately8 entitled “Man Gets 
Jail Time for Littering on Federal Land.” After the article, three readers posted 
their responses to the story. “Robert” said that Staton should have been charged 
with a lot more than littering such as “aiding and abetting fugitives, human 
smuggling, [and] drug trafficking.” He also argued that these “so-called human 
rights groups” are “only inviting more illegals to put their lives at risk,” and that it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Staton never received jail time, although he had the potential of receiving a 
sentence of one-year in prison. 
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is about time we show these “bleeding heart liberals” that their actions “will not 
be tolerated.” After “Robert,” “peaceful” responded that “there will be border 
crossers, legal or illegal...rather deal with live ones than deal with bones...water in 
the desert??? less costly than body bags.” Finally, “Allen Legatzke” posits that 
“[i]t’s about time these trash dumpers are prosecuted,” and “[i]f these so-called 
do-gooders want them so bad let them go across the border and live there with 
them.” 
 The discourse that Robert and Allen Legatzke engage in is biting. They 
use ideographs such as <illegals> and strongly dislike NMD volunteers for 
associating with them, calling the group a “so-called” human rights group, “so-
called” do-gooders, and “bleeding heart liberals.” By contrast “peaceful,” using 
the ideograph <border crossers>, values saving lives over citizenship status, yet 
argues curtly. This online discussion is brief but lays out common positions. 
 Tucson Citizen blogger “Rynski” also covered Staton’s conviction. She 
posted a story called “Leaving Water Jugs in the Desert is Littering,” which 
attracted 16 posts from readers. Again, the majority of readers expressed their 
disgust with NMD, calling Staton “arrogant,” “flaunting Immigration law,” and 
“arrogantly flaunt[ing] the law.” One inflamed the discussion by saying that 
Staton should be <deported> and <waterboarded>. Others suggested that those 
siding with NMD are <aiding and abetting lawbreakers> and “need to move to 
Mexico.” These respondents clearly use a xenophobic discourse. On the other 
hand, a few respondents, only three, circulated a humanitarian discourse. “RH” 
extensively used religious rhetoric, comparing the actions of Staton to Jesus, the 
	   	  131	  
minutemen to the KKK, and the Border Patrol to the Pharisees. “Liz Guiles” 
called Staton “kind and gentle,” “a person who has empathy and understands that 
we all have a responsibility to aid other human beings,” and repeated used the 
ideograph <human being> rather than <illegal alien>. “Danielito” mentioned “the 
value of water in the desert” and used “undocumented migration” to describe the 
phenomenon in southern Arizona. Nevertheless, the clear majority of respondents 
strongly disapproved of Staton, his actions, and the people he sought to help, but 
more importantly, the way in which they wrote their posts, with anger and disgust, 
and especially using the ideograph <waterboarded> is alarming, particularly for 
NMD volunteering who wish to change how publics frame the immigration 
debate in America. It would take time, careful planning, and strategic action. 
In 10 Weeks 
 On June 17, 2009, two weeks after Staton’s conviction, NMD called a 
press conference at Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson, where several local 
humanitarian, environmental, human rights, and religious organizations gathered. 
This coalition publicly requested a meeting with Secretary of the Interior Ken 
Salazar and BANWR manager Mike Hawkes to determine alternative ways to 
save lives on federal lands. The Arizona Daily Star among others covered the 
event. Star reporter Marisa Gerber’s article, “Immigrant Backers Demand Action 
to Save Lives” attracted a staggering 134 posts, which used the article as a point 
of entry to debate immigration and border enforcement policy. The overwhelming 
majority of responses again circulated a racist and xenophobic discourse. 
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 For example, one respondent, “Bob B.” wrote, “there are plenty of 
unemployed people that would love to have a job that pays real good at building 
the wall. where do I sign up. I will do anything a mehican [sic] won’t, like get it 
right the first time.” Ten different times readers either used the ideograph <build 
the wall> or <close the border>, and another ten times respondents focused their 
posts directly at border crossers, writing “stay home” or “go back to Mexico.” 
“PJ,” for instance wrote, “Stay in your own d*** country. Clean it up and don’t 
come over here and mess ours up,” while “Mike G.” succinctly combined both, 
“step 1: build a wall. step 2: tell them stay home. step 3: repeat step 2 as 
necessary.” 
 The clearest evidence of a xenophobic discourse was when a form of the 
word <invade> was used as an ideograph. It was used in three different ways, 
<invaders>, <invasion>, and <invading>; and each time it expressed a fear (and 
indignation) toward foreigners. For example, “Arrest the <criminal invaders> and 
those that aid them!” “[T]he Democrats are pushing for amnesty for about 30 
million illegal <alien invaders>.” “When an American citizen demands these 
<invaders> leave...we are called bigots and racists. [...] Illegal aliens do not 
deserve an iota of anything from our great country.” “[Staton]’s aiding and 
abetting <an invasion of America>.” “Mexico has encouraged this <invasion>.” 
“The current <border invasion> IS a threat and it should be handled like one. Now 
go drag your bleeding heart somewhere else” (original emphasis). “Illegals were 
openly <invading> this Country long before those two gifts [NAFTA and 
CAFTA] to Latin America were ever signed.” “We should DEMAND that 
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immigration laws are enforced so that those people are sufficiently discouraged 
from <invading America>” (original emphasis). A version of the word “invade” 
was used 13 times, two more times than the ideograph <illegal aliens> or <illegal 
immigrants> combined. Constructing undocumented immigrants as <invaders> or 
their actions as <invading> signals that border crossers are a threat that must be 
stopped. “Invasion” as a noun is normally used within a context of war, and the 
expected response to “an invasion” is a counterattack. Thus, it is not surprising 
that one respondent wrote, “I would have no issues with squeezing the trigger if 
we had a president that had the balls to put America and not his own selfish 
ambition first. It’s just like popping Taliban in Afghanistan, the hats are just 
different, that’s all.” Understanding the crisis on the border as <an invasion> 
produces a fear that induces violence against undocumented immigrants. 
 While an overwhelming majority of the posts were racist and xenophobic, 
there were some that focused on NMD. Twice NMD volunteers were accused of 
treason, four times they were called “bleeding heart liberals” and twice as  “do-
gooders.” Five respondents were tired of NMD’s “demands” and three argued that 
if NMD volunteers really wanted change, they should “change Mexico” first. 
There were a few that argued that NMD should be guilty not only of littering but 
also guilty of murder since volunteers “lure illegals to their deaths” with the water 
jugs in the desert. One respondent took Staton’s actions personally, blaming 
NMD for the loss of her job: “[H]ow many of you work at already low paying 
jobs and have lost your job to an ‘immigrant’ or have had to accept a lower job to 
keep it rather than having it taken over by a hard working ‘immigrant’? [...] Yes, 
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keep up your good work helping ‘immigrants’ to undercut the pay on already 
desperate American workers” (original emphasis). 
 Out of the 134 posts, there were only six (6) that somewhat subscribed to a 
humanitarian discourse, using ideographs such as <human>, <humane>, and 
<humanitarian>. One wrote, “I think we can be <human and compassionate> 
enough to pick them up and deport them rather than see them die if that’s 
possible. [...] But they are still illegal. [...] Illegal is illegal. [But w]e can be 
<humane>.” Another wrote, “This is about being <humanitarian>. Yes, people are 
choosing to enter the US illegally, but they should not have to die as a result.” A 
third, responding to a previous respondent, wrote, “[Y]es, Mexico should do more 
to help its own citizens [...but i]f we become a country that discourages its own 
citizens from helping dying people in the desert, then we are no better than 
Mexico.” The discourse is perhaps not as empathic as NMD’s but it is still retains 
humanitarian features nonetheless. The most combative post subscribing to a 
humanitarian and human rights discourse, however, came from “Karl O.” He 
wrote: 
Some of you need to get your heads out of your behinds, and realize that 
crossing the border illegally is a civil crime. Nothing worse than say, not 
coming to a complete stop, or being over the speed limit by 1 mph, or 
failing to yield, or failing to signal (all of which are civil infractions). 
Would you so harshly marginalize someone who commits any of the about 
civil infractions? No, you wouldn’t. Let’s cut the crap and let your true 
xenophobic colors show once and for all. Stop using this immigration 
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debate as a vehicle for your hate. [...] How can you deny water to a 
<fellow human being>, just for breaking a civil law? 
At this point, the dominant discourse circulating among local publics through this 
online medium is racist and xenophobic, out numbering the humanitarian and 
human rights discourses 149 to 10. NMD volunteers were aware of this disparity 
in mid-June but were still determined to make change. Over the course of the next 
several weeks, NMD volunteers made conscious and strategic decisions in an 
attempt to change the dominant immigration and border enforcement discourse. 
 At the press conference on June 17th at Southside Presbyterian, NMD 
showed an open letter that was written and sent to Salazar and Hawkes requesting 
a meeting before July 1st. Hawkes was not in attendance, but took an interview 
from the Arizona Daily Star, saying that even though he thinks that BANWR is 
already adequately equipped with water tanks, he is open to meeting with NMD, 
but added that “the meeting ‘may not be within the next two weeks, since we have 
the (July 4) holiday coming up,’” (Hawkes qtd. in Gerber). He concluded by 
saying that he anticipated a meeting in early July. 
 One week later, June 24, 2009, NMD had still not heard from Hawkes, so 
the humanitarian group sent a follow-up letter. The letter was sent to Hawkes but 
carbon copied to Salazar, Rowan Gould, head of the US Fish and Wildlife 
Service, Robert Gilbert, Border Patrol Chief of the Tucson sector, and Diane 
Humetewa, US District Attorney for Arizona. In the letter, NMD references the 
Arizona Daily Star article in which Hawkes says that he’s open to meeting with 
humanitarian groups but to date has not contacted any of them. The letter also 
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acknowledges that July is normally the deadliest month of the year and how 
urgent it is for a meeting to be scheduled. The letter concludes with nearly 70 
signatures of humanitarian, human rights, environmental, and religious group 
members.  
 Two days later, on June 26th, Hawkes contacted NMD. He requested a 
proposed meeting agenda and list of participants. NMD provided the materials 
and waited. And waited. Another week past, then the 4th of July weekend, and 
Hawkes still did not contact NMD to schedule a meeting. Then, on July 7th, 
Hawkes responded with a letter, saying that he preferred “a virtual meeting by 
email.” On July 8th, NMD held another press conference at Southside 
Presbyterian Church in Tucson. The humanitarian group announced that on July 
9th, volunteers would distribute gallon jugs of water on BANWR along known 
migrant trails. With temperatures already in the 100s, NMD argued that they 
could not wait for Hawkes any longer. The July 1st deadline had passed and no 
meeting was scheduled. NMD needed to act. 
 The action was purposeful and rhetorical. It drew media attention as well 
as the attention of the US Fish and Wildlife Service. Officers issued 13 littering 
tickets to NMD volunteers. According to the Arizona Daily Star, “Thursday’s 
arrests marked the latest incident involving the Tucson-based group, which says 
distributing water on the refuge is a humanitarian act aimed at preventing deaths 
of illegal immigrants, and US Fish and Wildlife officials, who see it as littering” 
(Refuge). The rhetorical actions of NMD enabled their humanitarian discourse to 
circulate through the media. The Tucson Weekly that morning printed a story 
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called, “The Activist Question: Tensions Between Humanitarians and Federal 
Officials Are on the Rise Along the Border.” A few days later on July 13, 2009, 
the Arizona Daily Star wrote an editorial calling for NMD and BANWR to meet 
and settle their differences: 
We believe an agreement could bolster both organizations’ missions and 
improve their public images. As it stands, both sides look bad. Refuge 
officials are coming across as heartless bureaucrats for confiscating water 
bottles that could potentially save lives. They also seem petty, citing 
volunteers for littering on the refuge. [...] No More Deaths, meanwhile, is 
coming off as a bunch of activists who refuse to follow the law. They 
mean well and are trying to save lives, but a couple of judges and a jury 
have deemed the water-bottle project illegal. (“Accord”) 
Even though Star editors criticized NMD, they legitimized the group’s position by 
discussing it on par with the state’s. Moreover, the discussion uses a humanitarian 
and human rights discourse, including ideographs such as <save lives>. Inserting 
this alternative discourse into an immigration conversation is one of NMD’s goal; 
volunteers believe that the more the humanitarian and human rights discourse 
circulates, the more the discourse community will grow; and with more publics 
recognizing the problems on the border as a humanitarian crisis, the greater 
chance there will be for immigration reform.  
 The editorial continued, quoting Hawkes and Staton, and concluded with 
this: “The refuge’s cries of litter may be overblown. [...] In the end, the volunteers 
probably take out more trash than they are accused of taking in. [...] We agree that 
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keeping the refuge litter-free is important. But it’s even more imperative to make 
sure everything possible is being done to prevent deaths along the border” 
(“Accord”). With this statement the humanitarian and human rights discourse of 
NMD entered into the mainstream media and began to circulate. 
 The day after 13 NMD volunteers received littering tickets for placing 
gallon jugs of water on BANWR, the group received a phone call from the 
Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar’s office, inviting volunteers to meet with 
Salazar in Washington DC. Seven volunteers flew out to see Salazar, and they 
talked with him personally and members of his staff for over an hour. Upon their 
return, Hawkes and regional US Fish and Wildlife director Chis Pease asked to 
meet with NMD volunteers. The groups finally began discussing over the course 
of multiple meetings how to prevent deaths in the desert while still preserving the 
land on the refuge. About a week before Staton’s sentencing, NMD constructed a 
“memo of understanding,” aimed at resolving the differences between NMD and 
BANWR. (See Appendix A.) The memo positions NMD and sister organization 
Tucson Samaritans as experts “uniquely qualified” to provide humanitarian aid to 
migrants in the desert and requests that NMD and the Samaritans provide this aid 
with the understanding and that they will remove twice as much trash as they put 
out; however, BANWR would need to provide the trash receptacles and trash 
bags and dismiss the pending littering citations against humanitarians.  
 While BANWR officials considered the memo, NMD volunteers turned 
their attention to Staton’s upcoming sentencing. They reached out to national 
environmental organizations, requesting letters of support for Staton to be sent to 
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Judge Guerin. Both the Center for Biological Diversity (Appendix B) and the 
Sierra Club (Appendix C) wrote letters of support on Staton’s behalf. The Center 
for Biological Diversity wrote: 
The last thing we wish to see is human rights pitted against environmental 
concerns in this matter. What is needed is a reformed policy that manages 
immigration from Mexico in an orderly and legal fashion, a policy that 
protects the environment as well as the lives of migrants. We support the 
work of humanitarian groups and determined volunteers such as Walt 
Staton who work to save human lives in the midst of the failure of the 
federal government to produce such a policy reform. [...] Trash is 
ephemeral—it can be cleaned up, as No More Deaths volunteers 
demonstrate—and it really is just a small part of the damage being done to 
our nation’s natural resources as a result of a misguided and failed federal 
policy.  
The Sierra Club wrote: 
[W]e do not believe that preserving imperiled species and the lands that 
support them is at odds with the efforts of border humanitarian groups 
such as No More Deaths. Flooding, erosion, sedimentation, habitat loss 
and fragmentation all pose a legitimate and serious threats to those species 
we seek to protect. We do not regard individuals leaving jugs of clean 
water as a comparable threat, or frankly, as much of a threat at all. [...] The 
Sierra Club supports the actions of Walt Staton and other humanitarian 
groups who attempt to save the lives of undocumented migrants in the 
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desert by leaving jugs of clean water at strategic locations along known 
migrant trails. They later return to check on the water and to remove 
garbage. These life-saving actions do not constitute a threat to the 
environmental integrity of the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge, but 
rather are a benefit to it. 
These two environmental organizations adopt a humanitarian and human rights 
discourse. They use ideographs such as <human rights>, <save human lives>, 
<save the lives of undocumented migrants>, and <life-saving actions>, which 
aligns with a humanitarian and human rights discourse. They also use the 
discourse in precisely the way that NMD volunteers hope they would: as a 
justification for immigration reform. Phrases such as, “[w]hat is needed is a 
reformed policy,” “the failure of the federal government to produce such a policy 
reform,” and “a misguided and failed federal policy” calls attention to the need for 
change, and especially the need to value human life over citizenship status. 
 In addition to these two letters, Judge Guerin also received a sentencing 
memo from Assistant US Attorney Lawrence Lee. In it, he argues that Staton 
should receive a $5,000 fine to be paid within one year, five years of unsupervised 
probation, and a five-year ban from BANWR. For several pages, Lee justifies this 
sentence, referencing biologists and wildlife officers who argue that the plastic 
jugs NMD leaves out in the desert kill vegetation and harms animals. He argues 
that Staton “does not care about the environmental impact of his actions, nor has 
he explored alternatives to leaving plastic water jugs on the refuge” (USA v 
Staton, Sent. Memo 4). He also contends that “[t]he defendant left full, plastic 
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water jugs on the Refuge with the intent to aid illegal immigrant traffic” (USA v 
Staton, Sent. Memo 4). Lee concludes the sentencing memo by quoting Staton in 
the Arizona Daily Star. He mentions that the day after the trial Staton said, 
“We’re committed to our humanitarian efforts [...] We’re not asking permission 
from the United States to save people’s lives. We never have, because we know 
they’d say no” (USA v Staton, Sent. Memo 5-6). In short, Lee argues that what 
Staton is doing is harmful to the environment, aiding “illegal immigrant traffic,” 
and has not been deterred thus far, so a harsh sentence, as he proposes is justified 
and necessary. 
 During the 10 weeks between Staton’s conviction and sentencing, NMD 
volunteers remained rhetorically active. They organized a collective of 
humanitarians, environmentalists, and faith-driven community members to 
uphold, spread, and strengthen their humanitarian and human rights discourse. 
They took action, performed their rhetoric in the desert, which forced the state to 
respond with littering tickets. They flew across the country to meet with national 
officials, followed by meetings with regional and state officials to negotiate a 
good faith resolution to the issues of water/litter in the desert. And all the while, 
they used the media as an amplifier to circulate their humanitarian and human 
rights discourse. At the end of the 10 weeks, there is some evidence that their 
discourse has disarticulated some of the well-worn discourses surrounding the 
immigration debate, namely racist and xenophobic discourses. While the 
overwhelming majority of online posts to NMD news stories used racist and 
xenophobic discourses, there were some that deployed humanitarian and human 
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rights ones. Also, the editors of the Arizona Daily Star inserted NMD’s alternative 
discourse into the immigration and border enforcement debate, and the support 
letters from the Center for Biological Diversity and the Sierra Club show that 
those organizations have adopted and will most likely circulate a humanitarian 
and human rights discourse to its members. After Staton’s sentencing there is 
local as well as national media coverage, providing NMD with the opportunity to 
circulate a humanitarian and human rights discourse that challenges a racist and 
xenophobic one. 
After	  the	  Sentencing	  	   After	  Judge	  Guerin	  sentenced	  Staton	  to	  one-year of unsupervised 
probation, 300 hours of community service, and a one-year ban from BANWR, 
NMD volunteers were inundated with phone calls and emails from local and 
national media outlets. The	  story	  of	  Staton’s	  trial	  and	  sentencing	  ran	  in	  the	  
Arizona	  Daily	  Star,	  the	  Associate	  Press,	  the	  LA	  Times,	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  and	  on	  CNN.	  NMD	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  media	  blitz	  to	  circulate	  their	  humanitarian	  and	  human	  rights	  discourse.	  The	  LA	  Times	  interviewed	  Danielle	  Alvarado,	  a	  NMD	  volunteer,	  who	  said,	  “It’s	  a	  human	  rights	  issue,	  from	  our	  perspective.	  We	  have	  people	  crossing	  and	  dying	  in	  our	  desert”	  and	  Staton	  who	  argued,	  “I	  wanted	  to	  make	  a	  point	  that	  humanitarianism	  is	  not	  a	  crime,	  and	  water’s	  not	  littering”	  (Powers).	  CNN	  reported	  that	  “Although	  the	  case	  involved	  only	  a	  misdemeanor	  charge,	  both	  sides	  used	  the	  divisive	  issue	  of	  illegal	  immigration	  in	  their	  arguments;	  Staton’s	  lawyer	  argued	  that	  Staton’s	  actions	  were	  humanitarian,	  but	  the	  government	  said	  otherwise”	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(Gandossy).	  The	  editorial	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  however,	  took	  a	  different	  approach.	  It	  argued	  that	  littering	  in	  the	  desert	  does	  not	  begin	  to	  capture	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  border	  enforcement	  in	  the	  southern	  Arizona	  desert	  and	  that	  littering	  (and	  deaths)	  along	  the	  border	  is	  not	  the	  fault	  of	  Staton	  but	  that	  of	  the	  state:	  Plastic	  litter	  is	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  environment,	  but	  so	  is	  the	  strategically	  dubious	  border	  fence,	  which	  disrupts	  migration	  and	  feeding	  for	  rare	  and	  endangered	  animals	  along	  hundreds	  of	  miles	  of	  remote	  wilderness.	  [...]	  When	  the	  government	  cracks	  down	  on	  illegal	  crossings	  while	  refusing	  to	  establish	  a	  safe,	  sane	  alternative,	  funneling	  people	  into	  the	  remotest	  stretches	  of	  a	  burning	  desert,	  it	  shares	  responsibility	  for	  the	  awful	  results.	  One	  of	  those	  results	  is	  plastic	  bottles.	  Another	  is	  corpses.	  (“Water”)	  The	  media	  attention	  generated	  by	  NMD’s	  strategic	  and	  rhetorical	  actions	  permitted	  their	  alternative	  discourse	  to	  circulate	  and	  compete	  with	  the	  commonplace	  immigration	  discourse	  on	  a	  national	  scale.	  	   The	  article	  that	  generated	  the	  most	  responses	  was	  by	  conservative	  blogger	  Debbie	  Schlussel.	  The	  blog	  entry	  on	  her	  website,	  complete	  with	  a	  YouTube	  clip	  of	  local	  TV	  station	  KOLD’s	  news	  coverage	  of	  Staton’s	  sentencing,	  was	  entitled	  “Walt	  Staton	  Gets	  (Almost)	  What	  He	  Deserves	  for	  Helping	  Illegal	  Aliens.”	  It	  garnered	  57	  responses	  from	  local	  publics.	  Schlussel	  in	  the	  brief	  blog	  entry	  wrote,	  “In	  my	  view,	  the	  guy	  should	  have	  gotten	  jail	  time	  for	  helping	  along	  the	  alien	  invasion	  of	  America,	  and	  he	  should	  have	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received	  a	  ban	  from	  the	  refuge	  for	  far	  more	  than	  a	  year,	  perhaps	  a	  lifetime.	  [...]	  We	  need	  to	  put	  our	  foot	  down	  against	  these	  liberal	  illegal	  alien	  activists	  who	  commit	  what	  is	  tantamount	  to	  treason”	  (Schlussel).	  As	  expected,	  many	  of	  her	  respondents	  engaged	  in	  a	  similar	  discourse,	  using	  ideographs	  such	  as	  <illegal	  invaders/invasion>	  (six	  times),	  <liberal/commie/do-­‐gooder/bleeding	  heart>	  (six	  times)	  and	  <treason>	  (once).	  In	  addition,	  the	  ideograph	  <illegal	  aliens/illegal	  immigrants/illegals>	  was	  used	  fifteen	  times,	  the	  phrase	  “it’s	  the	  immigrant’s	  fault/it’s	  their	  choice	  to	  cross”	  was	  used	  four	  times,	  and	  the	  ideograph	  <terrorist>	  was	  used	  three	  times.	  One	  respondent	  though	  seemed	  to	  capture	  the	  attention	  of	  many	  of	  the	  other	  respondents	  with	  his	  unapologetic	  racist	  and	  xenophobic	  post:	  As	  I	  have	  told	  many	  people,	  this	  illegal	  alien	  invasion	  of	  our	  country	  is	  unacceptable	  and	  should	  be	  enforced	  ruthlessly.	  What	  I	  advocate	  on	  the	  U.S.	  Mexico	  border	  is	  land	  mines	  and	  automated	  machine	  guns.	  Anything	  that	  crosses	  our	  border	  triggers	  a	  motion	  sensor	  and	  sprays	  it	  with	  a	  few	  hundred	  rounds.	  [...]	  Border	  problem	  solved,	  and	  our	  problem	  with	  drug	  smugglers,	  terrorists	  and	  law	  breaking	  South	  Americans	  would	  be	  taken	  care	  of.	  (“Jarhead”	  qtd	  in	  Schlussel)	  Jarhead’s	  post	  was	  the	  second	  of	  the	  online	  discussion,	  and	  the	  one	  immediately	  after	  his	  was	  from	  “goldenmike4393”	  who	  wrote,	  “Jarhead:	  Your	  plan	  is	  an	  effective	  one.	  I	  support	  you	  100%.”	  	   The	  extremely	  racist,	  xenophobic,	  and	  violent	  rhetoric	  is	  alarming	  but	  not	  new.	  However,	  what	  does	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  is	  how	  many	  respondents	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“called	  out”	  Jarhead	  and	  denounced	  his	  and	  others	  rhetoric.	  Eight	  weeks	  earlier,	  in	  the	  134	  posts	  after	  Gerber’s	  Arizona	  Daily	  Star	  article,	  only	  one	  respondent	  denounced	  such	  rhetoric;	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  either	  ignored	  or	  repeatedly	  praised	  it.	  But	  not	  this	  time.	  Thirteen	  different	  posts	  used	  a	  humanitarian	  and	  human	  rights	  discourse	  and	  eight	  times	  respondents	  directly	  denounced	  the	  racist	  and	  xenophobic	  rhetoric.	  	   “Joe	  Unger”	  wrote,	  “Yes,	  ‘Jarhead’	  is	  a	  horrible	  human	  being.	  Obviously	  a	  racist	  too.	  He	  claims	  to	  be	  against	  illegal	  immigration	  but	  he	  only	  wants	  land	  mines	  and	  machine	  guns	  on	  the	  Mexican	  border.	  What	  about	  the	  Canadian	  border?”	  “Mike”	  wrote,	  “Are	  you	  guys	  on	  crack?	  These	  are	  humans	  we’re	  talking	  about.”	  “John	  Swinburn”	  wrote,	  “[Staton]	  deserves	  accolades	  for	  his	  humanitarian	  actions,	  not	  punishment	  by	  an	  unforgiving	  government	  gone	  haywire.”	  “John”	  wrote,	  “Do	  you	  think	  if	  he	  stops	  leaving	  water	  in	  the	  desert	  for	  dying	  human	  beings	  (coincidently	  not	  white	  human	  beings	  of	  course)	  that	  less	  will	  cross	  or	  less	  will	  survive	  crossing?”	  “Gerald	  Scarfe	  Fan”	  wrote,	  “This	  article	  is	  a	  wonderful	  example	  of	  compassionate	  conservatism	  at	  work.	  ‘Let	  us	  squash	  like	  bugs	  all	  people	  trying	  to	  stop	  hundreds	  of	  deaths	  that	  occur	  each	  year	  because	  we	  have	  to	  maintain	  our	  xenophobia.’	  Yeah,	  that’ll	  teach	  him.”	  Gerald	  Scarfe	  Fan	  in	  another	  post	  wrote	  directly	  to	  Jarhead,	  “You	  have	  sacrificed	  your	  rationality	  and	  your	  empathy	  on	  the	  altar	  of	  xenophobia	  and	  scapegoating.	  [...]	  [You	  think]	  it’s	  those	  brown	  persons!	  How	  dare	  those	  brown	  persons!	  *spray	  bullets	  into	  air	  madly*	  Kill	  some	  brown	  persons,	  that’ll	  solve	  everything!”	  For	  a	  conservative	  blog	  to	  have	  so	  many	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posts	  using	  a	  humanitarian	  and	  human	  rights	  discourse	  and	  critiquing	  and	  condemning	  the	  normative	  discourse	  was	  significant	  and	  noteworthy.	  	   Jarhead	  eventually	  responded	  to	  these	  racist	  and	  xenophobic	  accusations	  later	  in	  the	  discussion.	  He	  wrote,	  “So	  now	  I	  am	  a	  racist	  because	  I	  want	  to	  keep	  illegals	  out	  of	  the	  U.S.?	  [...]	  Sounds	  like	  liberal	  talking	  points	  to	  call	  people	  racists	  because	  they	  oppose	  illegal	  immigration.”	  He	  then	  responded	  to	  those	  who	  did	  not	  find	  his	  resolution	  “logical.”	  “[M]y	  solution	  is	  very	  logical.	  Once	  a	  few	  illegals	  get	  blown	  away	  on	  U.S.	  territory,	  they	  will	  think	  twice	  before	  entering	  the	  U.S.	  illegally.	  I	  am	  actually	  saving	  lives	  by	  keeping	  these	  illegals	  from	  crossing	  into	  sovereign	  U.S.	  territory.”	  Jarhead	  concluded	  by	  writing	  directly	  to	  his	  critics,	  “Do	  you	  like	  supporting	  through	  your	  hard	  earned	  tax	  dollars	  these	  menaces	  to	  our	  society?	  Do	  you	  want	  to	  enable	  terrorists	  to	  come	  into	  our	  country,	  perhaps	  with	  nuclear,	  biological	  or	  chemical	  weapons?	  Wake	  up	  America!	  We	  are	  at	  war,	  or	  at	  least	  should	  be,	  with	  these	  illegal	  aliens.”	  	   Jarhead	  frames	  the	  crisis	  on	  the	  border	  in	  terms	  of	  warfare,	  complete	  with	  enemy	  invaders,	  who	  threaten	  Americans	  with	  weapons,	  who	  need	  to	  be	  stopped	  and	  deterred	  with	  violence.	  A	  humanitarian	  discourse	  works	  precisely	  to	  reconstruct	  this	  frame,	  disarticulate	  the	  racist,	  xenophobic,	  and	  sometimes	  violent	  discourse,	  and	  replace	  it	  with	  one	  that	  emphasizes	  human	  rights.	  Some	  respondents	  maintained	  their	  disapproval	  of	  “illegal	  immigration”	  while	  emphasizing	  the	  need	  for	  the	  humane	  treatment	  of	  all	  people.	  “John	  L.”	  writes,	  “[O]f	  course	  illegal	  immigration	  is	  wrong.	  But	  leaving	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water	  for	  a	  thirsty	  human	  being	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  supporting	  immigration.”	  “Luis	  from	  Mexico”	  wrote,	  “Deb,	  I	  usually	  agree	  with	  your	  opinions	  but	  not	  this	  one.	  I	  think	  this	  guy	  is	  only	  trying	  something	  very	  simple	  to	  alleviate	  the	  suffering	  of	  those	  immigrants.	  [...]	  [G]iving	  them	  some	  water	  is	  just	  a	  good	  action	  as	  they	  might	  be	  dying	  from	  dehydration	  and	  it’s	  only	  human	  to	  do	  it.	  They	  are	  humans.	  Repeat,	  illegals	  suffer	  as	  any	  of	  us	  can.”	  Luis	  continued	  in	  another	  post,	  “[Y]ou	  [cannot]	  justify	  denying	  a	  human	  being	  in	  peril	  of	  dying	  that	  most	  basic	  of	  human	  needs,	  water.	  [...]	  I	  am	  not	  advocating	  here	  that	  they	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  US	  but	  simply	  for	  the	  border	  patrol	  and	  other	  US	  officials	  to	  do	  their	  job	  and	  humanely	  get	  them	  back	  where	  they	  belong.”	  	   This	  online	  discussion	  shows	  a	  marked	  difference	  from	  the	  previous	  online	  discussions,	  and	  it	  is,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  attributed	  to	  the	  strategic	  and	  rhetorical	  actions	  of	  NMD.	  The	  efforts	  that	  NMD	  volunteers	  made	  to	  organize	  coalitions,	  conduct	  press	  conferences,	  illicit	  letters	  of	  support,	  take	  meaningful	  and	  mindful	  actions	  in	  the	  desert,	  negotiate	  with	  local	  and	  national	  officials,	  and	  use	  the	  media	  as	  an	  amplifier	  to	  circulate	  a	  humanitarian	  and	  human	  rights	  discourse	  proved	  to	  make	  a	  difference.	  More	  respondents	  were	  disarticulating	  the	  racist	  and	  xenophobic	  discourses	  and	  using	  the	  humanitarian	  and	  human	  rights	  discourses	  than	  at	  any	  time	  over	  the	  past	  10	  weeks.	  In short, NMD volunteers had a rhetorical effect as their 
humanitarian and human rights discourse circulated with publics.	  
Resisting and Resentencing 
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 On November 2, 2009, three months after leaving the courthouse, Staton 
sent a letter to Judge Guerin (Appendix D), informing her that he would no longer 
be completing his 300 hours of community service. Staton writes in the letter that 
during the trial and sentencing the state mischaracterized his actions as “civil 
disobedience.” He claims that he was not challenging US littering law or 
attempting to expose the law as unjust by deliberately breaking it. Instead, he was 
following the principle of civil initiative9. “When a government fails to respect 
and protect basic human rights—or, worse, is itself a violator—it is the 
responsibility of citizens to act in defense of those rights” (Staton Letter 1). He 
continues: “Working within the framework of civil initiative, my decision to place 
sealed gallon jugs of water along trails used by migrants to cross remote areas of 
the Sonoran desert should be understood as an attempt on my part to uphold 
international human rights law, specifically the right to life” (Staton Letter 2). In 
closing, Staton argues that because of this moral and philosophical belief, he no 
longer feels it is appropriate for him to complete the 300 hours of community 
service. Judge Guerin petitioned Staton to return to Tucson for a resentencing 
hearing. 
 On December 4, 2009, exactly one year from when Staton received the 
littering ticket on BANWR, he entered the courtroom again. This time, he asked 
Judge Guerin to modify or suspend his sentence while awaiting appeal from the 
Ninth Circuit Court. Judge Guerin rejected the request. She told Staton that if he 
no longer felt that it was appropriate for him to complete the 300 hours of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Civil initiative is the moral and legal justification of NMD’s actions as well as 
the foundation of the sanctuary movement. For further explanation, see Chapter 2. 
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community service, then he could serve double the amount of time behind bars. 
Six hundred hours equates to 25 days in prison. She quickly adjourned court by 
scheduling a probation violation hearing on December 21, 2009. 
 Shortly thereafter, on December 6, 2009, Staton sent out an email to the 
NMD coregroup listserv. He wrote: 
[...W]e again packed the courtroom and asked the judge to re-consider its 
harsh punishment for my humanitarian community service. I presented the 
judge with evidence that the United States violates international law by 
employing strategies of deterrence to enforce the border. I told her that 
another 206 bodies were recovered from the Arizona desert this year. And 
I clearly said that this is an issue of international importance. I hoped we 
could soften the court. The court fired back that it didn’t care about moral 
concerns for human rights and Magistrate Guerin denied my motion to 
postpone the community service until after the appeal. Not only was the 
court unyielding on the community service, but she added the extra threat 
of 25 days in prison if I don’t do it. It was a clear message, and I take it 
seriously from a court that readily criminalizes and punishes thousands of 
migrants each year. From what I’ve heard, we are very close to getting 
some kind of agreement with the Department of the Interior that would 
allow us to put out water without the threat of littering tickets. This is no 
small achievement, and we should count it as a victory earned through out 
perseverance. The mission of No More Deaths is to end death and 
suffering in the desert. That’s hard to do from a jail cell. I would rather 
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spend my winter break down along the border, putting out water and 
picking up trash like I’ve done in years past. So my answer to the judges’ 
[sic] offer of prison time is simple: “No, but thanks anyways.” My battle 
for human rights is not in the marble hallways of federal courts, or in the 
privately run prison in Florence, Eloy, and everywhere else along the 
border, but out among the yucca, ocotillo, and jackrabbits. (Staton “A 
Hard Decision”) 
 Staton decided not to serve prison time, but his moral and philosophical 
objection to the sentencing did not go unnoticed: The Department of Interior put 
pressure on BANWR to come to an understanding with NMD, the “Basura 13” 
(the NMD volunteers who received littering tickets on July 9, 2009) had their trial 
date set for January 2010, but then had it postponed to April 2010, and Dan 
Millis, the NMD volunteer who received the first littering ticket, received news 
that the Ninth Circuit Court would finally hear his appeal in March 2010. 
 In Chapter 5, NMD volunteers learn the results of Millis’ appeal hearing, 
BANWR’s decision to permit one-gallon jugs of water for migrants, and once and 
for all, if humanitarian aid is still never a crime.
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CHAPTER	  5 LOCATING	  THE	  OPPORTUNITIES	  WITHIN	  THE	  RESTRICTIONS:	  MAKING	  CHANGE	  IN	  POSTMODERNISM	  
While Dan Millis, a No More Deaths (NMD) volunteer who was convicted of 
littering on September 21, 2008 for leaving one-gallon jugs of water on the 
Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge (BANWR), prepared for his second 
appeal hearing on March 2, 2010, NMD volunteers met and exchanged letters 
with BANWR officials. Over six months, from July 2009 to January 2010, the 
two sides met three times and nearly reached an agreement for how to prevent 
deaths in the desert while keeping the refuge clean. It was proposed that NMD 
volunteers could leave multiple one-gallon jugs of water on known migrant trails 
if the jugs were tethered together or tied to trees. That way migrants could fill up 
their own water bottles with the one-gallon jugs but could not take and discard 
them later, whereby reducing the amount of waste on the refuge. But then the 
talks stalled when BANWR officials published a map on their website, which 
showed that the refuge already had 55 “water sources.” 
 Several NMD volunteers, who were familiar with the area and were 
surprised to learn of the availability of water, printed off the map and drove to 
BANWR in search of the “water sources.” They were able to locate 26 of the sites 
and found that 22 of them were bone dry. On the map, there were 39 sites which 
were identified as stock tanks. The medical advisors that accompanied the NMD 
volunteers refused to consider those “water sources,” meant for roaming cattle 
	   	  152	  
from nearby ranches, as potable water since the tanks contained giardia, 
cryptosporidium, and cattle feces. 
 In an interview with the Arizona Daily Star, refuge manager Mike Hawkes 
said that BANWR was “doing enough” to keep undocumented immigrants safe 
and had plenty of water for migrants, including the stock tanks. “That will save 
their life. It might make them sick. It might give them kidney failure or something 
later down the road. But it will save their life for the time being until they get to a 
road or something and get rescued” (Hawkes qtd. in McCombs “Water Drops”). 
 In mid-March of 2010 Arizona state Republicans pushed for a bill in the 
state legislature that would (officially) criminalize undocumented immigrants for 
their immigration status. Instead of deporting them for entering the United States 
without authorization, undocumented immigrants would be arrested for 
trespassing, a misdemeanor in Arizona punishable up to six months in jail 
(“Targeting”). The bill would allow police officers throughout the state to arrest 
anyone they deemed “suspicious,” i.e. lacked immigration papers. 
 A political firestorm raged across the state, with opponents suggesting that 
the bill would legalize racial profiling—arrests would be made solely on “skin 
color and accent” (“Targeting”)—and with a large population of Latinos living in 
Arizona, many “legal” US citizens would be harassed. Supporters of the bill 
suggested that the federal government had failed to deter and keep out 
undocumented immigrants from the state and thus, something needed to be done. 
On April 23, 2010, the controversial bill SB1070 passed. Protests erupted all over 
the state. Amidst the politically charged climate, the Basura 13 (thirteen NMD 
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volunteers who received littering tickets for leaving one-gallon jugs of water on 
BANWR on July 9, 2009) had their trial, which was already postponed to April 6, 
2010, postponed again, indefinitely. Also, negotiations with BANWR came to a 
halt. 
 BANWR officials seized the moment to issue a press release on their 
website, in local newspapers, libraries and post offices, asking local citizens to 
determine “whether placement of water stations by humanitarian organizations on 
the Refuge will materially interfere with or detract from the fulfillment of the 
National Wildlife Refuge System mission” (Hoffman). BANWR ran what is 
called a “compatibility determination” and asked for public review. Throughout 
the highly combative month of April, letters and emails poured in. BANWR 
received over 1,100 comments from 811 people (McCombs “US”), 360 of which 
were a form letter created my NMD that suggested the one-gallon jugs of water 
placed strategically on migrant trails were necessary and life-saving (Hoffman). 
BANWR officials promised to review the comments and reach a conclusion by 
the end of the summer. 
 On September 2, 2010, Dan Millis received word that his littering 
conviction had been overturned. In a vote of 2-1 the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that it was “ambiguous as to whether purified water in a sealed 
bottle intended for human consumption meets the definition of ‘garbage’” 
(Lacey). The successful appeal was a huge victory for NMD volunteers, 
validating their claim that clean water within the context of the Arizona desert is 
life-saving and not garbage. But the court’s decision over the definition of 
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garbage was so limited that if someone else left one-gallon jugs of water for 
migrants in the desert she or he might still be convicted of littering (Cohen). 
Millis was accused of the “disposing of garbage,” but had he been accused of 
“abandonment of property” he might not have won the appeal. 
 Two days later, on September 4, 2010, BANWR officials finally released 
the results of their compatibility determination. They decided that permitting 55-
gallon drums of water to be placed near designated roads was compatible with 
their mission. The humanitarian group Humane Borders was granted permission 
by the refuge in 2001 to place three such drums but had not been allowed to place 
anymore since. The one-gallon jugs that NMD volunteers strategically placed 
along migrant trails were rejected. BANWR officials said that the jugs even if 
tethered together or tied to a tree could still be cut, carried, and discarded later. 
And, they argued that putting water on remote migrant trials “may actually 
promote passage through the refuge” (McCombs “US”). 
 William Walker, who defended Staton as well as Millis, contacted Staton. 
Because of Millis’ successful appeal, Staton and the Basura 13’s littering charges 
could be dropped. On January 11, 2011, 25 months after receiving a littering 
ticket for leaving humanitarian aid for migrants on BANWR, Staton’s charges 
were “vacated.” He sent an email to the NMD Coregroup listserv thanking 
everyone for their support and encouraging them to continue providing life-saving 
humanitarian aid. In closing he wrote: 
Even though these littering tickets provided a good opportunity to bring 
more attention to the crazyness (sic) taking place at the border, I’m glad to 
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be done with it. I’m aware that we’re still being threatened by BANWR—
they want to use other laws, like abandonment of property, to mess with 
humanitarian efforts. I’m far more interested in continuing our efforts to 
make sure people are not treated like garbage, and that there’s not a 
complete abandonment of human rights on the border. (Staton) 
 The struggle for social justice on the border is on-going. The racist and 
xenophobic law passed by the Arizona state legislature was later blocked by a 
federal judge. BANWR officials have yet to allow Humane Borders to place a 
new 55-gallon drum on the refuge. US Fish and Wildlife officers continue to 
threaten humanitarians with abandonment of property littering tickets. But at least 
for now, humanitarian aid is and continues to be not a crime. 
 This study has focused on several areas important to the field of rhetorical 
studies: postmodern rhetorical agency, publics and counterpublics, the rhetorical 
situation, and rhetorical effect. In this final chapter, I summarize the most 
significant points from this study, examine possible contributions to the field, and 
propose new areas of inquiry that would help develop a better understanding of 
postmodern rhetorical agency. 
The Power of Rhetoric 
 The first significant point from this research comes in Chapter 1 when I 
explore the rhetoric of the word “illegal” within the context of US immigration. 
The word “illegal” on its own connotes “criminal activity,” and when applied to 
the word “immigrant” suggests that a person, an “illegal” immigrant, is a 
criminal. However, an “illegal” immigrant has not committed a crime. He or she 
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can be deported for not being authorized to immigrate into the United States and 
not having the proper immigration documentation as proof of authorization, but 
he or she cannot be arrested for a crime solely on immigration status. SB1070 
made living in Arizona without immigration documentation a misdemeanor but 
was later blocked in federal court. Nevertheless, the rhetorical marker “illegal” 
implies criminality, and regardless of the law, “illegal” immigrants are treated like 
criminals. 
 In Chapter 1, I analyze the complex history of the “illegal” immigrant. For 
nearly 150 years, it was not “illegal” to enter the United States without 
documentation, but with the passage of key immigration laws in 1917, 1921, and 
1924 and the crash of the US economy in 1929, entering the US from Mexico 
without authorization became “illegal.” However, once the US became involved 
in World War II and white, native-born US citizens left the country to fight 
overseas, there was a need for temporary laborers. In 1942, Congress created the 
Bracero Program where growers could import temporary laborers from Mexico 
“legally” to fill the labor shortage. The “braceros” signed a contract that 
guaranteed work, minimum wage, transportation, and housing but also required 
that once the growing season was over that they immediately return to Mexico. 
The United States and Mexico both economically benefited from the Bracero 
Program, the former receiving cheap labor, the later receiving millions in 
remittences.  
 In addition to US laborers being redirected to the war effort, so were US 
goods. The redirection opened a space for imports, and again, the US turned to 
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Mexico. The Mexican government launched a large-scale agricultural operation, 
aimed directly at the US for export, and sparked the “Green Revolution,” which 
resulted in the “Mexican Miracle,” where the Mexican economy grew by six 
percent every year for twenty years. While seemingly successful for the Mexican 
government, the Green Revolution had devastating effects on small farmers. They 
could not compete with the state-run operations, went bankrupt, and flooded the 
urban centers for work. Once the cities were saturated, these poor and desperate 
farmers had no other choice but to sign-up for the Bracero Program, taking them 
hundreds of miles away from their families, for months at a time, to perform 
backbreaking labor. 
 This set of circumstances, the US’s need for cheap labor and cheap goods 
and Mexico’s desire to meet those demands for quick economic gain, 
manufactured a poor, desperate population that was willing to work any job, 
anywhere, for any amount of money. Their labor generated easy capital for the 
US and Mexico, and both countries wanted to maintain this strong source of 
revenue, so they worked to maintain the conditions that produced this desperate 
population over time. The problem was that circumstances changed. Wars ended. 
Needs shifted. But both countries were determined to sustain the conditions that 
produced the desperate poor.  By the end of 1950s, the majority of the US 
agricultural workforce were braceros, yet for the first time, many of the poor and 
desperate who applied in Mexico for the program were turned away. There were 
simply not enough positions. However, they were still desperate, still in need of 
work and so decided to cross the border anyway, on their own, without 
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authorization or documentation from the Bracero Program. They were “illegal” 
immigrants. 
 The “legal” system that manufactured the desperate poor for the US and 
Mexico’s economic gain produced “illegal” immigrants. And once “illegal” 
immigrants entered the United States “illegally,” they were welcomed by growers. 
Unlike braceros, growers were not obliged to uphold any contract for “illegal” 
immigrants, did not have to pay a set wage, did not have to pay for transportation 
or housing. Growers could pay “illegal” immigrants as little as laborers would 
accept and could fire them (deport them) at any time. Often times, the mere threat 
of deportation could generate higher production for less pay. The drop in pay 
lowered the wage for all laborers and increased the profits of growers. The United 
States benefited from the profits and Mexico continued to benefit from the 
remittances. However, unlike braceros who were required to leave after the 
growing season, “illegal” immigrants stayed, brought their family and supported 
them by working other odd-jobs throughout the year.  
 After the Bracero Program officially ended in 1964, the US and Mexican 
governments still continued to maintain the conditions that produced the desperate 
poor. Mexico launched the Border Industrialization Program in 1965, which 
permitted the construction of maquiladoras, assembly plants run by US 
companies but employed by Mexicans on the Mexican side of the border. US 
companies could import materials, supplies, and machines duty-free, have goods 
assembled for 75 percent less of the labor costs, and then ship the finished product 
back into the US for a nominal fee to sell in the US market for a huge profit. 
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Initially, both sides again profited greatly, but throughout the 70s and 80s wages 
for Mexican workers’ wages began to drop. Heads of households could no longer 
support their families on such plummeting wages, so in turn traveled north, 
“illegally,” desperate for higher paying jobs. Then, with the passage of NAFTA in 
1994, when the US fruits and vegetables market opened its doors to Mexico, 
while Mexico permitted US grain imports into its grain market, over a million 
small farmers in Mexico went bankrupt. Without anywhere else to turn, just like 
the bankrupted farmers during the 1950s, they migrated north, “illegally,” 
desperate for work.  
 Maintaining the conditions for the production of the desperate poor was 
two-fold. First, the US needed to attract cheap labor, so it created a situation with 
the help of Mexico so restrictive and that the only seemingly reasonable option 
would be for the desperate to migrate north. Second, the US needed a mechanism 
to limit labor in order not to saturate the market; it appropriated the “illegal” 
marker from the category of immigration to the category of labor. An “illegal” 
immigrant can be deported, and when the “illegal” marker is placed on a laborer, 
he or she too can be deported. This instant firing (deporting) without repercussion 
or fall out from unions was extremely valuable for maintaining high levels of 
capital gain. The Border Patrol was tapped, naturally, to enforce these 
deportations. During times of economic downturn the Border Patrol could “crack 
down” on “illegal” immigration. The deportation of a large labor force, cut labor 
costs and provided jobs for native-born US citizens. The rhetoric of “illegal” used 
in this way translates into high profits for the state. 
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 During the early 90s a border enforcement policy was put into place to 
severely limit “illegal” immigrants (and their cheap labor) from entering into the 
US. The policy funneled border crossers who would normally enter through 
California and Texas into the harsh geography of the Arizona desert. The “funnel 
effect” promised that the harsh conditions would deter “illegal” immigrants from 
crossing, but it did not. The desperate poor continued to cross, and the number of 
deaths in the desert continued to climb. However, despite these deaths, the 
Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations continued to maintain the policy 
without a public outcry. 
 The border is what Agamben calls a “state of exception,” where law is 
suspended and anything goes. The rhetorical marker “illegal” permits this state of 
exception. It reduces the desperate poor from Mexico to “bare life,” disposable 
laborers who are not Americans, who perform the backbreaking jobs that “no one 
else will do” for little pay, and who can be replaced easily. They are expendable. 
Moreover, the “illegal” marker constructs the desperate poor as criminals, as 
undesirables, and so if they die, succumb to the perilous conditions of the Arizona 
desert, it is without consequence. Their lives have little worth. 
 The rhetoric of “illegal” within the context of immigration in the US hides 
the truth that undocumented immigrants are humans who have been made poor 
and desperate by a 75-year-old system put into place and maintained by the 
United States and Mexico for the sake of higher profits. These humans are 
sacrificed for capital gain. The rhetoric of “illegal” is powerful and when 
corrupted and unchecked can do considerable harm and even kill. 
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People are Powerful 
 The second significant point from this research comes in Chapter 2, when 
I explore the roots and early beginnings of NMD. NMD volunteers are ordinary 
people. Their ages range from 18 to 80. They are medics and ministers, teachers 
and nurses, students and retirees, computer programmers and social workers. 
They volunteer for NMD for a variety of reasons, but the one that binds them 
together is the belief that all humans should be treated fairly and with respect and 
should not suffer and die because of immigration status. This stance on social 
justice and human rights holds a space in discourse and serves as a relation among 
strangers that draws people together, making NMD a public. Every year, hundreds 
of people traveled from all around the nation to volunteer with NMD during the 
spring and summer months. 
 The US Border Patrol is a larger state-sponsored public that ranks 
immigration status as its top priority. Agents are persuaded by and reinforce the 
rhetoric of “illegal.” They act upon the notion that “illegal” immigrants are 
disposable criminals, not valued humans, who could be abandoned to the extreme 
conditions of the Arizona desert to suffer and die or should be apprehended and 
treated like criminals to deter them from crossing again. The Border Patrol is 
well-funded and supported heavily by both political parties. Their actions have 
been instrumental in maintaining cheap labor for high profits. Nevertheless, 
NMD, a group of ordinary people, has subverted the state through their rhetorical 
actions in two ways. 
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 One, NMD volunteers, who provide direct humanitarian aid to 
undocumented immigrants suffering in the desert, are counterhegemonic texts; 
their physical actions counter the physical enforcement of Border Patrol agents. 
Instead of abandoning border crossers to die, like the rhetoric of “illegal” permits, 
NMD volunteers attempt to keep them alive. In other words, the humanitarian 
actions of NMD volunteers make visible the effects of state power, that “illegal” 
immigrants are suffering and dying and are in need of emergency medical care. 
 Second, NMD volunteers take their experiences of encountering and 
attending to the needs of undocumented immigrants suffering in the Arizona 
desert, suffering because of destructive US immigration and border enforcement 
policies, and circulate them as narratives through NMD’s website or newsletter, 
on speaking tours at college campuses or houses of worship, or in newspapers 
online or in print as letters-to-the-editor or feature stories. These narratives have 
agency and powerful rhetorical effects because they challenge the reified 
discourse of state power. The narratives’ common theme, that “illegal” 
immigrants are not “criminals” but instead are “abused humans,” abused by the 
effects of an inhumane border policy, is an alternative to state hegemony; it 
counters the state. 
 Even though subjects are more restricted than previously thought, as per 
the postmodern critique, they can still act and effect change. NMD as a group of 
ordinary people operates as a public and a counterpublic, subverting the state with 
their physical and rhetorical actions.  
There are Opportunities for Change 
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 The third significant point from this research comes in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3. In Chapter 2, I explore Derrida’s postmodern theory that language is 
unstable, that no matter how much we attempt to keep language stable with 
definitions and meanings, it shifts. Words are imbued with differánce and 
contexts are always changing, so with each citation and iteration in a new context, 
an utterance is slightly different. 
 Nevertheless, we attempt to stabilize language by reinforcing definitions 
through each context shift. The state, for instance, has been reinforcing the 
rhetoric of “illegal” for the past 75 years. With each context shift, the state 
renegotiates the definition of “illegal” so that the system which produces the 
desperate poor continues to be maintained. In the 1950s, during the Bracero 
Program, “illegal” immigrant meant “a bracero without a contract,” but in the 
1960s it shifted to “deportable labor,” which encouraged US growers to pay 
workers at a lower wage and fire (deport) them without union oversight. In recent 
years, the system has been maintained by reinforcing that an “illegal” immigrant 
is a “criminal,” a “drug smuggler,” a “human trafficker,” or even a “terrorist.” 
However, with each one of these iterations, there is an opportunity to challenge 
and change the definition. NMD volunteers, as rhetorical agents, have been able 
to identify those opportunities and reconstruct those definitions in order to disrupt 
the state’s dominant discourse and oppressive system of death and profit. 
 During Walt Staton’s littering trial in Chapter 3, both lawyers, William 
Walker for the defense and Lawrence Lee for the state, negotiated and 
renegotiated definitions. Barbara Biesecker’s logic of articulation allowed me to 
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analyze this postmodern rhetorical situation, a site which made visible the history 
of decentered subjects and the continued production of their subjectivities. The 
subjectivities of the Border Patrol agents, US Fish and Wildlife officers and Walt 
Staton himself, were constructed and reconstructed several times by Walker and 
Lee. The credibility and ethos of these witnesses were challenged and 
strengthened numerous times. Meanings were deconstructed and reconstructed 
only to be rearticulated in new contexts. 
 For example, the definition of the one-gallon jugs of water was hotly 
contested. If the jugs were defined as litter, then Staton and NMD were 
considered to be litterers and criminals and the state as protectors of the 
environment. But if the jugs were defined as water, then Staton and NMD were 
considered to be heroes for trying to save undocumented immigrants from 
dehydration in the desert and the state as criminal for upholding such a destructive 
border enforcement policy. Since contexts are constantly changing and impacting 
how words are cited and reiterated in differánce, both lawyers tried to control the 
context of the case. Walker framed his questions within the context of a 
humanitarian crisis, where migrants were suffering, where the desert was 
unrelenting, and where death by dehydration and exposure was common. Framing 
his questions in this way cued answers which helped define the jugs as water, as 
life-saving material, and thus not litter. Lee redirected these questions, stripped 
the context of the desert away, and provided a new context, one which illustrated 
the polluted refuge that was meant for wildlife and plants. In this context, the jugs 
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were seen as plastic garbage contributing to the already trashed-filled 
environment.  
 The failure of Walker to “win” the case is not nearly as important as his 
attempt to do so. He identified the rhetorical opportunities when the state needed 
to reinforce its rhetoric. He stepped in and negotiated his (Staton and NMD’s) 
rhetorical agency with the state. He was severely restricted in his rhetorical 
ability, though. He was not allowed to call certain witnesses (other humanitarians 
who would have been able to establish the context of the crisis in the desert), not 
allowed to present certain evidence (state officials and local hunters littering on 
the refuge), and was not allowed—objected by Lee and sustained by Judge 
Guerin—to expose the true nature of this trial (to maintain the system of 
deportable labor and to penalize those who attempted to disrupt it). Yet, within 
those restriction, he still found rhetorical opportunities, a concrete example of a 
postmodern rhetorical agency. 
People Can Make Change 
 The fourth and final significant point from this research comes in Chapter 
4, when despite Staton’s guilty verdict, NMD volunteers were still able to make a 
change. I examined how the dominant discourse within the immigration debate 
was racist and xenophobic and circulated widely among local publics before (and 
immediately after) Staton’s trial. However, the rhetorical actions of NMD 
volunteers in the 10 weeks after Staton’s trial contributed to an increase of 
alternative discourses after his sentencing. NMD volunteers had this rhetorical 
effect because they made several rhetorical moves. 
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 Knowing that their rhetorical agency was restricted with Staton’s 
conviction—being marked a criminal does not generate a strong ethos—they 
created a coalition of humanitarians and faith-based citizens. NMD was able to 
circumvent the guilty verdict and appear strong, having the support of others 
credible publics. Next, they positioned BANWR to respond to the humanitarian 
crisis. In the courtroom, Walker was in a constant context tug-o-war with Lee. 
Outside the courtroom, NMD could control the context. They could define the 
issue as a humanitarian one, where water is life-saving humanitarian aid, and 
where the state-sponsored organization that restricts that life-saving aid 
(BANWR) needed to respond. Calling for a meeting with BANWR officials 
forced BANWR to act on NMD’s terms and making this call during a press 
conference held BANWR and NMD accountable for their actions. 
 NMD volunteers could have perceived the inability to establish a meeting 
with Hawkes as a failure, but they recognized an opportunity through this 
restriction. Backing up their words with actions, providing humanitarian aid on 
BANWR in July, one of the deadliest months of the year, strengthened their 
position and ethos. And Hawkes’ failure to meet with NMD created the 
perception, which circulated through the media, that NMD volunteers had no 
other choice but to act; their actions were seemingly justified. Once they acted, 
placed jugs of water in the desert, US Fish and Wildlife officers, wanting to 
maintain their position and ethos, needed to ticket the humanitarians. The 
rhetorical performance attracted the media, and the visual footage of religious 
leaders and school teachers and nurses having their water confiscated was 
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compelling, so compelling that the Secretary of the Interior asked NMD 
volunteers to meet with him in Washington DC. Not only did Hawkes publicly 
look bad, his ethos was damaged by having his boss meet with NMD volunteers 
instead of him, but NMD’s alternative discourse circulated on a national scale. 
 During this time, NMD volunteers were also able to gain letters of support 
for Staton from high-profile, credible organizations. Not only did the credibility 
of the Sierra Club and the Center for Biological Diversity help strengthen NMD’s 
ethos, but it allowed NMD’s humanitarian and human rights discourse to circulate 
through these organizations. Environmentalists who may have previously 
recognized Staton’s actions as polluting would now reconsider their position. 
Ecoconscious individuals would begin to see the border and the immigration 
debate through NMD’s humanitarian framework.  
 Warner tells us that publics are sustained through attention, and even 
though Staton’s sentence was not initially dismissed, his actions and the actions of 
other NMD volunteers garnered considerable local and national attention. 
National publications like the New York Times, the LA Times, and CNN picked up 
Staton’s story, including NMD’s alternative discourse and circulated it again on a 
large scale. That attention helped bring more people to NMD’s space in discourse. 
Thus, it was not surprising to see so many local publics utilizing a humanitarian 
and human rights discourse after Staton’s sentencing. However, as Derrida 
argues, the destabilizing forces of differánce will not keep this alternative 
discourse anchored. It must be, just like the rhetoric of “illegal,” continuously 
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reinforced, and the state will seek to disrupt it, most likely in the form of more 
littering tickets via an abandonment of property charge. 
New Areas of Inquiry 
 This study attempted to fill a gap in the rhetorical agency debate. The 
contemporary debate, which I covered extensively in Chapter 2, has revolved 
around abstractions and definitions. This study sought to provide a concrete 
example of rhetorical agency after the postmodern critique. There are many 
examples in the literature of modernist and humanist agency (Kneupper, Birdsell, 
Ling) to support and expand these respective theories but not a postmodern one. 
The example of NMD, negotiating their rhetorical agency with the state to subvert 
the state—despite restrictions in the form of resources, power, and influence—is 
compelling and worthy of rhetorical theorists’ attention. This study of postmodern 
rhetorical agency was not meant to resolve the agency debate but to move the 
discussion to a more productive space where scholars articulate theory and 
practice by examining the operation of power in tangible, complex and fluid 
rhetorical situations. 
 With any study, there are limitations. While I feel as though I have 
provided an extensive example for how agency works, how publics and 
counterpublics interact and negotiate power, I was unable to provide an in depth 
analysis of how NMD volunteers invent their rhetorical strategies, construct their 
narratives for public consumption, and circulate their counterhegemonic discourse 
through the media. I have attended meetings and volunteered for NMD for over 
two years. Yet I have been unable to attend every strategy meeting in every 
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working group. To compliment this study, which mainly documented the 
operations and effects of NMD negotiating their rhetorical agency, it would be 
appropriate and useful to the field to research NMD’s invention activities. NMD 
works by consensus. At every Monday night meeting, there are lively discussions 
with regards to strategy. While on the surface, it may seem as though the plans of 
action come about organically, the process is much more complicated. There is a 
considerable amount of negotiation of agency within the group. Articulating and 
evaluating this invention process would be difficult but worthwhile and would 
provide insight into how rhetors can better identify the opportunities within the 
restrictions of postmodernity and engage audiences at the right moments in the 
right contexts. 
 Another area I was unable to examine but wish to do so in the future deals 
with how NMD volunteers collect, craft, and circulate narratives. Since 
immigration in the US and particularly Arizona is so politically explosive, NMD 
steers clear from traditional “rational” argumentation. Instead, they tell stories. 
They don’t theorize about the border or observe the border from a distance; they 
walk through the desert and experience the gruesome, frightening, and raw 
injustices that constitute the borderlands. They then collect those experiences and 
craft them into narratives. They tell these stories of migrants suffering and 
struggling to survive to college students, the religiously inclined, and journalists. 
The rhetoric of their narratives is never overt is always compelling. The stories 
bring people in—regardless of where they stand on immigration—and challenge 
them. People listen. And those stories shift the focus from immigration status to 
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human life. Ultimately, the narratives are conversion stories; listeners are in one 
place politically before the story, hear the challenging narrative in which they 
must choose to remain in their position or undertake a new position, and are 
changed in the way they think about immigration issues. A study focusing on “the 
writing process” of these rhetorical narratives would be a rich and beneficial to 
public rhetoric scholars and compositionists who are looking for ways to make 
change in their local communities with their students. 	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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NO 	  
MORE DEATHS AND TUCSON SAMARITANS 
 
WHEREAS, hundreds of children, women and men die every 
year crossing the Arizona desert; and, 
 
WHEREAS, the United States Department of the Interior 
acknowledges that this is an extraordinary situation which 
warrants extraordinary intervention strategies which are 
designed to reduce unnecessary human suffering and death; and, 
 
WHEREAS, No More Deaths and Tucson Samaritans are 
uniquely qualified to provide food and water to persons in 
distress on shifting migrant trails; and, 
 
WHEREAS, the United States Department of the Interior, No 
More Deaths and Tucson Samaritans are committed to removing 
trash from public lands; 
 
THEREFORE, the United States Department of the Interior 
agrees that No More Deaths and Tucson Samaritans shall place 
water and food on public lands critical to human safety; and, 
 
THEREFORE, No More Deaths and Tucson Samaritans agree to 
remove no less than twice the aggregate amount of food and 
water left on public lands through an organized trash removal 
plan; and, 
 
THEREFORE, the United States Department of the Interior will 
provide a suitable receptacle and disposable bags wherein No 
More Deaths and Tucson Samaritans volunteers will place trash; 
and, 
 
THEREFORE, the United States Department of the Interior 
agrees to dismiss all pending citations against No More Deaths 
and Tucson Samaritans volunteers for activities conducted in 
association with providing food and/or water for persons in 
distress; and, 
 
THEREFORE, the United States Department of the Interior 
agrees to issue no more citations for activities conducted 
pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding; and, 
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THEREFORE, No More Deaths and Tucson Samaritans agree to 
report in writing on a quarterly basis, commencing 90 days from 
the signing of this document, the number of water bottles left 
and the number of bags of trash removed per week; and, 
 
THEREFORE, the United States Department of the Interior, No 
More Deaths and Tucson Samaritans will each designate a 
representative to serve as a point of contact for communication 
and management of this emergency effort. 
 
SIGNATURES OF AUTHORIZED PARTIES 
 
This Memorandum of Understanding is signed this _______ day 
of August, 2009 by the authorized persons whose names appear 
below. This Memorandum of Understanding shall take effect 
upon signature by authorized persons from the United States 



















For Tucson Samaritans 
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APPENDIX	  B	  LETTER	  FROM	  CENTER	  FOR	  BIOLOGICAL	  DIVERSITY	  




July 27, 2009 
 
The Honorable Jennifer Guerin 
Magistrate Judge 
United States District Court 
405 W Congress St #3180 
Tucson, AZ 85701 
 
Dear Judge Guerin, 
 
The Center for Biological Diversity is very concerned with environmental issues in the 
Arizona-Mexico border region. Over the last twenty years, we have advocated and 
litigated on behalf of various species and their borderlands habitats, including jaguar, 
cactus ferruginous pygmy owl, Sonoran pronghorn, and numerous others. 
 
The Center has been particularly alarmed in recent years at the impacts of activities in 
the borderlands related to illegal immigration. However, we see the problem of trash left 
along migrant trails to be a relatively minor problem in the grand scheme of things. The 
pernicious effects of border wall construction and other enforcement activities threaten to 
sacrifice the integrity of our precious border ecosystems for a policy that not only fails to 
solve the problem, but in fact demonstrably worsens it. Migrants continue to be pushed 
further into remote, environmentally sensitive areas such as the Buenos Aires National 
Wildlife Refuge, and enforcement activities follow, with disastrous results for border 
species and habitats. 
 
The last thing we wish to see is human rights pitted against environmental concerns in 
this matter. What is needed is a reformed policy that manages immigration from Mexico 
in an orderly and legal fashion, a policy that protects the environment as well as the lives 
of migrants. 
We support the work of humanitarian groups and determined volunteers such as Walt 
Staton who work to save human lives in the midst of the failure of the federal government 
to produce such a policy reform. We are intimately familiar with the work of No More 
Deaths, and it is our understanding that they regularly remove more discarded materials 
from the areas they patrol than they leave behind in the form of life-saving water bottles. 
 
We urge you to carefully consider the context of this situation in deciding Mr. Staton’s 
fate. Trash is ephemeral—it can be cleaned up, as No More Deaths volunteers 
demonstrate—and it really is just a small part of the damage being done to our nation’s 
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  Friday,	  July	  24,	  2009	  	  The	  Honorable	  Jennifer	  Guerin	  Magistrate	  Judge	  United	  States	  District	  Court	  405	  W	  Congress	  St	  #3180	  Tucson,	  AZ	  85701	  	  Dear	  Judge	  Guerin,	  	  As	  the	  oldest	  and	  largest	  environmental	  conservation	  organization	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Sierra	  Club	  has	  a	  particular	  interest	  in	  the	  integrity	  of	  protected	  areas	  such	  as	  the	  Buenos	  Aires	  National	  Wildlife	  Refuge.	  The	  preservation	  and	  protection	  of	  endangered	  species	  such	  as	  the	  masked	  bobwhite	  quail,	  for	  which	  the	  Refuge	  was	  founded,	  is	  of	  utmost	  importance.	  	  However,	  we	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  preserving	  imperiled	  species	  and	  the	  lands	  that	  support	  them	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  efforts	  of	  border	  humanitarian	  groups	  such	  as	  No	  More	  Deaths.	  Flooding,	  erosion,	  sedimentation,	  habitat	  loss	  and	  fragmentation	  all	  pose	  legitimate	  and	  serious	  threats	  to	  those	  species	  we	  seek	  to	  protect.	  We	  do	  not	  regard	  individuals	  leaving	  jugs	  of	  clean	  water	  as	  a	  comparable	  threat,	  or	  frankly,	  as	  much	  of	  a	  threat	  at	  all.	  	  The	  Sierra	  Club	  has	  organized	  a	  Borderlands	  Team	  on	  a	  national	  level	  that	  stays	  abreast	  of	  border	  issues.	  Tragic,	  unnecessary	  migrant	  deaths,	  as	  many	  as	  124	  of	  which	  may	  have	  occurred	  in	  Arizona’s	  borderlands	  this	  fiscal	  year	  alone,	  are	  a	  serious	  problem.	  The	  Sierra	  Club	  supports	  the	  actions	  of	  Walt	  Staton	  and	  other	  humanitarian	  groups	  who	  attempt	  to	  save	  the	  lives	  of	  undocumented	  migrants	  in	  the	  desert	  by	  leaving	  jugs	  of	  clean	  water	  at	  strategic	  locations	  along	  known	  migrant	  trails.	  They	  later	  return	  to	  check	  on	  the	  water	  and	  to	  remove	  garbage.	  These	  lifesaving	  actions	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  environmental	  integrity	  of	  the	  Buenos	  Aires	  National	  Wildlife	  Refuge,	  but	  rather	  are	  of	  benefit	  to	  it.	  	  Mr.	  Staton	  is	  a	  first-­‐time	  offender	  who	  sought	  no	  personal	  gain	  in	  his	  attempts	  to	  save	  life	  and	  remove	  trash	  from	  the	  Buenos	  Aires	  National	  Wildlife	  Refuge	  and	  surrounding	  areas.	  A	  lifelong	  Arizona	  resident,	  longtime	  humanitarian	  volunteer	  and	  former	  employee	  of	  an	  Arizona	  environmental	  conservation	  organization,	  Mr.	  Staton	  understands	  the	  environmental	  and	  humanitarian	  crisis	  facing	  our	  borderlands.	  As	  much	  leniency	  as	  possible	  would	  be	  appropriate	  when	  considering	  a	  sentence.	  	  Sincerely,	  	  Athan	  Manuel	  Director	  of	  Lands	  Protection	  Sierra	  Club	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November 2, 2009 
 
Honorable Jennifer Guerin: 
 
I am writing to inform the court that I will not be completing the 300 hours of community service 
and to request a modification in the sentence given to me on August 13, 2009. 
 
To explain my decision, I would like to provide clarification to the court about the intent of my 
actions. The court characterized my actions as “civil disobedience” at the August 
13th sentencing, and also used similar language during the proceedings of the trial. This is 
inaccurate, as civil disobedience refers to actions that intend to expose an unjust law by 
deliberately breaking that law. On December 15, 2008, I had no intention to violate the laws of the 
United States. As I testified on June 4, 2009, I do not believe the federal statue regarding littering 
is unjust, and I do not wish to challenge or change that law, as civil disobedience would suggest. 
 
Instead, my actions are better classified as “civil initiative:” When a government fails to respect 
and protect basic human rights—or, worse, is itself a violator—it is the responsibility of citizens to 
act in defense of those rights. 
 
It is my belief that the United States is currently in violation of international human rights law. In 
a petition put before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in February of 1999, the 
United States was accused of being responsible for violating Article I of the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man. “The Petitioners claim in particular that the United States has 
organized and implemented its immigration and border control policies in a way that has 
knowingly led to the deaths of immigrants seeking to enter the United States, in violation of 
Article I of the American Declaration and the principle good faith and the abuse of rights 
doctrine.”i 
 
A report released by the American Civil Liberties Union on October 1, 2009 titled “Humanitarian 
Crisis: Migrant Deaths at the U.S.-Mexico Border” outlines the development of U.S. border policy 
from Operation Gatekeeper in 1994 to its current status. They summarize the issue in the 
introduction: 
Under international law, the right to life has to be guaranteed at all times and under all 
circumstances. This right is violated not only when a life is deprived due to the arbitrary 
actions of a State, but also when actions are not taken to protect life. In enacting border 
and immigration policies, nations have the sovereign prerogative to protect their 
territorial integrity and defend their citizenry. That power, however, is restricted and 
constrained by international obligations to respect fundamental human rights. 
Unfortunately, these restraints have not precluded the U.S. government from deploying 
deadly border enforcement policies and practices that, by design and by default, lead to at 
least one death every day of a migrant crossing the border.ii 
 
An advisory opinion issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 2003 strongly 
condemned the United States’ inhumane border policy: 
The death of almost two thousand Mexican and some Central American migrants is the 
strongest evidence that the United States has violated and continues to violate human 
rights by maintaining the so-called “Operation Guardian [Gatekeeper].” This thesis is 
strengthened by the fact that a report of the United States General Accounting Office 
expressly recognized the link between “Operation Guardian” and the deaths of 
migrants.iii 
 
Working within the framework of civil initiative, my decision to place sealed gallon jugs of water 
along trails used by migrants to cross remote areas of the Sonoran desert should be understood as 
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an attempt on my part to uphold international human rights law, specifically the right to life. At 
the close of the 2008-09 fiscal year on September 30, 2009, the number of bodies recovered along 
the U.S.-Mexico border in Arizona increased, while the number of Border Patrol apprehensions 
dropped. This increase in death also occurred with an increase in agents and infrastructure along 
the border during those 12 months. The simple truth is that US border enforcement strategy 
intentionally leads to the suffering and death of migrants—a clear violation of human rights—and 
it is getting worse. 
 
In addition to the human rights perspective, I am called as a person of faith and conscience to 
participate in the humanitarian efforts of groups like No More Deaths. Our activities over the past 
six years have helped prevent the deaths of hundreds of individuals. The locations where I placed 
the jugs of water are serviced at regular intervals in order to replenish any water taken, clean up 
discarded jugs and other trash, and to continually assess the usefulness of that location. The 
evidence presented at the June trial showed that I was doing all three of these things in good faith 
and that my actions were intended to provide humanitarian assistance to individuals in the desert, 
not to “knowingly” break any laws. 
 
Given the above philosophical and moral reasons, I do not believe it is appropriate for me to 
undertake the task of completing the 300 hours of community service assigned by the court. At 
this point, I will not complete any amount of community service, nor pay any amount of fines. 
 
I invite the court to re-consider its sentence in light of the undeniable humanitarian crisis 
unfolding along the U.S.-Mexico border. My hope is to finish out my seminary education and 
become ordained as a minister to serve faith communities, which in my view is a lifelong 
commitment to community service. I also hope to see the United States change its border 
enforcement policy to, at the very least, come in compliance with fundamental human rights. I will 
continue working with humanitarian organizations until that shift in policy occurs and the death 
and suffering ends. 
 
Thank you for your time and consideration in this matter. The court’s compassion and 















ii American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties, “Humanitarian Crisis: 
Migrant Deaths at the U.S.-Mexico Border,” (October, 2009), 
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/gen/41186pub20091001.html, 7. 
 
iii Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented 
Migrants,” Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, September 17, 2003, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 18 
(2003).
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